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ABSTRACT 
 
An Analysis of the Relationship between CEO Compensation and 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Type and Quality  
by 
Nicole M. Heron 
 
Advisor: Joseph Weintrop 
 
The construct of corporate social responsibility (CSR) itself is comprised of three underlying 
components: environmental, social, and corporate governance. However, it is unclear from the 
extant literature whether and how these underlying components of CSR are related to CEO 
compensation. In the absence of a theoretical model of CSR that specifically considers its 
underlying components, I present in this paper an exploratory analysis of the relationships 
between CEO compensation and CSR disclosure type and quality. My CSR proxies are based on 
a firm’s environmental, social and corporate governance-related disclosure, as reported by 
Bloomberg. I calculate total CEO compensation as the annual change in a comprehensive 
measure of total CEO wealth. Using a sample of US firms for the period 2007 through 2014, I 
first test the relationship between overall CSR disclosure and CEO compensation, and I find no 
significant association. I then disaggregate the CSR firms by disclosure type and provide 
evidence that: (1) relative to non-CSR firms, CEO compensation is lower in firms providing only 
corporate governance-related CSR disclosures; (2) CEO compensation is higher in firms 
providing both corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosure, as compared to 
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firms providing only corporate governance-related CSR disclosure; (3) CEO compensation is 
roughly equivalent in firms providing both corporate governance-related and social-related CSR 
disclosure and in non-CSR firms; and (4) CEO compensation is higher in firms providing all 
three types of CSR disclosure, as compared to all other firms (CSR or non-CSR). I then test the 
association between CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation, and results in the CSR 
subsample analysis show a positive association between the two that is driven solely by the 
quality of the environmental-related CSR disclosures. Additional analysis is provided using a 
more common measure of compensation; these results suggest that the quality of the corporate 
governance-related CSR disclosures drives the positive association between overall CSR 
disclosure quality and CEO compensation. A detailed comparison of the two compensation 
measures highlights the importance of equity-based incentives for CSR disclosure quality. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure type and quality. The construct of CSR is itself comprised of 
three distinct underlying components: environmental, social, and corporate governance. CSR 
disclosures are voluntary in the US and often published on an annual basis as a separate, 
standalone report containing nonfinancial information about a firm’s policies and practices in 
one or more of these three areas. Therefore, in order to fully understand the relationship between 
CSR disclosure and CEO compensation, it is necessary to consider how each of the three 
underlying CSR components is associated with CEO compensation. However, the majority of the 
extant literature in this area does not provide this type of analysis, so my study seeks to fill this 
void. 
The voluntary nature of CSR disclosure results in three choices for firms. First, should any 
CSR information be disclosed? Second, if so, what type(s) of CSR information should be 
included in the disclosure? Third, how much of each type of CSR information should be included 
in the disclosure? Answering the first question will clearly split firms into two groups: those that 
disclose CSR information and those that do not. Much of the CSR research to date happens on 
this level, is based on theories of why firms should engage in and disclose CSR (e.g., shareholder 
theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, institutional theory), and seeks to identify 
differences between these two groups. For example, literature has shown that CSR disclosers 
have a lower cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), better financial reporting quality (Kim 
et al. 2012), and enhanced organizational processes and performance (Eccles et al. 2014). 
Although my study will include this aspect as well (largely to provide a context for 
interpreting the rest of the analysis), the primary objective of my analysis is to explore whether 
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the different ways firms respond to the second and third questions have differing implications for 
CEO compensation. The multidimensional nature of the construct of CSR suggests that firm 
choices about what types of CSR information to disclose and how much of each type of CSR 
information to disclose are complex processes. Indeed, recent survey data by Rangan et al. 
(2015) of executives responsible for implementing CSR within their firms describes a 
“multifaceted version of CSR that runs the gamut from pure philanthropy to environmental 
sustainability to the active pursuit of shared value.” Without a theoretical model of the firm’s 
complex disclosure choice among the underlying CSR components and what to disclose for each, 
I utilize an exploratory analysis to examine these choices. Specifically, I consider what 
combinations of environmental, social and corporate governance-related CSR disclosures firms 
employ, and how these different combinations are associated with CEO compensation. I also 
examine the association between the quality of the different CSR disclosure combinations and 
CEO compensation. Any results documented in this study should be interpreted as a preliminary 
attempt to understand the connections between the underlying CSR components and CEO 
compensation, which can be expanded upon with further research in this area. 
I choose CEO compensation as the setting for this study for three reasons. One, relative to 
other areas within CSR research, less work has been done with respect to CEO compensation 
(Malik 2015). Two, the extant literature on the relationship between CSR and executive 
compensation (Riahi-Belkaoui 1992; McGuire et al. 2003; Mahoney and Thorn 2006; Mahoney 
and Thorne 2005; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Cai et al. 2011) employs a variety of settings 
with mixed results. Three, several of these studies use stylized groupings of varied CSR 
dimensions, including product, people, diversity, community, employee relations, business 
practices, international, and environment (Mahoney and Thorn 2006; Mahoney and Thorne 
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2005; Cai et al. 2011), but it is unclear how these stylized groups map to the firm-specific 
disclosure of the underlying components of CSR. Similarly, the use of CSR strengths versus 
weaknesses (McGuire et al. 2003; Mahoney and Thorn 2006; Mahoney and Thorne 2005; Cai et 
al. 2011) does not clearly map to the quality the firm-specific disclosure of CSR. 
My study differs from these in four ways. One, my sample period, 2007 through 2014, is 
consistent with the timing of the recent increase in CSR reporting in the US. The only prior study 
I am aware of which includes any part of this period in their sample is Cai et al. (2011), who use 
a longer sample period of 1996 through 2010. Two, I employ a different proxy for CSR based on 
ESG data from Bloomberg. The advantage of this data is that it provides a relatively direct 
mapping from the firm-specific CSR disclosure, as well as its underlying components, to the 
construct of CSR, allowing me to explore the potential differences in the associations between 
CSR disclosure types and CEO compensation. In addition, this data relies solely on disclosures 
that the firm itself makes, as opposed to also incorporating CSR information that is generated by 
a third party. Three, I construct a measure of CEO compensation that is intended to capture the 
total change in CEO wealth from period t-1 to period t. This measure differs from the total CEO 
compensation data in ExecuComp commonly used in empirical studies, TDC1, primarily in its 
treatment of the equity portion of compensation. I estimate the changes in fair value of the 
CEO’s entire equity portfolio (common stock, stock options, and restricted stock) from period t-1 
to period t, and include those changes in the compensation calculation for period t. I use this 
measure because prior literature suggests it is more conducive to incorporating implicit 
performance measures in compensation contracts (Antle and Smith 1985), which is likely how 
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CSR information is currently utilized for compensation contracting for the majority of firms1, 
and because the incentive effect of CSR is more relevant for long-term market-based 
compensation (Mahoney and Thorne 2005; Deckop et al. 2006), which is a nontrivial portion of 
CEO compensation. Four, my focus is to present an exploratory analysis, as opposed to a causal 
study, of the relationships between the types and quality of CSR disclosure, with a particular 
emphasis on the underlying components, and CEO compensation. 
Using a sample of 9,306 US firm-years from 2007 through 2014, I first test whether 
aggregate CSR disclosure is related to CEO compensation. The sample includes observations 
both with and without CSR information. In this first test, if a firm provides any combination of 
environmental, social and/or governance disclosure in a given year, then an indicator variable is 
used to classify it as a CSR-firm. I find no significant association between CSR and CEO 
compensation, incremental to that of the firm financial and corporate governance variables. 
I then explore the relationships between the three underlying components of CSR disclosure 
and CEO compensation. I begin by disaggregating the CSR-firms into three distinct subsamples 
based on CSR disclosure type. The first group contains firms that only include corporate 
governance-related information in their CSR disclosures. The second group contains firms that 
only include corporate governance-related and social-related information in their CSR 
disclosures. The third group contains firms that provide all three types of underlying information 
in their CSR disclosure, i.e., corporate governance-related, social-related, and environmental-
related. I also include a group for the non-CSR firms. To test whether the different CSR 
                                                 
1 Recent reports find that only between 22% (KPMG 2013) and 24% (Ceres and Sustainalytics 2014) of their sample 
firms, representing the largest 250 global firms and the largest 613 US firms, respectively, link executive 
compensation to CSR. 
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disclosure types are associated with CEO compensation, I estimate the CEO pay model three 
times, with a different reference group excluded in each iteration. 
This analysis generates the following results. First, CSR firms that only provide corporate 
governance-related disclosures earn less CEO compensation, on average, than non-CSR firms. 
Second, CSR firms that disclose both corporate governance-related and social-related 
information earn more CEO compensation, on average, than CSR firms that only provide 
corporate governance-related disclosures. Third, there is no difference in CEO compensation, on 
average, for a CSR firm that discloses both corporate governance-related and social-related 
information and a non-CSR firm. Fourth, relative to all other firms, CEO compensation is higher, 
on average, in CSR firms that provide all three types of underlying disclosure (i.e., corporate 
governance-related, social-related, and environmental-related). 
Taken together, I conclude that when examining the relationship between CEO compensation 
and CSR disclosure, it is not sufficient to simply compare compensation between the CSR firms 
and the non-CSR firms, as this will give rise to a misleading inference. Rather, it is necessary to 
consider the types of CSR disclosure being made. In this case, estimating the CEO compensation 
model without incorporating the types of CSR disclosure each firm makes suggests that average 
CEO compensation is the same for all firms, regardless of whether or not they make CSR 
disclosures. As the next part of the analysis shows, disaggregating CSR disclosure into three 
distinct groups based on disclosure type clarifies the relationships each group has with CEO 
compensation. It also reveals how for two of these groups, the association with CEO 
compensation is significant and approximately the same amount; however, because the 
parameter estimates on these two groups have the opposite sign, they effectively cancel each 
other out in the aggregate CSR disclosure analysis. This illustrates the importance of CSR 
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disclosure type with respect to CEO compensation, and how including it in the analysis serves to 
deepen the understanding of the overall relationship. 
In the second part of my study, I examine the relationship between CSR disclosure quality 
and CEO compensation. The prior set of analyses indicates that CEO compensation differs, on 
average, across firms depending on the type of CSR information they disclose. This suggests that 
the act of providing the CSR disclosure is sufficient for the CEO to realize the differential 
compensation effects; however, it says nothing about what, if any, effect the quality of the CSR 
information provided has on CEO compensation. I analyze the relationship between the quality 
of CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation in two ways. 
First, using the total sample, I replace the CSR indicator variable in the CEO pay regression 
with a continuous variable reflecting the firm’s CSR score to test whether or not the quality of 
the CSR information is associated with CEO compensation. I assign a CSR score of zero to the 
non-CSR firms, and I include an indicator variable for them in the model. I then run the CEO pay 
model three more times, each time replacing the overall CSR score with different combinations 
of the three continuous scores for the underlying components of CSR disclosure. Which of the 
underlying component scores are used in each model is based on the idea that the CSR disclosure 
process is an additive one that starts with corporate governance-related disclosure, expanding to 
include social-related disclosure, and finally increasing to include environmental-related 
disclosure. Thus, in the first of these three models, I incorporate just the corporate governance-
related CSR disclosure score, replacing all missing scores with a zero. In the second of these 
three models, I include both the corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosure 
scores, replacing all missing scores with a zero. Finally, in the last of these three models, I 
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include the corporate governance-related, social-related, and environmental-related CSR 
disclosure scores, replacing all missing scores with a zero. 
Second, I use a series of CSR subsamples that only include observations with CSR 
information. As in the total sample analysis, I first estimate a model of the relationship between 
overall CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation using the CSR score variable in the 
regression. I then estimate three more models of CEO pay, each of which uses a distinct 
subsample representing the three different types of CSR disclosure groups possible in the 
sample. The first of these three models uses a subsample of firms that only provide corporate 
governance-related CSR disclosure, the second model uses a subsample of firms that provide 
both corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosure, and the third model uses a 
subsample of firms that provides all three types of CSR disclosure. 
The results are as follows. The total sample analysis on CSR disclosure quality provides 
some evidence that non-CSR firms, on average, receive higher compensation than CSR firms but 
that the firm’s overall CSR disclosure score is positively associated with CEO compensation, 
suggesting that an improvement in the quality of the CSR disclosure (in aggregate) is associated 
with higher CEO compensation. The three models using the disclosure scores for the underlying 
CSR components provide some evidence supporting a positive association between CEO 
compensation and both corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosure quality. 
Two important points about the total sample analysis, though, are that it does not jointly account 
for CSR disclosure type and quality, and that the number of missing score values that are 
replaced with zeros, in particular for the environmental score, potentially weakens the power of 
the tests. The CSR subsample analysis is employed to address these concerns, and these tests 
provide similar results for the relationship between the overall CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
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compensation as in the total sample analysis. Furthermore, when each distinct CSR disclosure 
group is used to test for the quality of the types of disclosures that particular group provides, only 
the third group, firms disclosing all three types of CSR information, has significant results for its 
environmental-related CSR disclosure quality. Thus, I conclude that it is the quality of the 
environmental-related CSR disclosures for firms disclosing all three types of CSR information 
that drives the overall relationship between CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation. 
As an additional analysis, I repeat the main set of tests on the relationship between CSR 
disclosure type and quality using TDC1 as the dependent variable. Although I believe the more 
comprehensive measure of CEO compensation is appropriate in my setting, I provide this 
additional analysis to facilitate comparison with other studies in this area that use the more 
common compensation measure from ExecuComp, as well as to highlight potential implications 
of differing inferences based on the choice of compensation proxy used. The results on the tests 
of CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation are largely consistent with the main analysis with 
two exceptions. When TDC1 is employed, marginally significant positive results are reported for 
the relationships between CEO compensation and both CSR disclosure (in aggregate) and firms 
disclosing both corporate governance-related and social-related disclosure, whereas both were 
insignificant in the main results. The tests on CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation in 
the total sample were also largely consistent with the main analysis. 
Finally, the additional analysis yields one key difference from the main analysis in the tests 
on CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation in the CSR subsamples. The additional 
analysis results suggest that the quality of the corporate governance-related disclosures for the 
CSR firms drives the overall association between CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation, not the environmental-related disclosure quality. These different results are due to 
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the compensation proxies used and they suggest that the equity-based incentives not captured by 
TDC1 are associated with the quality of the environmental-related CSR disclosures. To the 
degree that environmental disclosures represent policies and actions that are expected to enhance 
firm value in the long run, then the absence of the full range of the CEO’s equity incentives in 
TDC1 understates the effect of these disclosures on CEO compensation. Focusing on TDC1 
could lead the CEO of a CSR firm to spend firm resources to improve only the quality of 
corporate governance-related CSR disclosures, which might be easier in practice to accomplish 
than it would be for environmental-related CSR disclosures; however, these two CSR subsample 
analyses suggest that choice brings with it a tradeoff between higher total compensation and 
higher direct compensation (TDC1). 
My study contributes to the prior literature on CSR and CEO compensation by providing an 
exploratory analysis of the relationships between CEO compensation and underlying CSR 
disclosure types and quality. In the absence of a formal theory modelling the different types of 
CSR disclosure a firm can choose to make, this analysis is important because it provides 
evidence that different types of CSR disclosure are associated in different ways with total CEO 
compensation. It also suggests that the process of CSR disclosure is an additive one for firms, 
such that they start at a minimum level (providing only corporate governance-related 
information) and advance to the maximum level (providing all three types of CSR information). 
Finally, it shows that not all types of CSR disclosure quality are associated with CEO 
compensation, and depending on what proxy is used, different conclusions can be drawn about 
which type of CSR disclosure quality matters the most for CEO compensation. 
This area can benefit from future research. From a theoretical perspective, the development 
of a model of CSR disclosure that considers the three underlying components of CSR, their 
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relationships to each other, and their optimal use (separately or in combination), would provide a 
stronger foundation for future work to investigate CSR disclosure in many different settings. 
From an empirical perspective, even without a theory of CSR disclosure by underlying 
component, it can still be useful to revisit the results that have been documented thus far in the 
extant literature that rely on CSR disclosure at the aggregate level, and apply this same approach 
to explore which of the underlying CSR components are associated with the construct in 
question. Increased evidence about the underlying dimensions of CSR and how they relate to 
different research areas will provide insight and enhance the overall understanding of the value 
of CSR. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains the literature review and 
hypotheses development; section 3 is the research design; section 4 is the sample and descriptive 
statistics; section 5 contains the results; and section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 CSR background 
CSR disclosure in the US is voluntary2, nonfinancial in nature, and external assurance is not 
required; therefore, there tends to be variation in the content of these reports among firms. 
Typically, the material within CSR disclosures can be generally classified as ESG data. Some 
examples of content that might be in a CSR report include: the amount of and annual change in 
                                                 
2 The only CSR-related mandatory disclosure in the US pertains to conflict minerals, and it originated in Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (passed in July 2010). The SEC issued its final rule requiring the conflict minerals 
disclosures (Form SD and/or a Conflict Minerals Report) for issuers that meet the rule’s criteria on August 22, 2012. 
All conflict minerals disclosures are required to include information on a calendar year basis, regardless of the 
firm’s fiscal year, and must be filed by May 31 of the following year. The first conflict minerals disclosures were 
filed in 2014 for calendar year 2013. More specific details can be found on the SEC website: 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058 (accessed on 12/8/15).  
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greenhouse gas emissions; energy usage, recycling, and waste reduction data; employee job 
satisfaction; information on key members in the supply chain; charitable and philanthropic 
contributions within local communities; employee volunteering activities; product/process 
improvements; and promotion of skills development, diversity, and inclusion among employees3. 
Over the last decade, there has been a notable upward trend in the number of US firms making 
CSR disclosures. According to a recent KPMG (2013) global survey of corporate responsibility 
reporting, 86% of the largest US companies by revenue provide CSR disclosure in either a 
standalone or integrated report, as compared with an earlier KPMG (2005) survey, where CSR 
disclosures were provided by only 32% of the largest US companies by revenue. 
Similar to the recent growth in CSR disclosure in the US, there has also been a sizeable 
increase in socially responsible investments (SRI). As defined in the most recent US SIF 
Foundation (2014) report, these type of investments include “all labels that investors apply today 
to their strategies to consider environmental, social and corporate governance criteria to generate 
long-term competitive financial returns and positive societal impact” (p. 5). The total amount of 
socially responsible assets under management in the US is $6.57 trillion as of 2014, representing 
an increase of 929% over the twenty years that the US SIF Foundation has been measuring this 
market (US SIF Foundation 2014). With this rise of SRI, it is likely that investors are 
increasingly utilizing CSR disclosures to help tailor their investment strategies accordingly. The 
information contained within these reports can help identify a firm’s CSR-related opportunities 
and/or risks. 
                                                 
3 Appendix C contains excerpts from two CSR reports, highlighting why each company engages in CSR policies and 
disclosure in their own words, as well as some specific examples of how CSR policies are enacted within each 
company. 
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2.2 CSR disclosure and CEO compensation 
CSR reporting is a form of voluntary nonfinancial disclosure. Extant literature has examined 
other types of nonfinancial disclosure and documented their value relevance (Amir and Lev 
1996; Ittner and Larcker 1998) and usage as performance measures to enhance compensation 
contracting (Ittner et al. 1997). Each of these studies relies on a very specific industry, type of 
nonfinancial information, and/or compensation contract. For example, Amir and Lev (1996) 
document the value relevance of two nonfinancial measures, POPS (total population in licensed 
service areas) and customer penetration (ratio of subscribers to POPS), in independent cellular 
phone companies, the only industry for which these measures would be relevant. A detailed 
analysis of this industry suggests that financial reporting does not produce value relevant 
information, which Amir and Lev (1996) document; however, when the valuation model is 
updated to incorporate both financial and nonfinancial information, both types of information are 
value relevant. In a related point, Amir and Lev (1996) note that a similar pattern is evident in 
the compensation contracts of their sample firms: ten out of fourteen firms provided explicit 
details in their proxy statements about compensation drivers, of which all ten firms explicitly 
included nonfinancial measures while only four of the ten firms also explicitly included earnings 
as a driver of compensation. As they state, “A study of nonfinancial information naturally 
focuses on an industry, since such information is typically industry-specific” (Amir and Lev 
1996). In a similar manner, Ittner and Larcker (1998) test the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and future accounting performance within two industries in which they believe 
customer satisfaction is critical: a major telecommunications firm and retail bank branches of a 
large financial institution. Testing at both the individual and business unit levels yields evidence 
that customer satisfaction is related to future customer behavior and accounting performance, 
13 
providing support for the inclusion of customer satisfaction measures within compensation 
contracting (Ittner and Larcker 1998). In the third study, instead of focusing on a specific 
nonfinancial disclosure and industry, Ittner et al. (1997) study firms with compensation contracts 
that explicitly use nonfinancial performance measures. By limiting their sample to only those 
firms where the CEO’s bonus includes ex-ante explicit weights on nonfinancial performance 
measures, they provide evidence about the type of firm that, on average, is more likely to rely on 
such nonfinancial information when writing a bonus contract. 
However, CSR differs from the nonfinancial measures employed in these earlier studies in 
two ways.  One, CSR disclosures are not specific to one industry, as was the case with POPS and 
customer penetration, or certain select industries, as with customer satisfaction; rather, this type 
of disclosure is broadly applicable across all industries. Two, the nonfinancial information 
contained within a CSR disclosure is not necessarily the same from one report to the next, 
whereas the nature of POPS, customer penetration and customer satisfaction were similar from 
one disclosure to the next. Unlike these more specific measures and settings, the construct of 
CSR is broader and itself encompasses up to three dimensions, resulting in disclosures that vary 
from one firm to the next, even if they are in the same industry. One advantage of the specificity 
in each of the earlier study settings is that it allows for the relative ease of mapping the 
nonfinancial measures to firm financial, market and compensation variables. In contrast, the 
broad applicability of CSR across industries and the potential for wide variation in the content of 
this disclosure type suggest that the results from the earlier studies might not be generalizable to 
a setting such as this one. 
In spite of the challenges associated with a multidimensional construct like CSR, previous 
research has explored a number of ways in which CSR might affect firm value. Perhaps the 
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largest number of academic studies have been undertaken to examine the relationship between 
CSR and firm financial performance. Much of the early discourse on the use of CSR by 
businesses centers on the debate between those who feel it should be pursued only when it 
increases shareholder value (see e.g., Friedman 1970) versus those who feel it should be pursued 
as long as it benefits a firm’s stakeholders, even if that results in a decrease to shareholder value 
(see e.g., Freeman 1984; Clarkson 1995; Wood and Jones 1995; Carroll 1999; McWilliams and 
Siegel 2001; Handy 2002). The relationship between CSR and firm financial performance has 
been tested in many settings (e.g., see the meta-analyses by Margolis et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 
2003; and Margolis and Walsh 2003). Over 200 studies are documented across these three meta-
analyses, and although evidence is provided of all possible relationships (i.e., positive, negative 
and insignificant) between CSR and firm financial performance, each meta-analysis concludes 
that when all of the evidence is considered together, there is a positive, albeit small, relationship 
between CSR and firm financial performance (Margolis et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; and 
Margolis and Walsh 2003). 
Another channel through which CSR can provide value for a firm, as hypothesized by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), is that voluntarily providing CSR disclosure will result in a lower cost of 
equity capital. Their rationale for this is threefold: one, prior literature on the relation between 
voluntary financial disclosure and cost of capital generally documents a negative association 
between the two (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Lambert et al. 2007), which they argue can also be 
applied to value relevant nonfinancial disclosures; two, CSR can affect firm performance and 
value in other ways that financial disclosures do not; and three, some CSR activities can have an 
impact on cash flows in the near future. According to Dhaliwal et al. (2011), these three 
arguments taken together show that CSR disclosures help to reduce information asymmetry as 
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well as uncertainty about factors affecting firm value, and this, in turn, leads to a decrease in cost 
of equity capital. Using a sample of US firms, they show that those firms with a higher cost of 
capital in a given year are more likely to start disclosing CSR information the following year, 
and once that initial CSR disclosure is made, the firm’s cost of equity capital decreases in the 
following year. Furthermore, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also show that these firms who start 
disclosing CSR information exploit their subsequent reduction in cost of equity capital by issuing 
a seasoned equity offering in the first or second year after the initial CSR report.  
Kim et al. (2012) identify a third channel through which CSR can affect firm value, namely 
through financial reporting quality. In their study, Kim et al. (2012) examine the association 
between firm type, where firms are classified as either socially responsible or non-socially 
responsible, and earnings management. They predict that the (non-)socially responsible firms 
will be (less) more likely to behave responsibly with respect to their financial reporting; 
therefore, they expect these firms to engage in (more) less earnings management, thus providing 
investors (less) more transparent and reliable financial information. They find that socially 
responsible firms are less likely to manage earnings or be the subject of an SEC investigation, as 
compared to non-socially responsible firms. To better understand this finding, Kim et al. (2012) 
explore three possible CSR incentives: one, the manager is motivated by ethical concerns, two, 
the firm is concerned about its reputation, and three, the firm’s financial performance is strong 
enough to allow it to engage in CSR. After including controls for both firm financial 
performance and reputation, Kim et al. (2012) conclude that it is the ethical perspective of the 
manager that is driving the use of CSR in these firms. Although CSR disclosures contain 
nonfinancial information, these results suggest they are relevant in helping to assess a firm’s 
earnings quality, thereby making them supplementary to a firm’s financial reporting. 
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In a recent CSR review paper, Malik (2015) synthesizes the extant literature to support her 
claim that CSR can improve firm value. Among the studies she reviews, some of the potential 
benefits of CSR include improvements in employee productivity, enhanced product offerings and 
operating performance, capital market benefits, better firm reputation, M&A market benefits, 
and improved relationships between the firm and regulators, stakeholders, and other relevant 
parties (Malik 2015). 
Considering these various results together, it is clear that there are numerous channels 
through which engaging in CSR can enhance firm value, thereby suggesting that CSR and CEO 
compensation are related. Although several prior studies have examined this relationship, there 
has been less research in this area than in some of the other CSR topics; moreover, the work that 
has been done provides inconsistent results (Malik 2015). In an early study, Riahi-Belkaoui 
(1992) hypothesizes that executive compensation and social performance are positively related; 
however, he rejects that hypothesis after documenting a negative association between the two 
and concludes that the more socially responsible a firm is perceived to be, the more an 
executive’s compensation will suffer. McGuire et al. (2003) use incentive compensation 
structure as their setting to examine the relationship between corporate governance and social 
performance. They make a series of hypotheses about types of executive compensation (e.g., 
salary, bonus, long-term incentives and CEO ownership) and both strong and weak social 
performance, and provide evidence of positive associations between weak social performance 
and both salary and long-term incentives (McGuire et al. 2003). Mahoney and Thorn (2006) do a 
similar study using a Canadian setting, but they document different results. They find a positive 
relationship between stock options and total CSR, CSR strengths and CSR weaknesses, using 
both contemporaneous and lagged CSR data; however, they do not find any significant 
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associations between current CSR data and salary or bonus (Mahoney and Thorn 2006). In a 
separate study of Canadian firms, Mahoney and Thorne (2005) hypothesize and find a positive 
(negative) association between total CSR (CSR weaknesses) and long-term compensation, which 
they further show is driven by the product-related aspects of CSR (as opposed to the people-
related aspects). Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) test the relationship between a firm’s 
environmental performance and CEO pay, which they find is positive, but they find no evidence 
that this association is more pronounced in firms with environmental governance mechanisms in 
place. Finally, Cai et al. (2011) document a negative relationship between lagged CSR and both 
total and cash-based CEO pay. 
2.2.1 CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation 
A review of this prior literature on CSR and CEO compensation reveals that the relationship 
between the two is an open question. A potential explanation for the inconsistency between the 
results documented in these studies relates to differences in research designs and proxy choices. 
However, another possible cause is that the majority of the extant literature examines the 
construct of CSR at the overall level without considering the potential effects of its underlying 
components on compensation. One reason why the construct of CSR is challenging to study is 
that it is comprised of three different dimensions, specifically, environmental, social, and 
corporate governance. My first objective is to explore the relationship between the underlying 
CSR disclosure types and CEO compensation. Disaggregating CSR disclosure into different 
groups based on the types of CSR disclosure made and then considering each of these groups 
with respect to CEO compensation should yield a more nuanced analysis and understanding of 
the relationship between CSR and CEO compensation, as well as help guide future research in 
this area. 
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A number of theories exist to explain why a firm might engage in CSR. In addition to those 
already discussed (i.e., shareholder theory and stakeholder theory), management literature offers 
a large body of research into this area; legitimacy theory, institutional theory, and theory of the 
firm are some of the more commonly used. Suchman (1995) provides a review of the literature 
on organizational legitimacy theory to date as well as a clear definition, suggesting that firms 
engage in CSR in order to demonstrate their “legitimate” status as entities with respect to the 
norms, beliefs, cultures, and traditions of the society in which they operate. Campbell (2007) 
describes the institutional theory for CSR as drawing on both sociology and political science to 
develop a theory of CSR in which a firm’s socially responsible behavior is limited by the 
institutions present within its operating environment. In McWilliams and Siegel's (2001) theory 
of the firm, they propose that a firm should approach engaging in CSR like it would any other 
investment decision, incorporating the CSR demands of customers and other key stakeholders as 
well as the resources required to supply the CSR demands, and apply a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine the optimal level of CSR that results in profit maximization for the firm. All of these 
theories have one thing in common (other than their ultimate purpose): they all consider the 
construct of CSR at the overall level. Thus, in the absence of a theory that specifically considers 
the underlying components of CSR, I utilize an exploratory study to examine the relationship 
between CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation. 
Of the three components of CSR, corporate governance is the most widely researched within 
accounting literature on its own (this literature is summarized in review articles by Bushman and 
Smith (2001) and Armstrong et al. (2010)). Interest in corporate governance is not merely an 
academic matter. In the wake of the accounting scandals at the turn of this century, governance-
related regulation ensued in the US; therefore, it is not surprising to find more US firms 
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providing governance-related disclosures, especially in a post-Regulation FD and post-Sarbanes-
Oxley period. In comparison with social-related and environmental-related CSR disclosure, 
corporate governance-related disclosure is more mature and established. Descriptive evidence by 
KPMG (2008) in their international survey of CSR reporting shows that the vast majority of their 
sample firms (i.e., the Global Fortune 250 and the largest 100 companies by revenue per country 
for 22 countries) report on corporate governance, mainly driven by the publicly-traded 
companies4, while social and environmental reporting lag behind5. Holder-Webb et al. (2009) 
perform a detailed content analysis on US firms’ social and environmental disclosures, and 
provide evidence that community (i.e., part of the social-related component) is the most 
commonly disclosed CSR item with a 16.2% frequency rate; environmental disclosures, on the 
other hand, occur only 7.9% of the time in their sample. Other aspects of social-related CSR 
disclosure, such as health and safety, and diversity and human resources, are also disclosed more 
frequently than environmental issues, at 11.6% and 10.8%, respectively (Holder-Webb et al. 
2009). 
Taken together, it is evident that different disclosure patterns exist for the three underlying 
components of CSR. Corporate governance-related disclosures are the most common, while 
social-related disclosures occur less often and environmental-related disclosures are the least 
commonly used. Different choices about what combination of these three components to include 
                                                 
4 The report documents that 92% of the Global Fortune 250 firms include a code of conduct or ethics, and that 68% 
of these firms have a section specifically for corporate governance within their CSR reports. The corresponding 
results are much lower for the N100 firms (the top 100 firms by revenue for 22 countries), with only 64% disclosing 
a code of conduct or ethics, and only 42% having a separate corporate governance section in their CSR reports. A 
breakdown of the overall N100 results by country within the N100 sample firms is not provided.  
5 The report focuses on two areas in particular: supply chains and climate change disclosure. It documents that 
although 63% of the Global Fortune 250 firms disclose some data on supply chains, this is lower than the rate 
reported in the previous KPMG (2005) CSR report (68%). An even lower rate of supply chain disclosure is reported 
for the N100 firms (38%), although the breakdown among the N100 firms shows that in the US this rate is higher 
(53%). As for climate change, 57% of the Global Fortune 250 report on climate change risks while the majority of 
N100 firms (68%) do not. 
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in a CSR disclosure mean that the results will be different across firms. However, if the CSR 
disclosure is not considered with respect to the components it contains, then the potentially 
differing effects of the underlying components on CEO compensation will not be detected. By 
examining the different combinations used of the three underlying CSR components within a 
disclosure, I aim to document how each different disclosure choice is associated with CEO 
compensation. Based on the descriptive evidence and content analysis of CSR reporting 
discussed above, I expect three distinct disclosure patterns to emerge. 
First, with the nearly ubiquitous nature of corporate governance disclosure, I expect that all 
CSR firms will include corporate governance-related information, and furthermore, that some of 
these CSR firms will not provide any other types of CSR information. In other words, I expect 
that there will be a group of CSR firms that only provides corporate governance-related 
disclosure. 
Second, based on the differences in social and environmental disclosure patterns, I expect 
that more firms will make social disclosures as compared to environmental disclosures. 
However, considering my previous expectation that all CSR disclosures will include corporate 
governance-related data, I expect that the second group of CSR firms will be those that provide 
only corporate governance-related and social-related information in the disclosure. The pervasive 
nature of corporate governance-related disclosures means that I cannot examine social-related 
disclosures in isolation, as firms provide these in addition to their corporate governance-related 
disclosures. Instead, I group the CSR firms that only provide these two types of disclosure 
(social and corporate governance) in order to differentiate them from the CSR firms that only 
provide corporate governance information. 
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 Third, although environmental disclosures are utilized the least, I expect that when firms 
make these types of disclosures, they also include corporate governance-related and social-
related data in their CSR disclosure. Thus, my final group of CSR firms will include those that 
provide all three of the underlying components of CSR within their disclosures. Similar to the 
rationale for the second group, the environmental-related disclosures cannot be separately 
examined; however, like the two before it, this final group of CSR firms represents a subset that 
is unique based on the type of CSR disclosure employed within the group. 
Upon collectively considering these three groups, I interpret the CSR disclosure process to be 
an additive one, whereby firms build upon their preexisting CSR disclosure to expand it and 
include an additional component. Although possible, it is much less likely that a firm will stop 
providing a particular component of CSR disclosure after having committed to providing it in 
previous years. This notion of CSR disclosure functioning in an additive manner suggests that a 
firm begins with providing only corporate governance-related information, then expands their 
CSR disclosure to include social-related data, and finally extends the CSR disclosure to also 
include environmental-related information. This yields three distinct groups of CSR firms based 
on disclosure type (governance-related only, social- and governance-related, and environmental-, 
social- and governance-related) that can each then be tested with respect to CEO compensation. 
I begin with the first group of firms that only provide corporate governance-related CSR 
data. Prior empirical literature has generally documented a negative relationship between 
corporate governance and CEO compensation (Core et al. 1999; Bebchuk and Fried 2005; 
Armstrong et al. 2012), which is usually interpreted as evidence of excessive managerial power 
over compensation in the presence of a weakly structured board of directors and/or weak external 
monitoring forces. If corporate-governance related CSR disclosures are consistent with better 
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(worse) corporate governance, then I would expect a negative (positive) association with CEO 
compensation in these firms. Some examples of items found within corporate governance-related 
CSR disclosures include explicit connections between good corporate governance and CSR, 
descriptions of how corporate governance-related CSR can attenuate risk, details of the firm’s 
CSR structures, corruption policies, identifications of the people or groups within the firm who 
are responsible for CSR, and explanations of how the nonfinancial data is collected (KPMG 
2005; KPMG 2008). These examples are illustrative of voluntary disclosure provided to 
highlight positive aspects of a firm’s corporate governance system with respect to CSR, 
consistent with this type of disclosure being utilized by firms with better corporate governance 
structures. Thus, if firms voluntarily provide only corporate governance-related CSR disclosures, 
I expect that the CEO compensation will be lower for these firms, on average, as compared to 
firms that do not provide any CSR disclosure. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1a: CEO compensation is lower in firms that only make corporate governance-related CSR 
disclosures, ceteris paribus, as compared to those that do not. 
The second and third groups of CSR firms that include social- and environmental-related 
disclosures are of particular interest. Relative to corporate governance, there is much less 
research on these two components of CSR. In addition, the social and environmental aspects of 
CSR tend to be more broadly focused on stakeholders as opposed to corporate governance, 
which tends have a shareholder focus. Despite not having a specific theory about the various 
combinations of CSR components within each disclosure group, there is still reason to believe 
that social- and environmental-related CSR information might be associated with CEO 
compensation, incremental to that of corporate governance-related information. The increased 
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use of CSR disclosure by US firms over the last decade6, coupled with the relative maturity of 
corporate governance-related disclosure, suggests that the increased use of social- and 
environmental-related disclosures are largely the drivers of the overall increase in CSR 
disclosure. 
In addition, the social and environmental aspects of CSR are increasingly being focused on 
as areas with potential risks and/or opportunities for business. Recent reports show that social 
policies comprise the largest percentage of all shareholder proposals in 2014, and that the 
proportion of shareholder proposals related to social policies has been increasing over the last 
five to ten years7. Despite the increased demand by shareholders for companies to consider these 
types of policies, Tonello and Aguilar (2014) document that these proposals have the highest 
percentage of abstention and nonvotes, relative to all other types of shareholder proposals, which 
they conclude implies that shareholders trust that the firm’s management and board of directors 
are best suited to handle the firm’s CSR policies and practices. 
From an environmental perspective, in 2010 the SEC acknowledged the growing interest by a 
wide array of groups, including investors, companies, regulators, scientists, academics and 
journalists, in a key environmental area, climate change, and responded by issuing interpretive 
guidance about how to apply existing disclosure requirements to climate change8. Four types of 
disclosure that might be affected by this environmental topic are explicitly mentioned in the SEC 
                                                 
6 86% of the 100 largest US companies by revenue provide CSR reporting in 2013 (KPMG 2013), as compared with 
32% in 2005 (KPMG 2005). 
7 Copland and O’Keefe (2014) report that the most shareholder proposals in 2014 for the Fortune 250 firms are 
within the social policy category (48%), and that the social policy category comprised 39% of all shareholder 
proposals for the 2006-2014 period. Tonello and Aguilar (2014) document that shareholder proposals in 2014 for the 
S&P 500 and the Russell 3000 were most frequently related to social and environmental policy (43% and 38.3%, 
respectively), representing an increase of almost 10% in the Russell 3000 since 2010, when social and 
environmental policy accounted for 29.2% of all shareholder proposals. 
8 Securities and Exchange Commission. (Feb. 2, 2010). Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to 
Climate Change, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf; 75 Fed. Reg. at 6797. 
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guidance: description of business, legal proceedings, risk factors, and management’s discussion 
and analysis (MD&A)9. In an analysis of 10-Ks filed by the S&P 500 for the period 2009-2013, 
the rate of climate change disclosures grew from 45% to 59%; however, most of these 
disclosures were judged to be inadequate since they were brief, did not quantify the potential 
risks facing the firm, and contained little in the way of discussion about material issues facing 
the firm (Coburn and Cook 2014). Moreover, Coburn and Cook (2014) review the SEC response 
to its guidance in the form of comment letters issued to companies to ensure compliance, and 
document that only 45 comment letters were issued on climate change in the period 2010 – 2013 
(out of the more than 45,000 comment letters issued over the same four-year period). This view 
of the period immediately following the SEC climate change guidance highlights the 
contradiction between the stated importance of this environmental issue for creating business risk 
and/or opportunity, versus the low response from the SEC to ensure compliance with its 
guidance10. 
Combining these potential reasons for social- and environmental- disclosures to be 
incrementally associated with CEO compensation within the concept of CSR disclosure as an 
additive process (i.e., one that moves from only corporate governance disclosure to then 
incorporate both corporate governance and social disclosure, and finally to incorporate all three 
of the underlying components of CSR), and in the absence of a formal theory of specific CSR 
disclosure types, I formulate the following hypotheses stated in the null: 
H1b: There is no difference in CEO compensation in firms that make both social- and corporate 
governance-related CSR disclosures, as compared to those that only make corporate governance-
related CSR disclosures, ceteris paribus. 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Please see Appendix F for excerpts from an SEC 10-K filing and from a CDP disclosure on climate change. 
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H1c: There is no difference in CEO compensation in firms that make all three types of CSR 
disclosures, as compared to those that only make social- and corporate governance-related CSR 
disclosures, ceteris paribus. 
2.3 CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation 
 The second objective of this study is to explore the relationships between CSR disclosure 
quality and CEO compensation. The hypotheses presented in the previous section only consider 
the action of providing different combinations of CSR disclosure, and whether the act of making 
the disclosure is associated with CEO compensation. I now turn my attention to the quality of the 
different CSR disclosure types in order to consider whether they are associated with CEO 
compensation. 
Most of the prior literature on disclosure quality and compensation has focused on 
financial disclosures. In a recent review paper, Armstrong et al. (2010) identify a newly growing 
area of research that focuses on the relationship between financial reporting quality and 
executive compensation, in particular equity incentives. An early paper in this area by Nagar et 
al. (2003) hypothesizes and finds evidence that firms using stock-based incentives have higher 
quality voluntary financial disclosures, as proxied by the frequency of management earnings 
forecasts. They conclude that equity incentives are an effective tool to induce the manager to 
voluntarily disclose his private information, thus improving the alignment of disclosure 
preferences with investors, lowering the disclosure agency costs by reducing information 
asymmetry between the manager and investors, and making the stock price more informative 
through this disclosure (Nagar et al. 2003). Hui and Matsunaga (2015) document that voluntary 
financial disclosure quality is positively associated with CEO bonuses and that it is driven by 
firms with better corporate governance structures, suggesting that the board of directors finds the 
CEO’s voluntary communications to be relevant for users, representative of the CEO’s efforts, 
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and linked to improved firm value, thereby implicitly including this performance measure in the 
contract. 
The different frameworks identified in the extant literature to support the use of voluntary 
financial disclosure quality in compensation contracting can be applied to CSR disclosures as 
well. First, these disclosures represent the CEO’s effort and the voluntary disclosure of his 
private information about one or more of environmental, social, and corporate governance 
matters. Referring again to the CSR disclosure excerpts included in Appendix C, it is notable that 
both companies begin their report with a letter or statement written by the CEO laying out his 
vision for how CSR policies and practices fit in at his company. These examples are 
representative of standard practice, such that the average CSR report is expected to include at the 
outset a message from the CEO. This sets the tone for the remainder of the disclosure and 
suggests that the information that follows is precisely what the CEO wanted to share with 
stakeholders regarding his company’s CSR practices. Second, the increase in SRI to a level of 
$6.57 trillion in 2014 (US SIF Foundation 2014) implies that there is a large and growing group 
of investors who have a strong preference for CEO information about CSR issues. These 
investors in particular tend to have a long horizon and seek CSR information that will help them 
earn a long-term return; therefore, increasing the quality of CSR disclosures should result in 
more aligned disclosure preferences and less information asymmetry between the CEO and 
investors. Third, as discussed at length in section 2.2, there are numerous ways through which 
CSR disclosures affect firm value, including lower cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), 
improved financial reporting quality (Kim et al. 2012), and improved financial performance 
(Margolis et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Margolis and Walsh 2003). Taken together, it is likely 
that higher quality CSR disclosures will also be positively associated with CEO compensation. 
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On the other hand, certain aspects of CSR reporting in the US suggest that the quality 
might not be positively associated with CEO compensation. In the absence of universal CSR 
reporting standards, firms have numerous reporting framework options from which to choose; in 
addition, the content included within CSR disclosures is highly subjective. This can result in a 
lack of comparability and reliability, thus making it difficult for investors to utilize this 
information and for issuers to create meaningful reports (Park and Ravenel 2013; Park and 
Ravenel 2015). Relatedly, a CEO could employ any number of strategies to present the firm’s 
CSR activities and disclosure as something other than what they actually are. For example, he 
might engage in “greenwashing”, broadly defined as the presentation of an environmentally 
friendly image to cover up policies, products, or actions that are environmentally unfriendly (see 
Du (2015) for a summary of greenwashing definitions), a charge commonly leveled at CSR 
disclosures. A similar issue is the inclusion of only the positive aspects of CSR, as opposed to a 
balanced presentation containing both positive and negative CSR information. Holder-Webb et 
al. (2009) provide evidence of this tendency for positive CSR disclosure behavior in US firms. 
A potential countermeasure to address these issues is external verification or assurance 
for a CSR disclosure. Although this is not required, choosing to have a CSR report assured is a 
way to enhance the credibility of the information contained in it, potentially leading to increased 
user reliance on the disclosure. Voluntary assurance is also associated with a less positive overall 
tone, as compared to CSR disclosures that are not audited or reviewed (Holder-Webb et al. 
2009). However, US firms have very low rates of assurance on CSR disclosures. In their study 
on CSR report assurance spanning the three-year period ending in 2004, Simnett et al. (2009) use 
an international sample in which only 6.19% of US firms who provide CSR reports have them 
assured; although the US was the country with the third-highest number of CSR disclosures in 
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the sample, they had the lowest rate of assurance (excluding the five nations with no CSR 
assurance). This is a consistent trend over time, as shown in KPMG's (2011) global survey of 
corporate responsibility reporting, where only 13% of the 100 largest US firms by revenue 
obtained assurance for their CSR reports. The US was tied with Russia for the second lowest 
assurance rate across the 34 countries included in this report (KPMG 2011). Therefore, the 
relationship between CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation is an empirical question. 
Beginning the analysis of CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation at the aggregate 
CSR disclosure level should provide a useful context within which to better understand the 
underlying relationships between the different CSR disclosure types and CEO compensation. 
Independently considering the quality of the three underlying components of CSR should 
enhance the overall analysis by identifying any associations that might exist between each of 
them and CEO compensation, which would otherwise go undetected. Collectively considering 
the relationship between CEO compensation and both overall and disaggregated CSR disclosure 
quality should lend itself to inferences about which, if any, of the individual components drive 
the overall relationship. 
The analysis in the previous section of CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation is 
exploratory given the absence of a theory that specifically considers the disclosure of the 
underlying components of CSR. Thus, I follow a similar approach now to examine the 
relationship between the quality of CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation. This issue is 
not unique to nonfinancial disclosure; as Barth (2003) notes in her discussion of Nagar et al.'s 
(2003) paper, the authors make a series of assumptions that are not part of a formal model of 
financial disclosure quality and equity-based compensation, and as such, the conclusions might 
not be reliable. As discussed in subsection 2.2.1, the lack of specific models of the underlying 
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components of CSR with respect to CEO compensation will also make it difficult to formulate 
directional predictions about the quality of each one with respect to compensation, with the 
exception of corporate governance. H1a assumes that corporate governance-related CSR 
disclosures are made by firms with better corporate governance structure and therefore predicts 
that compensation is lower in these firms. Following from this and incorporating the above 
discussions about disclosure quality, I expect that CEO compensation will be higher in firms 
with higher quality corporate governance-related CSR disclosure, leading to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2a: Corporate governance-related CSR disclosure quality is positively associated with CEO 
compensation, ceteris paribus. 
 The combined implications of H1a and H2a are that while firms making corporate 
governance-related CSR disclosures are expected to be compensated less, on average, than non-
CSR disclosers, there is an expectation that improving the quality of the corporate governance-
related CSR disclosure will be associated with higher compensation. I expect this will be most 
salient when examined within the first group of CSR disclosers, i.e., the ones that only provide 
corporate governance-related information, since there is no other form of CSR information that 
can be relied on to improve the overall CSR disclosure quality for this group. 
As for the relationships between CEO compensation and the quality of the social- and 
environmental-related CSR disclosures, respectively, in the absence of a formal theory of either 
of these specific CSR disclosure types, and following from H1b and H1c, respectively, I 
formulate the following hypotheses stated in the null: 
H2b: Social-related CSR disclosure quality is not associated with CEO compensation, ceteris 
paribus. 
30 
H2c: Environmental-related CSR disclosure quality is not associated with CEO compensation, 
ceteris paribus. 
Although no directional predictions are made for the respective relationships between CEO 
compensation and social-related and environmental-related CSR disclosure, these two 
components have been researched the least and therefore have the most to offer in terms of 
developing a more meaningful understanding of how they relate to each other and to 
compensation. Considering the process of CSR disclosure in an additive manner, I expect, then 
that the results for H2b will be most salient among the second group of CSR disclosers, i.e., the 
ones that only provide corporate governance-related and social-related information. Similarly, I 
expect that the results for H2c will be most prominent when limited to the third group of CSR 
disclosers, i.e., only the firms who have provided all three types of CSR disclosure. 
3. Research design 
3.1 CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation 
My first objective is to test whether CEO compensation differs for firms based on the 
type of CSR disclosure a firm makes. I begin by first documenting the overall association 
between CSR disclosure and CEO compensation. This should provide a useful context within 
which to better understand the underlying relationships between the different CSR disclosure 
types and CEO compensation, as well as to help situate this study within the extant literature. I 
use a variation of the methodology in Core et al. (1999) to estimate the following model of CEO 
pay for firm i in period t using ordinary least squares regression: 
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(1) CEO Compensationi,t = α + γ1 CSR_DVi,t + β1-6Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate 
Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
 
All models used throughout this study include year and industry fixed effects, and 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level. A full explanation of 
each variable is provided in Appendix A. 
The model includes six financial variables intended to proxy for the economic 
determinants of CEO compensation. These variables include sales (SALES), the five-year 
average market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on assets (ROA), the annual stock return (RET), the 
five-year standard deviation of return on assets (StdDevROA), and the five-year standard 
deviation of the annual stock return (StdDevRET). As in Core et al. (1999), these variables 
represent firm size and complexity (SALES), the firm’s investment opportunity set (MTB), firm 
performance (ROA and RET), and firm risk factors (StdDevROA and StdDevRET); they are 
intended to capture those firm aspects that, in the absence of agency conflict, should fully 
explain CEO pay. 
The model also includes eight corporate governance variables representing characteristics 
of the board of directors’ structure (CEOisChair, BoardSize, InsideDirs, OutsideRelatedDirs, 
Over70Dirs, and BusyDirs) and the firm’s ownership structure (NonCEOInsiderStockOwn and 
OutsideBlock). Core et al. (1999) include a series of corporate governance variables in their 
model in order to test for an association between corporate governance and the level of CEO pay. 
They first estimate the CEO pay model using only the firm financial variables, and then they 
estimate it again after adding the corporate governance variables to the model. The significance 
of the majority of the corporate governance variables, combined with the increase in the adjusted 
R-squared from the first to the second model, is provided as evidence of the existence of an 
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association between corporate governance and CEO pay; furthermore, the signs of the significant 
additional variables are consistent with weak corporate governance, suggesting that there is an 
unresolved agency conflict (Core et al. 1999). I include these variables in my model in order to 
control for the firm’s corporate governance structure. Although my corporate governance 
variables are not identical to those in Core et al. (1999), I expect that the tenor of their results 
(i.e., corporate governance mechanisms play a role in CEO compensation contracting over and 
above that of the role of the firm’s fundamentals as captured by the economic determinants) will 
be evident in my sample as well. 
The main variable of interest in Model 1 is CSR_DV, an indicator variable used to proxy 
for the firm’s CSR disclosures. If the firm has provided any CSR information in a given year, 
then the indicator variable takes the value of one (otherwise, it is a zero). Extending the Core et 
al. (1999) logic, I include CSR_DV after controlling for both the economic determinants of CEO 
compensation and corporate governance to see if CSR disclosure has an incremental effect on, 
and therefore a role to play in, CEO compensation contracting before I separate CSR disclosure 
into its types. 
My first set of hypotheses (H1a – H1c) examines the relationships between the three 
types of CSR disclosure (corporate governance-related, social-related, and environmental-
related) and CEO compensation. Disaggregating the firms voluntarily disclosing CSR 
information into three distinct groups based on the type of CSR disclosure each group makes 
allows me to examine the effect that each particular disclosure type has on CEO compensation. 
Beginning with firms that only provide corporate governance-related CSR information, I 
use the following model of CEO pay to test H1a: 
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(2) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 Gov_only_DVi,t + δ2 Gov_Soc_only_DVi,t 
+ δ3 Gov_Soc_ Env_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t 
+ β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The main variable of interest in Model 2 is Gov_only_DV, an indicator variable for those firms 
that only disclose corporate governance-related CSR information in a given year. The other firms 
making CSR disclosures are represented with Gov_Soc_only_DV (firms that only make 
corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosures) and Gov_Soc_Env_DV (firms 
that disclose all three types of CSR information). My prediction in H1a is that δ1 < 0, consistent 
with CEO compensation being lower in these firms, as compared to those firms that do not 
provide any CSR disclosure. If a firm has voluntarily provided corporate governance-related 
CSR information, it suggests that this information is a signal of better corporate governance 
practices (as opposed to voluntarily providing information about poor corporate governance 
practices), and as a result, CEO compensation will be lower than a firm which does not 
voluntarily provide similar information. 
Next, I consider the case of firms that voluntarily provide both corporate governance-
related and social-related CSR information. I use the following model of CEO pay to test H1b: 
(3) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ2 Gov_Soc_only_DVi,t + δ3 Gov_Soc_ Env_DVi,t  
+ η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t 
+ β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The main variable of interest in Model 3 is Gov_Soc_only_DV, whose coefficient should capture 
the net effect on CEO compensation of providing both corporate governance-related and social-
related CSR disclosures, as compared to firms only providing corporate governance-related CSR 
disclosures. This model includes Non-CSR_DV, an indicator variable representing all of the 
firms that have no CSR disclosures. In Model 2, this was the reference group; however, since I 
am interested in H1b in testing the differential effect on CEO compensation of including social-
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related CSR disclosures in addition to corporate governance-related CSR disclosures, I change 
the reference group accordingly. Under the null hypothesis, my prediction in H1b is that δ2 = 0, 
consistent with CEO compensation being no different for firms that voluntarily disclose social-
related and corporate governance-related CSR, as compared to those that only provide corporate 
governance-related CSR disclosure. 
Finally, I consider the case of firms that voluntarily provide all three forms of CSR 
disclosure (corporate governance-related, social-related, and environmental-related). I use the 
following model of CEO pay to test H1c: 
(4) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 Gov_only_DVi,t + δ3 Gov_Soc_ Env_DVi,t  
+ η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t 
+ β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The main variable of interest in Model 4 is Gov_Soc_Env_DV, whose coefficient should capture 
the net effect on CEO compensation of providing all three types of CSR disclosure, as compared 
to firms only providing two types (corporate governance-related and social-related) of CSR 
disclosure. The reference group in this model is the Gov_Soc_only_DV firms. With this model, I 
am testing the incremental effect of including environmental-related CSR disclosures on CEO 
compensation. Under the null hypothesis, my prediction in H1c is that δ3 = 0, consistent with 
CEO compensation being no different for firms that voluntarily disclose all three forms of CSR 
disclosure, as compared to those that only provide corporate governance-related and social-
related CSR disclosure. 
 In summary, each of hypotheses H1a – H1c is being primarily tested in a different model 
(2 – 4) with a different reference group. One advantage of this research design is that it allows 
me to directly test the differential effect on CEO compensation of increasing CSR disclosure to 
include an additional component. More specifically, I directly compare the CSR firms who only 
35 
provide corporate governance-related information to the non-CSR firms in Model 2; the CSR 
firms with both social- and corporate governance-related disclosure to the CSR firms with only 
corporate governance-related disclosure in Model 3; and the CSR firms with all three types of 
disclosure to those that only provide social- and corporate governance-related CSR information 
in Model 4. 
Another advantage of this research design is that inferences can also be made about the 
two hypotheses not directly tested in a model, and the parameter estimates on the corresponding 
indicator variables can be checked for consistency. For example, Model 2 is used to test H1a; 
however, I can also examine the results on Gov_Soc_only_DV and Gov_Soc_ENV_DV for 
accuracy based on the expectations of H1b and H1c, respectively. Since the corporate 
governance-related CSR disclosures are hypothesized to be negatively associated with CEO 
compensation (H1a), and the null hypothesis of H1b predicts that social-related CSR disclosures 
are not associated with CEO compensation, then my prediction is that the net effect of both 
corporate governance-related and social-related disclosure, δ2, will be negative and 
approximately equivalent to that of δ1. Alternatively, a negative result on δ2 that is a higher or 
lower magnitude than δ1, or a positive result on δ2, would suggest that social-related CSR 
disclosure is associated with CEO compensation. Similarly, since the null hypothesis of H1c 
predicts that environmental-related CSR disclosures are not associated with CEO compensation, 
my prediction is that the net effect of all three types of CSR disclosure, δ3, will be negative and 
approximately equivalent to that of δ1. A different result for δ3 would suggest that environmental-
related disclosures are associated with CEO compensation. The same type of analysis can be 
performed on Model 3 (4) to check the accuracy of the predictions for H1a and H1c (H1b). 
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The following two subsections provide a brief discussion of: (1) the primary dependent 
variable in each model, Total CEO Compensation, and (2) the CSR-related independent 
variables. 
3.1.1 Total CEO compensation 
My primary proxy for the dependent variable, Total CEO Compensation, is calculated as 
the change in total CEO wealth with firm i from year t-1 to year t. With this proxy, I incorporate 
all publicly available sources of a CEO’s income related to his job with firm i. More specifically, 
I include the following components in my measure: salary, bonus, non-equity incentives, other 
compensation, and cash realized from stock option exercises, as well as the annual changes in the 
pension, market value of common stock holdings, fair value of the full stock options portfolio, 
and fair value of the full restricted stock portfolio. For a detailed description of this variable 
construction, as well as an example from my sample, please refer to Appendix B. 
A commonly used measure of CEO compensation is the ExecuComp variable TDC1. 
ExecuComp defines its primary compensation variable, TDC1, as total compensation in 
thousands of dollars calculated using the: 
“2006 reporting format, which is comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity 
Incentive Plan Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards, Grant-Date Fair 
Value of Stock Awards, Deferred Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation, and 
Other Compensation.” 
The common elements found in both Total CEO Compensation and TDC1 are salary, bonus, 
non-equity incentives, and other compensation. The difference between Total CEO 
Compensation and TDC1 lies primarily in the treatment of the equity-based compensation. Total 
CEO Compensation considers all of the outstanding stock options in the CEO’s portfolio at the 
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end of years t-1 and t, whereas TDC1 considers only the stock options granted to the CEO in 
year t. The same is true of each variable’s treatment of the CEO’s restricted stock holdings. In 
addition, Total CEO Compensation incorporates three components that are not found in TDC1: 
the annual changes in the CEO’s pension, the CEO’s common stock holdings at the end of years 
t-1 and t, and the cash received from the CEO’s stock option exercises in year t. Finally, TDC1 
includes deferred compensation, which is not a part of Total CEO Compensation. For a 
comparison of Total CEO Compensation and TDC1, please see the example from my sample 
provided in Appendix B. 
I construct this proxy based largely on the methodology described by Antle and Smith 
(1985), who first created a measure of total CEO compensation (which they call “current income 
equivalents”). The motivation for developing this measure was to better account for the implicit 
elements within CEO contracting that were not being captured by the explicit measures of CEO 
compensation commonly used in research at the time (Antle and Smith 1985). In a later study, 
Hall and Liebman (1998) use a similar measure, allowing them to present a more comprehensive 
picture of total CEO compensation, which is especially important given the large increase in 
stock option issuances in the 1980s and 1990s. They conclude, “that changes in CEO wealth due 
to stock and stock option revaluations are more than 50 times larger than wealth increases due to 
salary and bonus changes” (Hall and Liebman 1998). These prior studies suggest two reasons 
that this type of total compensation proxy is relevant in my setting. 
First, the use of CSR within CEO compensation contracting as a performance measure is 
still an open question. While the number and type of CSR disclosures have increased in the US 
over the last decade, descriptive evidence indicates that the majority of CEOs are not explicitly 
incentivized for their company’s CSR efforts. A 2012 report by Ceres, a non-profit organization 
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advocating for sustainability in the business world, studies 600 of the largest US firms and notes 
that 84% of firms do not tie executive compensation to CSR measures11 (Ceres and 
Sustainalytics 2012). Ceres updated their analysis in a 2014 report, and although more firms are 
now linking executive compensation to CSR (24%), the vast majority of firms (76%) still are 
not12 (Ceres and Sustainalytics 2014). Similarly, in a recent global survey on CSR, KPMG 
(2013) documents that among the world’s largest 250 companies reporting on sustainability, 
78% of these firms do not link CSR performance with compensation13. However, it is possible 
that firms are implicitly using CSR as a performance measure for CEOs and simply not 
disclosing that information14. For example, Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss how the board of 
directors will often rely on stock price as the key measure of CEO performance, while also 
utilizing the more varied information contained within financial reporting as a means to better 
understand a CEO’s performance. This type of informal contracting allows the board the 
flexibility to consider what they feel is relevant from the vast array of available financial 
reporting information, and the same can be said for their consideration of a firm’s CSR 
disclosures. Furthermore, disaggregating the CSR disclosure allows for the board to engage in a 
more detailed analysis of what actions have been taken with respect to any or all of the 
underlying components within CSR. Thus, to the extent that measuring total CEO compensation 
as the annual change in wealth does a better job at accounting for implicit contract elements, I 
                                                 
11 The executive compensation analysis appears on page 16 of the report. What I refer to in this paper as CSR is 
called ESG in this report. The acronym ESG is commonly used when referring to CSR. 
12 The executive compensation analysis appears on page 19 of the report. What I refer to in this paper as CSR is 
called sustainability performance in this report. The term sustainability is commonly used when referring to CSR. 
13 See Figure 47 on page 74 of the report for the graphic associated with CSR performance and compensation. What 
I refer to in this paper as CSR is called corporate responsibility, or CR, in this report. It is not uncommon to use the 
phrase corporate responsibility when referring to CSR. 
14 Appendix D includes excerpts from two proxy statements of companies that explicitly mention CSR with respect 
to executive compensation contracting. 
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expect this proxy will improve the tests of CSR disclosure and CEO compensation. 
Second, the trend of CEO pay being more heavily weighted with equity as opposed to 
cash has continued. Using data from 1984 through 1996, Abowd and Kaplan (1999) show that 
relative to 12 OECD countries, US CEOs receive more total pay than CEOs in any other country, 
and this is largely driven by the long-term compensation (i.e., stock options, restricted stock, 
performance shares), which grew from about 17% of total US CEO pay in 1984 to about 29% of 
total US CEO pay in 1996. Using a longer time series of CEO compensation data from 1993 
through 2008 for S&P 500 firms, Core and Guay (2010) note that because equity-based 
incentives (i.e., performance incentives) are higher for US firms and have been increasing over 
time, it is important to consider the effect of these incentives on the CEO’s overall wealth. They 
accomplish this by calculating the change in the value of the CEO’s entire equity portfolio using 
a method similar to the one I employ for my primary proxy estimation. Prior studies have 
documented that CSR will impact a CEO’s wealth through his equity-based compensation more 
than through his cash-based compensation (Mahoney and Thorne 2005; McGuire et al. 2003; 
Deckop et al. 2006). As such, including the CEO’s entire equity portfolio in the measurement of 
the compensation proxy should help to better estimate its association with CSR by incorporating 
the incentive effect related to the CEO’s equity holdings.  
Many empirical studies employ TDC1 as their proxy for CEO compensation; however, 
its treatment of the equity portion of compensation does not completely reflect the change in the 
CEO’s wealth from one year to the next. By only including the stock options and restricted stock 
awarded to a CEO in a given year, TDC1 does not fully consider the impact of the change in 
value of any outstanding stock options and/or restricted stock granted to the CEO in prior years 
but that the CEO has not yet vested in and/or exercised. As a result, the fair value of the stock 
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options and restricted stock will always be positive in TDC1. As for the CEO’s common stock 
holdings, they are not considered in the TDC1 calculation. By evaluating all of the outstanding 
stock options, restricted stock awards, and common stock holdings in the CEO’s portfolio in 
years t-1 and t, I present a more comprehensive picture of the CEO’s exposure to equity-related 
risk. In this approach, I measure the change in the fair value of the total outstanding stock 
options, restricted stock, and common stock holdings from year t-1 to year t. As a result, it 
allows for the possibility that a CEO’s stock options, restricted stock, and/or common stock 
holdings portfolio decreased in value from year t-1 to year t, even if a new grant of either/both 
stock options and/or restricted stock is made to the CEO in year t. Therefore, by construction, the 
stock options, restricted stock, and common stock holdings components of Total CEO 
Compensation, and by extension, Total CEO Compensation itself, are not necessarily always 
positive. Negative values of Total CEO Compensation represent reductions in the CEO’s overall 
wealth from one year to the next. 
3.1.2 CSR 
The construct of CSR is very complex, as shown in part by the numerous definitions 
found for it in extant literature15; therefore, it is not surprising that many different proxies have 
been employed when trying to measure CSR. Arguably, the most popular proxy used in 
empirical CSR studies to date is from the KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini) database16, 
which was one of the earliest repositories for CSR data. In 1991, KLD began by covering certain 
                                                 
15 There are at least 14 different definitions of CSR commonly cited, including but not limited to: Carroll (1979); 
Wartick and Cochran (1985); Wood (1991a); Wood (1991b); Clarkson (1995); Wood and Jones (1995); Carroll 
(1999); McWilliams and Siegel (2001); Post et al. (2002); Barnett (2007); Campbell (2007); Mackey et al. (2007); 
Benabou and Tirole (2010); and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
http://www.wbcsd.org/home.aspx. 
16 KLD, now part of MSCI, is called MSCI ESG Research; see https://www.msci.com/esg-integration. 
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social categories for the S&P 500, and expanded its coverage to the 3,000 largest US firms by 
2003; its general approach is to assess each company using a variety of sources (not limited to 
firm-specific disclosure) on a series of strengths and concerns within each one of the following 
seven qualitative categories: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and product17. Researchers tend to incorporate this data into 
empirical studies in three ways: generating one net overall measure for CSR based on 
aggregating the strengths and concerns across all seven qualitative categories; generating seven 
measures for CSR, calculated as the net of the aggregate strengths and concerns within each 
qualitative category; and generating fourteen measures for CSR, calculated as the aggregate 
strengths and aggregate concerns within each qualitative category. While KLD has been a rich 
source of CSR data, several issues have been identified with it in the literature, including its 
equal treatment of all strengths and concerns within each qualitative category for each firm and 
industry that it covers (Capelle-Blancard and Petit 2014), its use of simple zero/one indicator 
variables to document the absence/presence of each strength or concern (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), 
and the possibility that it does not map to actual CSR-related outcomes, suggesting a suboptimal 
use of publicly available data (Chatterji et al. 2009). 
In an effort to address some of these KLD critiques, my results are based on a different 
CSR proxy: the ESG score from Bloomberg. Although Bloomberg only started collecting and 
reporting on sustainability data in 2009, it now covers over 5,000 companies globally and 
collects over 700 data points per company (where available) within the ESG portion of its 
                                                 
17 KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (2006). Getting Started with KLD Stats and KLD’s Ratings Definitions. 
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terminals18. Bloomberg utilizes these data points to calculate scores for each firm based on the 
extent of their ESG disclosure. Although the exact calculation of each score is proprietary, 
Bloomberg states that they weigh each data point in terms of relative importance and that they 
make additional provisions by industry when considering the relevance of the data points. As a 
result, the end product is a continuous number as opposed to an indicator variable, all of its 
underlying data points are not treated equally, and adjustments have been made to it for data 
relevance based on industry. Overcoming some of the earlier limitations identified in the KLD 
data suggests that this measure has the potential to enhance CSR-related analysis and further our 
understanding of CSR disclosure. 
From a user perspective, E&Y notes that when Bloomberg started providing CSR data, it 
was “one of the biggest moments in the mainstreaming of sustainability reporting”19. 
Bloomberg’s ESG data easily reaches over 300,000 users daily via its terminals, and early 
tracking of its usage documents over 50 million hits in the second half of 201020. This was 
followed by another 44 million hits from November 2010 through April 2011 – with the most 
hits going to the ESG disclosure score (i.e., the basis of my CSR proxy) in both the US and the 
global markets (Eccles et al. 2011), suggesting a serious interest on the part of analysts and 
investors for CSR information. Since its inception in 2009 through 2015, the number of unique 
users querying Bloomberg for ESG data has grown more than 600%21. 
                                                 
18Appendix E provides a list of all 758 data points that Bloomberg collects within the ESG portion of its terminals, 
as of February 2016. There are 276 Environmental data points, 50 Social data points, and 432 Governance data 
points.   
19 E&Y & Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship. (2014). Value of Sustainability Reporting (EYG no. 
FQ0061) (BSC no. 1401-1183411). 
20 Tullis, Paul. (2011, April). Making the Bottom Line Green. Fast Company, (154), 36-37. 
21 Bloomberg L.P. (2016). Impact Report Update 2015. Per the graph shown on page 12 of this report, there were 
only 1,545 unique users of ESG data in 2009, and as of 2015, there are 12,078 unique users of ESG data. 
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Some caveats should be noted about my CSR proxy. One, although hundreds of data 
points are analyzed per company, it is a relatively new measure as compared with the data 
available from KLD. As such, my study is limited to a much shorter time-series than might 
otherwise be possible if a different CSR proxy were being used. Two, the Bloomberg ESG score 
is designed to capture CSR disclosure made by the firm; however, to the extent that a firm’s CSR 
disclosures are not perfectly aligned with their CSR activities, then there will be a disconnect 
between what the measure reflects versus what the company is actually doing with respect to 
CSR. Depending on which way the misalignment occurs, the ESG score could be either 
understated (less CSR disclosure than actual CSR activity) or overstated (more CSR disclosure 
than actual CSR activity). In the absence of a direct measure of CSR activity, however, I use this 
proxy of CSR disclosure and note its potential limitation, as it is a common criticism of CSR 
measures provided by third parties (such as KLD ratings). Finally, although Bloomberg does not 
use a simple 0/1 indicator for each of the data points underlying the ESG score, the proprietary 
nature of how exactly the score is calculated from these underlying data points suggests that this 
proxy is a “black box” itself. 
3.2 CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation 
3.2.1 Total sample analysis 
My second objective is to examine the relationship between CSR disclosure quality and 
CEO compensation. As in the previous set of tests, I start by first documenting the association 
between overall CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation in the total sample using the 
following modified model of CEO pay: 
(5) CEO Compensationi,t = α + γ1 CSR_Score_1i,t + η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial 
Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
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The variable of interest here is CSR_Score_1, which is a continuous number on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 100 that measures the amount of CSR disclosure a firm makes in a given year. 
Although the exact methodologies used by Bloomberg to calculate all of its CSR scores are 
proprietary, it considers the firm’s industry when assessing the relevance of each data point 
(disclosed or not). The firm’s overall CSR score is known as the ESG_Score in Bloomberg, and 
as such, higher ESG_Scores should represent firms with more relevant, and therefore higher 
quality, overall CSR disclosures. In order to test this relationship using the total sample, I have to 
replace the missing ESG_Scores for the non-CSR firms (who do not have any CSR data in 
Bloomberg). Thus, CSR_Score_1 is equal to the ESG_Score for those firms with CSR data in 
Bloomberg, and is equal to 0 for those firms without CSR data in Bloomberg. In addition, I 
control for the non-CSR firms by including Non-CSR_DV in the model. This technique is 
consistent with the treatment that Koh and Reeb (2015) suggest researchers apply when using 
R&D data as a way to deal with large quantities of missing or non-reported values when R&D 
matters in a study. Although CSR disclosure is inherently different than R&D, in my setting this 
treatment implicitly assumes that non-CSR firms have little to no CSR information to disclose; 
therefore, assigning a 0 to these firms represents the lowest-quality score they would have 
received had they disclosed little to nothing with respect to CSR. 
 After looking at the overall CSR score, I then examine which, if any, of the underlying 
scores for CSR disclosures that are corporate governance-related, social-related, and 
environmental-related are associated with CEO compensation, as in H2a – H2c. Beginning with 
H2a, I test the relationship between corporate-governance related CSR disclosure quality and 
CEO compensation in the total sample using the following model: 
(6) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 GOV_Score_1i,t + η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial 
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Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The variable of interest here is GOV_Score_1, which is a continuous number on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 100 that measures the amount of corporate-governance related CSR disclosure a firm 
makes in a given year. The firm’s corporate governance-related CSR score is known as the 
GOV_Score in Bloomberg, and as such, higher GOV_Scores should represent firms with more 
relevant, and therefore higher quality, corporate governance-related CSR disclosures. In order to 
test this relationship using the total sample, I have to replace the missing GOV_Scores for the 
non-CSR firms (who do not have any CSR data in Bloomberg). Thus, GOV_Score_1 is equal to 
the GOV_Score for those firms with CSR data in Bloomberg, and is equal to 0 for those firms 
without CSR data in Bloomberg. In addition, I control for the non-CSR firms by including Non-
CSR_DV in the model. Consistent with H2a, I predict that δ1 > 0, suggesting a positive 
association between corporate governance-related CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation. 
I then test the relationship between social-related CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation in the total sample using the following model: 
(7) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 GOV_Score_1i,t + δ2 SOC_Score_1i,t  
+ η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t 
+ β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The variable of interest here is SOC_Score_1, which is a continuous number on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 100 that measures the amount of social-related CSR disclosure a firm makes in a given 
year. The firm’s social-related CSR score is known as the SOC_Score in Bloomberg, and as 
such, higher SOC_Scores should represent firms with more relevant, and therefore higher 
quality, social-related CSR disclosures. In order to test this relationship using the total sample, I 
have to replace the missing SOC_Scores for the firms without social-related CSR data in 
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Bloomberg. Thus, SOC_Score_1 is equal to the SOC_Score for those firms with social-related 
CSR data in Bloomberg, and is equal to 0 for those firms without social-related CSR data in 
Bloomberg. In addition, I control for the non-CSR firms by including Non-CSR_DV in the 
model. Consistent with H2b, in which I expect that the quality of social-related CSR disclosures 
is not associated with CEO compensation, I predict that δ2 = 0. 
Finally, I test the relationship between environmental-related CSR disclosure quality and 
CEO compensation in the total sample using the following model: 
(8) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 GOV_Score_1i,t + δ2 SOC_Score_1i,t  
+ δ3 ENV_Score_1i,t + η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial 
Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The variable of interest here is ENV_Score_1, which is a continuous number on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 100 that measures the amount of environmental-related CSR disclosure a firm makes 
in a given year. The firm’s environmental-related CSR score is known as the ENV_Score in 
Bloomberg, and as such, higher ENV_Scores should represent firms with more relevant, and 
therefore higher quality, environmental-related CSR disclosures. In order to test this relationship 
using the total sample, I have to replace the missing ENV_Scores for the firms without 
environmental-related CSR data in Bloomberg. Thus, ENV_Score_1 is equal to the ENV_Score 
for those firms with environmental-related CSR data in Bloomberg, and is equal to 0 for those 
firms without environmental-related CSR data in Bloomberg. In addition, I control for the non-
CSR firms by including Non-CSR_DV in the model. Consistent with H2c, in which I expect that 
the quality of environmental-related CSR disclosures is not associated with CEO compensation, I 
predict that δ3 = 0. 
3.2.2 CSR subsample analysis 
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In this final part of my research design, I present a modified version of the models used in 
the previous subsection in order to test the relationships between CSR disclosure quality and 
CEO compensation within four distinct CSR subsamples. This is important because CSR 
disclosure is voluntary; therefore, the group of firms within which I expect the quality of the 
CSR disclosures to matter the most is among the firms actually making the CSR disclosures. 
From a research design perspective, this means removing the non-CSR firms from the sample 
and running the revised models on a series of subsamples that only include the firms making 
CSR disclosures. In the previous subsection where a total sample analysis is performed, the firms 
without the disclosures in each model have their missing CSR quality scores replaced with a 
zero. While it is not unreasonable to assume that a non-CSR discloser (of any type) is one that 
has no information to disclose, thereby earning a quality score of zero, it is also possible that 
non-disclosers have CSR information and either do not want to report it or do not have the 
capacity to do so. One potential consequence of using this approach is that in cases where there 
are a large number of non-CSR disclosers (of any type), the resulting distribution of the 
independent variable could end up with a large number of zero scores in it and thus be negatively 
skewed, potentially weakening the power of the tests. 
By repeating each of the analyses from the previous subsection again within a specific 
CSR subsample and using a modified model, I expect to strengthen the tests of the association 
between CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation. First, I reexamine the relationship 
between overall CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation using just firms that have CSR 
data (of any disclosure type) and the following model: 
(9) CEO Compensationi,t = α + γ1 CSR_Scorei,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t  
+ β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
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The variable of interest here is CSR_Score, which is simply the unmodified ESG_Score from 
Bloomberg, and since I am only using firms with CSR data in Bloomberg, there is no need to 
control for the non-CSR firms in this model. 
 I then repeat the testing for my second set of hypotheses (H2a – H2c). Beginning with 
H2a, I test the relationship between corporate-governance related CSR disclosure quality and 
CEO compensation in a subsample of firms that only have corporate governance-related CSR 
data in Bloomberg using the following model: 
(10) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 GOV_Scorei,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t  
+ β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The variable of interest here is GOV_Score, which is the firm’s corporate governance-related 
CSR score from Bloomberg. 
 Then I examine the relationship between social-related CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation in H2b for a subsample of firms that have both corporate governance-related and 
social-related CSR Bloomberg data in the following model: 
(11) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 GOV_Scorei,t + δ2 SOC_Scorei,t + β1-6 Financial 
Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε 
The variable of interest here is SOC_Score, which is the firm’s social-related CSR score from 
Bloomberg. 
 Finally, I test the relationship between environmental-related CSR disclosure quality and 
CEO compensation in H2c for a subsample of firms that have all three types of CSR data in 
Bloomberg using the following model: 
(12) CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 GOV_Scorei,t + δ2 SOC_Scorei,t + δ3 ENV_Scorei,t  
+ β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance 
Variablesi,t + ε 
49 
The variable of interest here is ENV_Score, which is the firm’s environmental-related CSR score 
from Bloomberg. 
 In summary, although I don’t expect the predicted results from H2a – H2c to differ in 
these CSR subsample analyses, the purpose of including them is to test the predictions in more 
powerful settings limited to just the voluntary CSR disclosing firms. 
4. Sample and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Sample selection 
 The sample is constructed of publicly-traded US firms using data from four sources. First 
I utilize Compustat and CRSP to obtain the necessary financial and stock variables. My third 
data source is MSCI, which I use for the board of director and ownership structure variables. 
Then I obtain the CEO compensation data from ExecuComp. Finally, I delete all observations in 
industries with fewer than ten observations per industry, where industry is defined as the two-
digit SIC code. There are 9,306 observations remaining and this represents the total sample, as 
detailed in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
I then obtain the CSR information from Bloomberg. Given that CSR disclosure is 
voluntary for US firms, not all of the observations in the total sample will have the Bloomberg 
data. I refer to those sample observations with (without) CSR data collectively as the (non-)CSR 
sample. The total sample consists of 6,984 CSR firm-years and 2,322 non-CSR firm-years from 
2007 to 2014. The sample period begins in 2007 for three reasons: one, CSR data is not widely 
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available prior to 200622; two, the primary dependent variable, Total CEO Compensation, 
requires a detailed breakdown of the CEO’s stock options and restricted stock grants, which is 
not available prior to 2006; and three, Total CEO Compensation is calculated using the annual 
change in fair value of the equity portions of the CEO’s wealth, requiring two consecutive years’ 
worth of this data. 
Table 2, Panel A, provides the distribution of the CSR, non-CSR and total samples by 
year. The CSR sample has the fewest observations in 2007 (452), and increases over time to the 
most observations in 2014 (1,106). The opposite pattern is seen in the non-CSR sample, which 
starts with the most observations in 2007 (573) and decreases over time to end with the fewest 
observations in 2014 (85). Table 2, Panel B, provides a distribution of the CSR, non-CSR and 
total samples by industry, where industry is defined as the two-digit SIC code. As prior literature 
shows, certain industries are more likely to engage in CSR than others, making industry-related 
differences particularly important with respect to CSR (Simnett et al. 2009); therefore, I include 
industry fixed-effects in all regression models to control for these baseline differences. Panel B 
shows that the total sample composition by industry is roughly similar across the CSR and non-
CSR samples, that there is great variation in the number of industries represented (60 in total), 
and that there is little evidence of industry concentration, with no one industry representing 12% 
or more of any sample. The three most represented industries are Business Services (73), 
Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and Components (36), and Chemicals and Allied 
Products (28). 
                                                 
22 Based on the Bloomberg data for actively traded US equities as of February 2016, prior to 2006 there are a total of 
91 CSR firm-years available, with the following breakdown: 1 in 2002; 2 in 2003; 6 in 2004; and 82 in 2005. There 
were only 170 CSR firm-years in 2006. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 3, Panel A presents the full set of descriptive statistics for the total sample. The 
average (median) total CEO compensation is $12.1 ($5.4) million across all observations. My 
measure of total CEO compensation ranges from a negative $117 million to a positive $237 
million. Calculating CEO compensation as the change in wealth, notably by using the change in 
the fair value of the CEO’s equity holdings from one year to the next, is what drives both the 
existence of negative compensation as well as the large variations in compensation. In 
comparison, the average (median) TDC1 amount is $5.5 ($3.9) million, and ranges from $344 
thousand to $29 million. In the total sample, firms are generally large and profitable, with 
average (median) sales of $6.4 ($1.2) billion, an average (median) ROA of 10.2% (9.1%), and an 
average (median) annual return of 13.1% (10.3%) over the sample period. Regarding the 
corporate governance variables, about 53% of the total sample, on average, retains the CEO as 
the chairman of the board of directors. The average firm’s board has more than 9 members, of 
which approximately 16% are insiders, 10% are related outsiders, 12% are over the age of 70, 
and 1% sit on more than four corporate boards. Finally, about 35% of the total sample, on 
average, has a non-CEO insider with a substantial equity holding, while the vast majority (94%) 
has an outside blockholder. 
Table 3, Panel B provides the mean and median of all dependent and independent 
variables for each of the CSR and non-CSR samples, as well as univariate tests of the difference 
in means and medians across the two subsamples. With the exception of two variables, 
CEOisChair and BusyDirs, each of the means and medians presented is significantly different 
52 
between the two subsamples. This panel presents univariate evidence that the average (median) 
Total CEO Compensation of $14.3 ($6.6) million in the CSR sample is significantly higher, as 
compared to that of the Non-CSR sample, $5.4 ($2.4) million. The CSR sample, on average, also 
has more sales, a larger five-year average MTB ratio, ROA, and annual stock return, and a lower 
five-year standard deviation of both ROA and stock return, as compared with non-CSR firms. 
This suggests that the average CSR firm is a financially stronger firm with less firm risk, as 
compared to the average non-CSR firm. When comparing the two samples on their corporate 
governance characteristics, the board of directors, on average, is larger in CSR firms, has a 
greater percentage of outside related directors and directors over the age over 70, and is less 
likely to have a non-CEO insider with a significant equity holding and an outside blockholder, as 
compared to the average non-CSR firm. On the other hand, the average CSR firm has fewer 
inside directors, as compared with the average non-CSR firm. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4, Panel A presents the annual breakdown of the CSR sample by type of CSR 
disclosure. The CSR sample is now disaggregated into three groups based upon the types of CSR 
disclosure a firm has made. The G only group has only made corporate governance-related 
disclosures, the S & G only group has only made social-related and corporate governance-related 
disclosures, and the E, S, & G group has made environmental-related, social-related and 
corporate governance-related disclosures23. Looking at the time-series trends shows that the G 
only and the E, S, & G groups have had the largest increases over the sample period, while the S 
                                                 
23 Upon disaggregating the CSR sample by CSR disclosure type, several anomalies were observed. There were 7 
observations with only social disclosures and 2 observations with only environmental and governance disclosures. 
Since these likely represent noise in the data, the 7 social only disclosures have been grouped with the S & G only 
group, and the 2 environmental and governance only disclosures have been grouped with the E, S, & G group. 
Removing these observations does not qualitatively change any of the reported results. 
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& G only group has not increased as much. Also, while the frequency of CSR reporting has 
increased over time, the only disclosure group to monotonically increase over the sample period 
is the E, S, & G group. 
The CSR-related descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4, Panel B. Approximately 75% 
of the total sample has some kind of CSR disclosure, and the breakdown by CSR disclosure 
types, on average, is 24.2% with only corporate governance-related disclosures (G only group), 
20.5% with both social-related and corporate-governance related disclosures (S & G only group), 
and 30.3% with all three types of CSR disclosure (E, S & G group). Among just the CSR sample 
firms, the average (median) CSR_Score is 19.69 (14.05), ENV_Score is 20.77 (14.73), 
SOC_Score is 18.52 (14.04), and GOV_Score is 52.41 (51.79), all of which are out of a 
maximum possible 100 points. In comparison, when the missing scores are replaced with zero 
values as described in subsection 3.2.1 to test CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation for 
the total sample, the average (median) CSR_Score_1 is 14.75 (12.81), ENV_Score_1 is 6.25 (0), 
SOC_Score_1 is 9.37 (3.13), and GOV_Score_1 is 39.25 (48.21). 
As Panel B shows, among CSR sample firms GOV_Score is the most common of the 
three disclosure types, with nearly all CSR sample firms providing governance disclosures, while 
social and environmental scores are less frequent. This is consistent with a firm’s governance-
related disclosures being more established than its social-related and environmental-related CSR 
disclosures. This also suggests that when the missing values are replaced with zeros, it will have 
the greatest (least) effect on the distribution of the environmental-related (corporate governance-
related) disclosure scores, as evidenced by the differences in means and medians for ENV_Score 
(GOV_Score) and ENV_Score_1 (GOV_Score_1). In addition to frequency, the relative maturity 
of the governance disclosures as compared to both the social and the environmental disclosures 
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is evident from the scores, where the average and median values for GOV_Score are much 
higher than those for both SOC_Score and ENV_Score, suggesting these disclosures are of a 
higher quality than the social-related and environmental-related CSR disclosures. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 shows the Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients above (below) the 
diagonal line. All correlations in bold are significant at the 1% or better (p < 0.01) level. Further 
univariate evidence is provided in this table for the positive association between CSR and Total 
CEO Compensation. In addition, there is univariate support for a negative association between 
GOV_only_DV and Total CEO Compensation (H1a), no significant association between 
GOV_SOC_only_DV and Total CEO Compensation (H1b), and a positive association between 
GOV_SOC_ENV_DV and Total CEO Compensation (H1c). The correlation table also shows 
positive univariate associations between each of the CSR disclosure quality scores and Total 
CEO Compensation (H2a – H2c). 
The univariate correlations between CSR and each of the economic determinants is 
consistent with Table 3, Panel B, in that there are significant positive associations between CSR 
and SALES, MTB, ROA, and RET, and significant negative associations between CSR and 
StdDevROA and StdDevRET. Similarly, the univariate correlations between CSR and each of 
the corporate governance variables in Table 5 is generally consistent with Table 3, Panel B. A 
significantly positive (negative) correlation is shown between CSR and each of BoardSize, 
OutsideRelatedDirs, and Over70Dirs (InsideDirs, NonCEOInsiderStockOwn and OutsideBlock). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5. Results 
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5.1 CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation 
 The empirical results of the tests for H1a – H1c are shown in Table 6. Parameter 
estimates and t-statistics are shown for the main variables in Models 1 through 4 (the year and 
industry coefficients are suppressed). Starting with Model 1 in column (1), the parameter 
estimate on the main variable of interest, CSR_DV, is -370.44 and it is insignificant (t-statistic of 
-0.43). In the multivariate setting, this suggests that once the firm financial variables and 
corporate governance characteristics are controlled for, there is no difference in CEO 
compensation, on average, for a firm that makes CSR disclosures and one that does not. 
However, the purpose of this model is to provide some context within which to better understand 
the underlying types of CSR disclosure and how each of them might be associated with CEO 
compensation. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 Turning to Model 2 in column (2), CSR_DV is replaced with three indicator variables 
representing the three different types of CSR disclosure groups possible in the sample. The 
parameter estimate on my main variable of interest in H1a, GOV_only_DV, is -3,037.97 and it is 
significant at the 1% level (t-statistic of -2.84). Firms that only make corporate governance-
related CSR disclosures have lower CEO compensation, on average, as compared to firms that 
do not make any CSR disclosures, consistent with the prediction for H1a. 
Furthermore, although H1b and H1c are not directly tested in Model 2, inferences can be 
made about these hypotheses by analyzing the coefficients on GOV_SOC_only_DV and 
GOV_SOC_ENV_DV. First, the coefficient on GOV_SOC_only_DV is -332.19 (t-statistic of -
0.26) and insignificant, which is in contrast to the null expectation in H1b that social-related 
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CSR disclosures are not associated with CEO compensation. If that were the case, then I would 
expect to see a significantly negative coefficient on GOV_SOC_only_DV that is approximately 
equivalent to that of GOV_only_DV. Similarly, the coefficient on GOV_SOC_ENV_DV is 
3,072.51 (t-statistic of 2.60) and significant at the 1% level, which is inconsistent with the null 
prediction in H1c that environmental-related CSR disclosures are not associated with CEO 
compensation. 
Each of these inferences will be directly tested in Models 3 and 4, but it is worthwhile to 
note that, relative to firms making no CSR disclosures, CEO compensation differs, on average, 
depending on the type of CSR disclosure a firm makes. The results in Model 2 taken together 
suggest that, relative to non-CSR firms, CEO compensation is lower in firms making only 
corporate governance-related CSR disclosures, about the same in firms making both corporate 
governance-related and social-related CSR disclosures, and higher in firms making all three 
types of CSR disclosures. Given that the results in Model 1 suggest there is no difference in CEO 
compensation between CSR and non-CSR firms, by disaggregating the CSR firms into groups 
based on their disclosure type, Model 2 provides a more nuanced and informative analysis of the 
relationships between CEO compensation and type of CSR disclosure, and documents the 
different ways that CSR disclosure type is associated with CEO compensation. 
The results of Model 3 are shown in column (3). The variable of interest here is 
GOV_SOC_only_DV, which has a parameter estimate of 2,705.78 (t-statistic of 1.86) and is 
significant at the 10% level. By changing the reference group in this model to those firms only 
providing corporate governance-related CSR disclosure, I am able to test the differential effect 
on CEO compensation of a firm that also makes social-related CSR disclosure. As hypothesized 
in H1b, if providing social-related CSR disclosures in addition to that of corporate governance-
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related disclosures has no incremental effect, then the coefficient estimate in this model should 
be insignificant. However, the significantly positive result on GOV_SOC_only_DV is evidence 
that the null hypothesis in H1b can be rejected as social-related CSR disclosures are positively 
associated with CEO compensation. 
Both of the other two CSR indicator variables in Model 3 also have results consistent 
with those in Model 2. First, the coefficient on GOV_SOC_ENV_DV is 6,110.48 (t-statistic of 
4.68), suggesting that CEO compensation is higher in these firms, relative to firms only 
providing governance-related CSR disclosures. As for the differential effect of including 
environmental-related CSR disclosures, in addition to social-related and corporate governance-
related, the increased magnitude and significance of this coefficient (as compared to that of 
GOV_SOC_only_DV) suggests that there is also an association between environmental-related 
disclosures and CEO compensation, which will be directly tested in Model 4. Second, the non-
CSR firms have a significantly positive coefficient of 3,037.97 (t-statistic of 2.84), which is 
consistent with the inverse of the Model 2 results on GOV_only_DV. 
The results of Model 4 are shown in column (4). The variable of interest here is 
GOV_SOC_ENV_DV, which has a parameter estimate of 3,404.70 (t-statistic of 2.31) and is 
significant at the 5% level. By changing the reference group in this model to those firms only 
providing corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosure, I am able to test the 
differential effect on CEO compensation of a firm that also makes environmental-related CSR 
disclosure. As hypothesized in H1c, if providing environmental-related CSR disclosures in 
addition to that of corporate governance-related and social-related disclosures has no incremental 
effect, then the coefficient estimate in this model should be insignificant. However, the 
significantly positive result on GOV_SOC_ENV_DV is evidence that the null hypothesis in H1c 
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can be rejected as environmental-related CSR disclosures are positively associated with CEO 
compensation. 
Finally, both of the other two CSR indicator variables in Model 4 also have results 
consistent with those in Models 2 and 3. First, the coefficient on GOV_only_DV is -2,705.78 (t-
statistic of -1.86), consistent with governance only firms having lower CEO compensation than 
firms with both governance and social CSR disclosure. As expected, this coefficient is the 
inverse of the Model 3 result on GOV_SOC_only_DV. Second, the non-CSR firms have an 
insignificantly positive coefficient of 332.19 (t-statistic of 0.26), which is consistent with the 
inverse of the Model 2 results on GOV_SOC_only_DV. 
Collectively considering the results in Models 1 – 4 yields the following inferences. One, 
although no evidence is provided of CEO compensation being different for CSR firms (as a 
whole) and non-CSR firms, disaggregating CSR firms by their disclosure types produces 
significantly different results. Two, as compared to non-CSR firms, those firms only providing 
corporate governance-related CSR disclosures have lower average CEO compensation, ceteris 
paribus. Three, compared to those CSR firms only providing corporate governance-related 
disclosure, the ones who also provide social-related CSR disclosure have higher average CEO 
compensation, ceteris paribus; however, on average there is no difference between the CEO 
compensation of a non-CSR firm and of a CSR firm providing both corporate governance-related 
and social-related disclosure. Fourth, firms that provide all three types of CSR-related disclosure 
have higher CEO compensation, on average, than any other firms (non-CSR, corporate 
governance CSR disclosures only, and both corporate governance and social CSR disclosures). It 
suggests that when considering the relationship of CEO compensation contracting and CSR 
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disclosures, it is not sufficient to simply separate the voluntary CSR disclosers from the non-
CSR disclosers; rather, it is necessary to consider the type of CSR disclosure being made. 
5.2 CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation 
5.2.1 Total sample analysis 
 The empirical results of the tests for H2a – H2c are shown in Table 7. Panel A presents 
the total sample analysis, with parameter estimates and t-statistics shown for the main variables 
in Models 5 through 8 (the year and industry coefficients are suppressed). Starting with Model 5 
in column (1), the parameter estimate on the main variable of interest, CSR_Score_1, is 176.48 
and is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic of 3.32). In addition, the Non-CSR_DV coefficient is 
3,231.19 and it is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic of 2.60). Taken together, it suggests that 
non-CSR firms, on average, have higher CEO compensation; however, there is a positive 
relationship between a firm’s overall CSR disclosure score and CEO compensation. One 
inference drawn from this result is that although CSR firms, on average, have lower CEO 
compensation, one way to offset that is by improving the quality of the firm’s overall CSR 
disclosure. To provide some context, the economic significance of the reported parameter 
estimate is approximately $2.4 million, assuming a one standard deviation change in the firm’s 
overall CSR score. 
 Column (2) shows the results for Model 6, in which the overall CSR disclosure score 
variable is replaced with the corporate governance-related CSR disclosure score variable. The 
parameter estimate on the main variable of interest in H2a, GOV_Score_1, is 279.97 and it is 
significant at the 1% level (t-statistic of 2.62). Consistent with the prediction in H2a, if a firm 
that discloses corporate governance-related CSR disclosure improves the quality of that 
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disclosure, then there is a positive association with CEO compensation. If we assume the firm 
increases its governance score by one standard deviation, then the economic significance of the 
coefficient on GOV_Score_1 is about $6.5 million in CEO compensation. This is taken as 
evidence that the quality of corporate governance-related CSR disclosures is positively 
associated with CEO compensation in the total sample. It is important to note, however, that this 
result does not differentiate between the different types of CSR disclosures that firms make; thus, 
the average effect documented in Model 6 applies to all CSR firms with governance disclosures. 
This full sample analysis will be followed by a subsample analysis that examines more closely 
the differences in CSR disclosure quality across different types of CSR disclosures. 
  Model 7 is expanded to include both the corporate governance-related and the social-
related CSR disclosure score variables. The results are presented in column (3). My focus in H2b 
is the quality of the social-related CSR disclosure. As such, the parameter estimate on the main 
variable of interest, SOC_Score_1, is 95.85 and it is significant at the 5% level (t-statistic of 
2.22). The prediction in H2b is that social-related CSR disclosure quality is not associated with 
CEO compensation, following from the earlier prediction in H1b that social-related CSR 
disclosures are not associated with CEO compensation; however, this total sample evidence 
suggests that hypothesis H2b should be rejected. Similar to Model 6, this result in Model 7 
applies to all CSR firms with social-related disclosures, and does not separate the CSR firms by 
type of disclosure (e.g., governance and social only versus environmental, governance and 
social). The next subsection will provide a subsample analysis to address this issue. 
 Finally, Model 8, shown in column (4), includes all three of the individual CSR 
disclosure score variables. The main variable of interest in H2c is the environmental-related CSR 
disclosure quality, which has an insignificant coefficient of 54.49 (t-statistic of 0.65). As a result, 
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the total sample evidence suggests that H2c, which predicts that environmental-related CSR 
disclosure quality is not associated with CEO compensation, cannot be rejected. Unlike the prior 
two models, since there is only one group of CSR disclosers that provide environmental data, 
this particular model does not have the same issue regarding the inference of this parameter. 
However, given that in the total sample (9,306 firm-years) there are only 2,823 firms that provide 
environmental CSR data (see Table 4, Panel B), by construction this variable includes 6,483 zero 
values (70% of the observations), potentially weakening the power of this test. This will be 
addressed in the next subsection with a subsample analysis. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5.2.2 CSR subsample analysis 
 As discussed in the previous subsection, I now test the relationships between CSR 
disclosure quality and CEO compensation again within four distinct CSR subsamples. By 
focusing only on firms that provide CSR disclosure (of any type), I can now analyze whether the 
relationship between CEO compensation and CSR disclosure quality differs based on the type of 
CSR disclosures a firm makes (i.e., only corporate governance, corporate governance and social, 
or corporate governance, social and environmental). In addition, these subsamples represent the 
firms for which I expect the relationship between CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation 
to be the most relevant. By removing the non-CSR firms from these subsamples, it also allows 
for a more accurate representation of the underlying CSR score variable distributions. 
The empirical results of the tests for H2a – H2c are repeated using four CSR subsamples 
in Table 7, Panel B. Parameter estimates and t-statistics are shown for the main variables in 
Models 9 through 12 (the year and industry coefficients are suppressed). Beginning with Model 
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9, the CSR subsample analysis corroborates the total sample analysis with respect to the 
relationship between overall CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation. The parameter 
estimate on CSR_Score is 164.62 and is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic of 2.93), 
suggesting that among CSR disclosers (of all types), improving the overall CSR disclosure 
quality is associated with higher CEO compensation. 
To see which of the underlying CSR disclosure types is driving this result, I first test H2a 
using Model 10 and a subsample composed of firms that only provide corporate governance-
related CSR disclosures. As the GOV_Score coefficient shows (-181.29, t-statistic of -0.51), 
there is no significant relationship between the quality of the corporate governance-related CSR 
disclosure and CEO compensation for this particular subsample. Although this is inconsistent 
with the H2a prediction and the total sample analysis results in Model 6, this evidence is 
compelling given the expectation that limiting the subsample to these firms should provide 
strong evidence of the relationship between disclosure quality and compensation. It also suggests 
that the results in Model 6 are possibly being driven by the corporate governance-related 
disclosures made by firms providing more than just this one type of CSR disclosure. 
I then test H2b again using Model 11 and a subsample consisting of firms that provide 
both corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosures. As this analysis shows, 
the parameter estimate on SOC_Score is a statistically insignificant 273.97 (t-statistic of 1.29). It 
is also worth noting that the coefficient on GOV_Score in this subsample is a statistically 
insignificant 268.84 (t-statistic of 1.61). This suggests that the quality of neither of these two 
types of CSR disclosure is associated with CEO compensation for this subsample of firms. 
Although I hypothesize in H2b that social-related CSR disclosure quality is not associated with 
CEO compensation, for which Model 11 provides support, it is possible that the reduction in 
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sample size, while expected to strengthen the hypothesis testing by focusing on firms for which 
the relationship should matter the most, has also reduced the power of the tests. A comparison of 
the time trend of this disclosure group (corporate governance-related and social-related) to that 
of the governance only and governance, social and environmental disclosure groups (see Table 4, 
Panel A) shows that this group in particular had the flattest disclosure trend over the sample 
period, with the least amount of frequency change. Thus, while the parameter estimates have 
signs consistent with what one might expect about the relationship between disclosure quality 
and CEO compensation, the subsample composition has potentially weakened the results. 
An alternative explanation is that for this particular combination of CSR disclosures, 
there is no association between the disclosure quality and CEO compensation because the act of 
providing these two types of CSR disclosure is sufficient to yield higher CEO compensation and 
improving the quality of the disclosures will have no further effect. The earlier evidence 
documented in support of H1a and rejecting H1b suggested that firms in this particular 
subsample have higher CEO compensation than firms disclosing only corporate governance CSR 
information, and roughly the same CEO compensation as firms not making any CSR disclosures. 
It is possible, then, that this particular CSR disclosure strategy is employed by firms, on average, 
that want to present some more CSR information than just corporate governance but that do not 
invest resources to substantially improve or enhance the quality of that disclosure over time. This 
would also help explain why CEO compensation is roughly equivalent between firms that make 
both corporate governance-related and social-related disclosures and firms that make no CSR 
disclosures. Further research can explore which of these alternative explanations holds. 
Finally, in column (4) I present the test of H2c using Model 12 and a subsample of firms 
that provide all three types of CSR disclosure. In this model, each of the individual CSR 
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disclosure scores are employed. The primary variable of interest is ENV_Score, which has a 
parameter estimate of 156.44 (t-statistic of 1.99) and is significant at the 5% level. Additionally, 
the results on both GOV_Score and SOC_Score are statistically insignificant in this subsample. 
The evidence of the positive association between CEO compensation and the environmental-
related CSR disclosure quality provided in this column is inconsistent with the predicted null 
relationship in H2c, and suggests that this hypothesis be rejected. It is also inconsistent with the 
total sample analysis in Panel A; however, as noted previously, it is likely that the earlier results 
in the full sample are affected by the large amount of environmental CSR scores that have values 
of zero. Thus, I conclude that for firms providing all three types of CSR disclosure, improving 
the quality of the environmental disclosure in particular is associated with higher CEO 
compensation. Also, considering the combined results across Models 9 through 12, it suggests 
that the environmental-related CSR disclosure quality result in column (4) is what drives the 
overall CSR quality result in column (1). 
5.3 Additional Analysis 
 As an additional analysis, I repeat all of the tests from Tables 6 and 7 again using TDC1 
as the dependent variable. Although I believe the more comprehensive measure of CEO 
compensation that I employ in my main analyses is appropriate in this setting, I want to test these 
hypotheses using a different dependent variable. This should serve to better facilitate comparison 
with other compensation studies in this area that have more commonly used ExecuComp’s 
measure of direct compensation. 
Table 8 presents the results of the tests on CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation. The 
results shown in columns (1) through (4) are largely consistent with that provided in Table 6. 
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One exception is the overall effect of the relationship between CSR firms and CEO 
compensation, versus non-CSR firms. Table 6 reports an insignificant result, while Table 8 
shows a marginally positive coefficient on CSR_DV of 299.65 (t-statistic of 1.78). A possible 
explanation for this lies in the only other notable difference in the results between the two tables, 
and that is the coefficient on GOV_SOC_only_DV. In Table 6 it is insignificant, while it is 
marginally significant in Table 8 with a coefficient of 344.28 (t-statistic of 1.70), and this in turn 
could be causing the overall CSR effect to load with marginal significance. The interpretation of 
this result is that firms providing governance and social CSR disclosures have higher CEO 
compensation than non-CSR firms, all else equal. If that is the case, though, then I would also 
expect to see different results in the following analysis on CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Table 9 presents the results of the tests on CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation. Panel A contains the total sample analysis. The results on the primary variables of 
interest in each of Models 5 through 8 are consistent in both tables. However, in Models 7 and 8, 
Table 9, Panel A also reports significantly positive coefficients on GOV_Score_1 and 
SOC_Score_1. Although these are not the main variables being tested in H2b and H2c, it is 
interesting to note that when compensation is measured in this way, the suggestion is that 
improving the quality of corporate governance-related and social-related CSR disclosure will 
always be associated with higher CEO compensation. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
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Just as in the main analyses, though, this table does not differentiate between the CSR 
firms based on disclosure type, so a corresponding CSR subsample analysis is provided in Panel 
B. It is in this analysis that the most striking difference between the dependent variable measures 
occurs. The results of Models 9 through 12 are presented in Panel B. In a comparison with Table 
7, Panel B, a significantly positive coefficient is estimated on the overall CSR disclosure score 
when the subsample is limited to only CSR firms. In columns (2) and (3), the results on H2a and 
H2b are consistent across both tables. It is only column (4), where the Model 12 results are 
shown, that a key difference emerges. While Table 7, Panel B documents a significantly positive 
parameter estimate on ENV_Score, when TDC1 is used, the resulting coefficient in Table 9, 
Panel B is insignificant. Instead, the parameter estimate on GOV_Score is marginally significant 
at 52.87 (t-statistic of 1.81). Considering the CSR subsample results collectively in Table 9, 
Panel B suggests that the quality of the corporate governance-related disclosures for the CSR 
firms seems to drive the overall association between CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation documented in column (1). This is in contrast to the results in Table 7, Panel B, 
where the evidence provided suggests that the environmental-related CSR disclosure quality is 
what drives the positive association between CEO compensation and overall CSR disclosure. 
These different results, and the inferences from them, are likely due to the different CEO 
compensation measures used in each table. The proxy used in Table 7 includes the CEO’s entire 
equity portfolio and the estimated change in its fair value from the previous year as a component 
of CEO compensation. To the extent that environmental disclosures represent policies, actions 
and strategies that are expected to impact firm value in the long run, and that they are implicitly 
utilized in compensation contracting, then this proxy does a better job at capturing the total 
wealth effect on the CEO of these disclosures and their quality. Conversely, the direct 
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compensation proxy only captures the current year equity awards granted to an executive, and 
thus risks both understating the compensation effect of environmental-related CSR disclosure 
quality, and overstating the compensation effect of corporate governance-related CSR disclosure 
quality. While improving the quality of corporate governance-related CSR disclosures might be 
easier in practice for a CEO to accomplish than it would be for environmental-related CSR 
disclosures, these two tables suggest that choice brings with it a tradeoff between higher total 
compensation and higher direct compensation. 
6. Conclusion 
 This study contributes to the growing literature on CSR disclosure in accounting, as well 
as the literature streams on nonfinancial disclosure and executive compensation. In this study I 
test the association between CEO compensation and CSR disclosure type and quality using a 
sample of US firms from 2007 – 2014. I document that when CEO compensation is measured as 
the total annual change in wealth, then on average, there is no significant difference between 
CSR firms and non-CSR firms. However, by disaggregating the CSR firms into three distinct 
groups based upon their CSR disclosure type, I provide evidence that the type of CSR disclosure 
provided is associated with CEO compensation, ceteris paribus, after controlling for firm 
financial performance and risk factors, as well as a series of corporate governance variables 
reflecting the board of directors’ structure and the firm’s ownership structure. Specifically, firms 
providing only corporate governance-related CSR disclosure have lower CEO compensation than 
non-CSR firms; firms providing both corporate governance-related and social-related CSR 
disclosure have higher CEO compensation than firms only providing corporate governance-
related CSR disclosure and approximately the same CEO compensation as non-CSR firms; and 
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firms providing all three types of CSR disclosure have higher CEO compensation than all other 
firms (both CSR disclosers of other types and non-CSR firms). 
I then provide evidence on the association between CSR disclosure quality and CEO 
compensation using both total sample and CSR subsample analyses. Given that CSR disclosure 
is voluntary, the subsample analyses focusing only on the CSR firms should provide a stronger 
setting in which to test these relationships. Results of the CSR subsample analyses show that 
there is a positive association between CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation, and that 
it is driven primarily by the quality of the environmental-related CSR disclosures. 
Additional analyses are also provided using total direct compensation, a more common 
CEO compensation measure used in empirical literature. The general tenor of the results on the 
association between CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation using this proxy are consistent 
with those already reported; however, the inference on the relationship between CSR disclosure 
quality and CEO compensation is different. While both proxies provide evidence of a positive 
association between CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation, the direct compensation 
measure suggests the primary driver is the quality of the corporate governance-related CSR 
disclosures. These different interpretations are likely due to the nature of the comprehensive 
versus direct measures of compensation, and suggest the importance for researchers of 
determining an appropriate proxy in their compensation studies.   
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
This table describes the sample selection procedures used to construct the total sample. 
 
  Number of firm-
years 
Observations with necessary Compustat/CRSP 
data 
 27,982 
Less: Observations missing MSCI data  (15,426) 
Less: Observations missing ExecuComp data  (3,215) 
Less: Observations in industries with fewer than 
ten observations per industry, defined as two-
digit SIC code 
 (35) 
Remaining observations, total sample:  9,306 
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Table 2 
Sample Distribution 
Panel A provides a breakdown of the total sample by year, as well as a breakdown of the CSR 
and non-CSR firm-years. Panel B provides an industry breakdown of the total, CSR, and non-
CSR samples by two-digit SIC code. 
 
Panel A: CSR, non-CSR and total sample distributions by year 
 
Year CSR Non-CSR Total 
2007 452 573 1,025 
2008 646 526 1,172 
2009 691 478 1,169 
2010 937 220 1,157 
2011 1,038 163 1,201 
2012 1,028 154 1,182 
2013 1,086 123 1,209 
2014 1,106 85 1,191 
Total 6,984 2,322 9,306 
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Panel B: CSR, non-CSR and total sample distributions by industry 
 
 
SIC Code Description CSR Sample Non-CSR Sample Total Sample 
N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage 
Agriculture Production-Crops (01) 8 0.11% 6 0.26% 14 0.15% 
Metal Mining (10) 37 0.53% 8 0.34% 45 0.48% 
Coal Mining (12) 17 0.24% 4 0.17% 21 0.23% 
Oil and Gas Extraction (13) 263 3.77% 78 3.36% 341 3.66% 
Mining, Quarry Nonmetallic 
Minerals (14) 20 0.29% 7 0.30% 27 0.29% 
Building Construction-Gen 
Contractors, Op Builders (15) 69 0.99% 22 0.95% 91 0.98% 
Heavy Construction-Not Building 
Construction (16) 45 0.64% 15 0.65% 60 0.64% 
Construction-Special Trade (17) 17 0.24% 4 0.17% 21 0.23% 
Food and Kindred Products (20) 219 3.14% 35 1.51% 254 2.73% 
Tobacco Products (21) 14 0.20% 5 0.22% 19 0.20% 
Textile Mill Products (22) 23 0.33% 10 0.43% 33 0.35% 
Apparel and Other Finished 
Products (23) 66 0.95% 29 1.25% 95 1.02% 
Lumber and Wood Products, Ex 
Furniture (24) 35 0.50% 11 0.47% 46 0.49% 
Furniture and Fixtures (25) 68 0.97% 9 0.39% 77 0.83% 
Paper and Allied Products (26) 81 1.16% 39 1.68% 120 1.29% 
Printing, Publishing and Allied 
(27) 50 0.72% 16 0.69% 66 0.71% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
(28) 523 7.49% 195 8.40% 718 7.72% 
Pete Refining and Related 
Industries (29) 48 0.69% 8 0.34% 56 0.60% 
Rubber and Misc Plastics Prods 
(30) 60 0.86% 14 0.60% 74 0.80% 
Leather and Leather Products (31) 31 0.44% 17 0.73% 48 0.52% 
Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete 
Products (32) 48 0.69% 16 0.69% 64 0.69% 
Primary Metal Industries (33) 117 1.68% 25 1.08% 142 1.53% 
Fabr Metal, Ex Machy, Trans Eq 
(34) 119 1.70% 21 0.90% 140 1.50% 
Indl, Comml Machy, Computer Eq 
(35) 421 6.03% 158 6.80% 579 6.22% 
Electr, Oth Elec Eq, Ex Cmp (36) 511 7.32% 275 11.84% 786 8.45% 
Transportation Equipment (37) 197 2.82% 58 2.50% 255 2.74% 
Meas Instr; Photo Gds; Watches 
(38) 425 6.09% 160 6.89% 585 6.29% 
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SIC Code Description CSR Sample Non-CSR Sample Total Sample 
N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage 
Misc Manufacturing Industries 
(39) 41 0.59% 35 1.51% 76 0.82% 
Railroad Transportation (40) 36 0.52% 1 0.04% 37 0.40% 
Motor Freight Trans, Warehousing 
(42) 63 0.90% 22 0.95% 85 0.91% 
Water Transportation (44) 31 0.44% 18 0.78% 49 0.53% 
Transportation By Air (45) 71 1.02% 7 0.30% 78 0.84% 
Transportation Services (47) 42 0.60% 9 0.39% 51 0.55% 
Communications (48) 156 2.23% 54 2.33% 210 2.26% 
Electric, Gas, Sanitary Serv (49) 453 6.49% 73 3.14% 526 5.65% 
Durable Goods-Wholesale (50) 170 2.43% 35 1.51% 205 2.20% 
Nondurable Goods-Wholesale (51) 89 1.27% 22 0.95% 111 1.19% 
Building Matl, Hardware, Garden-
Retl (52) 32 0.46% 1 0.04% 33 0.35% 
General Merchandise Stores (53) 78 1.12% 23 0.99% 101 1.09% 
Food Stores (54) 28 0.40% 12 0.52% 40 0.43% 
Auto Dealers, Gas Stations (55) 57 0.82% 18 0.78% 75 0.81% 
Apparel and Accessory Stores (56) 135 1.93% 32 1.38% 167 1.79% 
Home Furniture, Equip Stores (57) 40 0.57% 4 0.17% 44 0.47% 
Eating and Drinking Places (58) 128 1.83% 37 1.59% 165 1.77% 
Miscellaneous Retail (59) 114 1.63% 45 1.94% 159 1.71% 
Depository Institutions (60) 486 6.96% 152 6.55% 638 6.86% 
Non-Depository Credit Institutions 
(61) 14 0.20% 0 0% 14 0.15% 
Security & Commodity Brokers, 
Dealers, Exchanges, Services (62) 10 0.14% 2 0.09% 12 0.13% 
Insurance Carriers (63) 14 0.20% 16 0.69% 30 0.32% 
Ins Agents, Brokers, Service (64) 36 0.52% 11 0.47% 47 0.51% 
Holding, Other Invest Offices (67) 87 1.25% 28 1.21% 115 1.24% 
Hotels, Other Lodging Places (70) 14 0.20% 0 0% 14 0.15% 
Personal Services (72) 23 0.33% 9 0.39% 32 0.34% 
Business Services (73) 668 9.56% 255 10.98% 923 9.92% 
Auto Repair, Services, Parking 
(75) 16 0.23% 7 0.30% 23 0.25% 
Motion Pictures (78) 26 0.37% 5 0.22% 31 0.33% 
Amusement & Rec Services (79) 42 0.60% 15 0.65% 57 0.61% 
Health Services (80) 106 1.52% 65 2.80% 171 1.84% 
Educational Services (82) 58 0.83% 4 0.17% 62 0.67% 
Engr, Acc, Resh, Mgmt, Rel Svcs 
(87) 88 1.26% 60 2.58% 148 1.59% 
Total: 6,984 100% 2,322 100% 9,306 100% 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A provides a full set of descriptive statistics for the total sample. Panel B provides the 
mean and median of all dependent and independent variables for each of the CSR and non-CSR 
samples, and tests for differences in means (t-statistics) and medians (z-statistics) for all 
variables shown. All mean and median difference statistic values denoted with ***, **, * 
represent variables with a statistically significant difference between the CSR and non-CSR 
samples at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels or better, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, total sample 
 
 Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
TotalCEOCompensation 9,306 12,086.77 38,500.58 -116,983 5,407.98 236,863.5 
TDC1 9,306 5,541.102 5,283.712 344.137 3,879.87 29,073.17 
Sales 9,306 6,361.927 14,698.8 57.767 1,590.66 100,887.1 
MTB 9,306 2.915452 3.056677 -6.3666 2.197484 20.30032 
ROA 9,306 0.10207 0.094624 -0.17692 0.090892 0.434005 
RET 9,306 0.131299 0.421623 -0.74939 0.10333 1.71329 
StdDevROA 9,306 0.043846 0.047224 0.001788 0.028739 0.278078 
StdDevRET 9,306 0.431426 0.368443 0.068791 0.334497 2.503088 
CEOisChair 9,306 0.534386 0.498843 0 1 1 
BoardSize 9,306 9.293467 2.256415 5 9 16 
InsideDirs 9,306 0.156527 0.077752 0.0625 0.125 0.428571 
OutsideRelDirs 9,306 0.10391 0.136687 0 0.076923 0.6 
Over70Dirs 9,306 0.117452 0.133429 0 0.1 0.555556 
BusyDirs 9,306 0.01329 0.037038 0 0 0.166667 
NonCEOInsOwn 9,306 0.345906 0.475688 0 0 1 
OutsideBlock 9,306 0.943477 0.230941 0 1 1 
  
 ` 
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Table 3, cont. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics, CSR and non-CSR samples 
 
Variable 
CSR Sample Non-CSR Sample T-statistic for 
the difference 
between 
columns (2) 
and (5) 
 
(7) 
Z-statistic for 
the difference 
between 
columns (3) 
and (6) 
 
(8) 
N 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
Median 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
N 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
(5) 
Median 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
TotalCEOCompensation 6,984 14,297.84 6,641.44 2,322 5,436.42 2,363.09 9.6556*** 17.909*** 
TDC1 6,984 6,061.29 4,420.59 2,322 3,976.51 2,511.78 16.7157*** 20.897*** 
Sales 6,984 7,618.88 1,980.02 2,322 2,581.33 841.5375 14.4659*** 23.061*** 
MTB 6,984 2.9889 2.2339 2,322 2.6944 2.1073 4.0260*** 3.290*** 
ROA 6,984 0.1081 0.0964 2,322 0.0838 0.0762 10.7776*** 11.722*** 
RET 6,984 0.1557 0.1278 2,322 0.0580 -0.0001 9.7222*** 12.616*** 
StdDevROA 6,984 0.0414 0.0270 2,322 0.0513 0.0340 -8.7862*** -9.733*** 
StdDevRET 6,984 0.4127 0.3182 2,322 0.4878 0.3785 -8.5373*** -11.906*** 
CEOisChair 6,984 0.5387 1 2,322 0.5215 1 1.4317 1.433 
BoardSize 6,984 9.5223 9 2,322 8.6051 8 17.2376*** 17.660*** 
InsideDirs 6,984 0.1545 0.125 2,322 0.1627 0.1429 -4.3909*** -8.899*** 
OutsideRelDirs 6,984 0.1080 0.0769 2,322 0.0915 0 5.0542*** 3.182** 
Over70Dirs 6,984 0.1228 0.1 2,322 0.1013 0.0714 6.7499*** 6.694*** 
BusyDirs 6,984 0.0134 0 2,322 0.0129 0 0.6402 1.561 
NonCEOInsOwn 6,984 0.3182 0 2,322 0.4294 0 -9.8097*** -9.760*** 
OutsideBlock 6,984 0.9386 1 2,322 0.9582 1 -3.5545*** -3.552*** 
 
  
 75 
 
Table 4 
CSR Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics by Disclosure Type 
Panel A provides an annual breakdown of the CSR sample into three groups by CSR disclosure 
type: governance disclosures only (G only), social and governance disclosures only (S & G 
only), and environmental, social and governance disclosures (E, S & G). Panel B provides the 
CSR-related descriptive statistics. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: CSR sample distribution by disclosure type and year 
 
Year G only S & G only E, S, & G CSR Sample 
2007 84 173 195 452 
2008 116 265 265 646 
2009 137 243 311 691 
2010 363 226 348 937 
2011 413 226 399 1,038 
2012 359 264 405 1,028 
2013 390 250 446 1,086 
2014 394 258 454 1,106 
Total 2,256 1,905 2,823 6,984 
 
 
Panel B: CSR-related descriptive statistics 
 
 Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
CSR_DV 9,306 0.750484 0.432756 0 1 1 
GOV_only_DV 9,306 0.242424 0.428573 0 0 1 
GOV_SOC_only_DV 9,306 0.204707 0.403509 0 0 1 
GOV_SOC_ENV_DV 9,306 0.303353 0.459731 0 0 1 
CSR_Score 6,984 19.69262 12.11238 10.3306 14.0496 61.157 
ENV_Score 2,823 20.76922 17.57585 1.3793 14.7287 67.4419 
SOC_Score 4,726 18.52017 15.28796 3.125 14.0351 65.625 
GOV_Score 6,977 52.41431 5.442279 42.8571 51.7857 71.4286 
CSR_Score_1 9,306 14.74533 13.47398 0 12.8099 59.3361 
ENV_Score_1 9,306 6.245922 13.37231 0 0 58.1395 
SOC_Score_1 9,306 9.369633 14.16282 0 3.125 60.9375 
GOV_Score_1 9,306 39.24542 23.21144 0 48.2143 71.4286 
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Table 5 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are reported above (below) the diagonal. 
All correlations in bold are significant at the 1% or better level. All variables defined in Appendix A. 
No. Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 CSR_DV 1 0.33 0.29 0.38 . . . . 0.76 0.37 0.54 0.77 0.19 0.22 
2 GOV_only_DV 0.33 1 -0.29 -0.37 -0.78 . . -0.66 -0.24 -0.37 -0.53 -0.15 -0.08 -0.29 
3 SOC_GOV_only_DV 0.29 -0.29 1 -0.33 -0.07 . -0.58 -0.03 0.18 -0.33 0.27 0.20 0.01 0.01 
4 ENV_SOC_GOV_DV 0.38 -0.37 -0.33 1 0.81 . 0.58 0.66 0.78 0.98 0.77 0.68 0.24 0.47 
5 CSR_Score . -0.47 -0.28 0.70 1 0.97 0.88 0.84 1.00 0.86 0.94 0.84 0.26 0.57 
6 ENV_Score . . . . 0.97 1 0.73 0.67 0.97 1.00 0.73 0.67 0.19 0.42 
7 SOC_Score . . -0.53 0.53 0.90 0.75 1 0.61 0.88 0.74 1.00 0.61 0.23 0.43 
8 GOV_Score . -0.49 -0.15 0.60 0.81 0.69 0.67 1 0.84 0.72 0.77 1.00 0.24 0.53 
9 CSR_Score_1 0.63 -0.14 -0.03 0.75 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.82 1 0.80 0.92 0.94 0.28 0.48 
10 ENV_Score_1 0.27 -0.26 -0.24 0.71 0.98 1.00 0.81 0.75 0.90 1 0.79 0.71 0.25 0.49 
11 SOC_Score_1 0.38 -0.37 -0.03 0.73 0.92 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.90 0.84 1 0.83 0.27 0.50 
12 GOV_Score_1 0.98 0.22 0.25 0.49 0.78 0.68 0.65 0.97 0.75 0.42 0.52 1 0.27 0.45 
13 TotalCEOCompensation 0.10 -0.04 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.12 1 0.43 
14 TDC1 0.17 -0.26 -0.03 0.43 0.50 0.33 0.37 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.25 0.29 1 
15 Sales 0.15 -0.19 -0.09 0.40 0.50 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.24 0.16 0.53 
16 MTB 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.10 
17 ROA 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.14 
18 RET 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.45 0.06 
19 StdDevROA -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.02 -0.09 
20 StdDevRET -0.09 0.08 -0.01 -0.15 -0.15 -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 
21 CEOisChair 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.15 
22 BoardSize 0.18 -0.17 -0.04 0.36 0.41 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.24 0.07 0.35 
23 InsideDirs -0.05 0.10 0.09 -0.22 -0.26 -0.22 -0.23 -0.25 -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.09 0.01 -0.18 
24 OutsideRelDirs 0.05 0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.06 
25 Over70Dirs 0.07 0.10 0.07 -0.09 -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.01 
26 BusyDirs 0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.13 
27 NonCEOInsOwn -0.10 0.17 0.02 -0.27 -0.27 -0.16 -0.20 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.15 -0.01 -0.21 
28 OutsideBlock -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 
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Table 5, cont. 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are reported above (below) the diagonal. 
All correlations in bold are significant at the 1% or better level. All variables defined in Appendix A. 
No. Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
1 CSR_DV 0.24 0.03 0.12 0.13 -0.10 -0.12 0.01 0.18 -0.09 0.03 0.07 0.02 -0.10 -0.04 
2 GOV_only_DV -0.35 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.09 -0.19 0.13 0.08 0.08 -0.09 0.17 0.03 
3 SOC_GOV_only_DV -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 
4 ENV_SOC_GOV_DV 0.56 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.16 -0.20 0.11 0.39 -0.29 -0.08 -0.07 0.08 -0.27 -0.07 
5 CSR_Score 0.67 0.11 0.09 0.02 -0.18 -0.19 0.15 0.45 -0.32 -0.11 -0.13 0.11 -0.31 -0.07 
6 ENV_Score 0.51 0.09 0.09 -0.00 -0.13 -0.11 0.13 0.36 -0.29 -0.05 -0.15 0.08 -0.15 -0.10 
7 SOC_Score 0.50 0.08 0.09 0.06 -0.10 -0.15 0.07 0.31 -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.20 -0.06 
8 GOV_Score 0.62 0.10 0.07 0.02 -0.16 -0.18 0.14 0.41 -0.32 -0.11 -0.15 0.13 -0.30 -0.04 
9 CSR_Score_1 0.56 0.09 0.14 0.11 -0.18 -0.20 0.09 0.39 -0.25 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.25 -0.07 
10 ENV_Score_1 0.59 0.10 0.10 0.06 -0.18 -0.21 0.12 0.41 -0.31 -0.08 -0.09 0.09 -0.28 -0.08 
11 SOC_Score_1 0.58 0.12 0.14 0.08 -0.15 -0.20 0.11 0.38 -0.25 -0.05 -0.03 0.10 -0.26 -0.07 
12 GOV_Score_1 0.52 0.08 0.14 0.11 -0.17 -0.19 0.09 0.37 -0.25 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 -0.24 -0.05 
13 TotalCEOCompensation 0.33 0.14 0.24 0.74 -0.09 -0.07 0.10 0.16 -0.12 -0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.01 
14 TDC1 0.72 0.16 0.20 0.11 -0.14 -0.09 0.15 0.39 -0.29 -0.11 -0.06 0.16 -0.30 -0.04 
15 Sales 1 0.06 0.19 0.05 -0.26 -0.20 0.17 0.53 -0.32 -0.07 -0.07 0.17 -0.32 -0.10 
16 MTB 0.03 1 0.52 0.05 0.17 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 
17 ROA 0.05 0.33 1 0.17 0.15 -0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
18 RET 0.00 0.03 0.15 1 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.03 
19 StdDevROA -0.12 0.15 0.08 0.01 1 0.42 -0.09 -0.37 0.20 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.11 0.04 
20 StdDevRET -0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.16 0.32 1 -0.08 -0.25 0.16 0.05 -0.01 -0.00 0.10 0.06 
21 CEOisChair 0.12 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 1 0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 
22 BoardSize 0.34 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.29 -0.19 0.05 1 -0.48 0.07 -0.01 0.12 -0.17 -0.09 
23 InsideDirs -0.16 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.08 -0.03 -0.32 1 -0.07 0.15 -0.07 0.30 -0.03 
24 OutsideRelDirs -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.06 -0.09 1 0.10 -0.02 0.22 -0.03 
25 Over70Dirs -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.10 1 -0.02 0.13 -0.00 
26 BusyDirs 0.12 0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 1 -0.06 0.00 
27 NonCEOInsOwn -0.17 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.09 0.09 -0.12 -0.15 0.31 0.17 0.15 -0.05 1 -0.08 
28 OutsideBlock -0.16 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 1 
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Table 6 
CSR Disclosure Type and CEO Compensation 
This table provides the OLS regression results of CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation 
for the total sample. Column (1) shows the results for model (1): CEO Compensationi,t = α + γ1 
CSR_DVi,t + β1-6Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε. Column (2) 
shows the results for model (2): CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1 Gov_only_DVi,t + 
δ2Gov_Soc_only_DVi,t + δ3 Gov_Soc_Env_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate 
Governance Variablesi,t + ε. Column (3) shows the results for model (3): CEO Compensationi,t = 
α + δ2 Gov_Soc_only_DVi,t + δ3 Gov_Soc_Env_DVi,t + η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial 
Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε. Column (4) shows the results for model 
(4): CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ1Gov_only_DVi,t + δ3 Gov_Soc_Env_DVi,t + η1 Non-
CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε. The 
dependent variable in each model is Total CEO Compensation. All models include robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels or better, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent variable = Total CEO Compensationt 
 
 
Variable Model 1 
(1) 
Model 2 
(2) 
Model 3 
(3) 
Model 4 
(4) 
Reference group: Non-CSR firms Non-CSR firms Gov_only 
CSR firms 
Gov_Soc_only 
CSR firms 
γ1 – CSR_DVt -370.44 
[-0.43] 
   
δ1 – GOV_only_DVt  -3,037.97*** 
[-2.84] 
 -2,705.78* 
[-1.86] 
δ2 – GOV_SOC_only_DVt  -332.19 
[-0.26] 
2,705.78* 
[1.86]  
 
δ3 – GOV_SOC_ ENV_DVt  3,072.51*** 
[2.60] 
6,110.48*** 
[4.68] 
3,404.70** 
[2.31] 
η1 – Non-CSR_DVt   3,037.97*** 
[2.84] 
332.19 
[0.26] 
β1 – Salest 0.3551*** 
[6.06] 
0.3148*** 
[5.41] 
0.3148*** 
[5.41] 
0.3148*** 
[5.41] 
β2 – MTBt 685.71*** 
[3.63] 
644.97*** 
[3.48] 
644.97*** 
[3.48] 
644.97*** 
[3.48] 
β3 – ROAt 21,703.73*** 
[4.25] 
20,772.72*** 
[4.08] 
20,772.72*** 
[4.08] 
20,772.72*** 
[4.08] 
β4 – Returnt 39,589.32*** 
[21.04] 
39,614.98*** 
[21.07] 
39,614.98*** 
[21.07] 
39,614.98*** 
[21.07] 
β5 – StdDevROAt 3,880.83 
[0.33] 
5,596.71 
[0.48] 
5,596.71 
[0.48] 
5,596.71 
[0.48] 
β6 – StdDevRett -6,707.14*** 
[-7.12] 
-6,400.74*** 
  [-6.83] 
-6,400.74*** 
[-6.83] 
-6,400.74*** 
[-6.83] 
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β7 – CEOisChairt 4,737.75*** 
[5.46] 
4,581.51*** 
[5.27] 
4,581.51*** 
[5.27] 
4,581.51*** 
[5.27] 
β8 – BoardSizet 727.47*** 
[2.85] 
492.57* 
[1.95] 
492.57* 
[1.95] 
492.57* 
[1.95] 
β9 – InsideDirst 13,538.96* 
[1.74] 
13,928.49* 
[1.80] 
13,928.49* 
[1.80] 
13,928.49* 
[1.80] 
β10 – OutRelDirst -7,369.96** 
[-2.43] 
-6,646.65** 
[-2.21] 
-6,646.65** 
[-2.21] 
-6,646.65** 
[-2.21] 
β11 – Over70Dirst 7,938.75** 
[2.14] 
8,878.27** 
[2.39] 
8,878.27** 
[2.39] 
8,878.27** 
[2.39] 
β12 – BusyDirst 28,240.99** 
[2.36] 
27,611.10** 
[2.31] 
27,611.10** 
[2.31] 
27,611.10** 
[2.31] 
β13 – NonCEOInsStockt 810.71 
[0.81] 
1,379.03 
[1.39] 
1,379.03 
[1.39] 
1,379.03 
[1.39] 
β14 – OutsideBlockt -3,323.12 
[-1.21] 
-3,273.30 
[-1.19] 
-3,273.30 
[-1.19] 
-3,273.30 
[-1.19] 
Intercept 6,592.95 
[1.38] 
7,375.52* 
[1.67] 
4,337.56 
[0.91] 
7,043.34 
[1.52] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 26.64% 26.85% 26.85% 26.85% 
N 9,306 9,306 9,306 9,306 
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Table 7 
CSR Disclosure Quality and CEO Compensation 
Panel A, column (1) of this table provides the OLS regression results on CSR disclosure quality 
and CEO compensation for the total sample using the following model: CEO Compensationi,t = α 
+ γ1CSR_Score_1i,t + η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14Corporate Governance 
Variablesi,t + ε. The dependent variable is Total CEO Compensation and the CSR score variable 
is a continuous measure. In columns (2) through (4), the CSR Score variable is replaced with 
one, two or three of the underlying CSR score variables when estimating the model. Column (2) 
uses the governance score (GOV_Score_1), column (3) uses GOV_Score_1 and the social score 
(SOC_Score_1), and column (4) uses GOV_Score_1, SOC_Score_1, and the environmental 
score (ENV_Score_1). Panel B estimates the model without the Non-CSR indicator variable for 
four CSR subsamples: column (1) includes all CSR firm-years, column (2) includes CSR firm-
years that only provide governance disclosure, column (3) includes CSR firm-years that only 
provide governance and social disclosures, and column (4) includes CSR firm-years that provide 
governance, social and environmental disclosures. All models include robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels or 
better, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Total sample 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
γ1 – CSR_Score_1t 176.48*** 
[3.32] 
   
δ1 – GOV_Score_1t  279.61*** 
[2.62] 
138.22 
[1.22] 
111.56 
[1.00] 
δ2 – SOC_Score_1t   95.85** 
[2.22] 
62.59 
[0.81] 
δ3 – ENV_Score_1t    54.49 
[0.65] 
η1 – Non-CSR_DVt 3,231.19*** 
[2.60] 
14,553.67*** 
[2.67] 
8,164.59 
[1.46] 
6,783.77 
[1.22] 
β1 – Salest 0.3034*** 
[5.01] 
0.3194*** 
[5.25] 
0.3073** 
[4.98] 
0.3016*** 
[5.97] 
β2 – MTBt 671.17*** 
[3.55] 
681.04*** 
[3.60] 
666.68*** 
[3.53] 
668.82*** 
[3.54] 
β3 – ROAt 20,815.91*** 
[4.06] 
20,816.67*** 
[4.05] 
20,724.97*** 
[4.01] 
20,697.39*** 
[4.02] 
β4 – Returnt 39,688.83*** 
[21.08] 
39,673.43*** 
[21.07] 
39,673.75*** 
[21.06] 
39,692.17*** 
[21.07] 
β5 – StdDevROAt 5,438.88 
[0.47] 
4,813.25 
[0.41] 
5,223.97 
[0.45] 
5,438.13 
[0.47] 
β6 – StdDevRett -6,565.62*** 
[-6.99] 
-6,632.58*** 
[-7.05] 
-6,527.41*** 
[-6.94] 
-6,543.12*** 
[-6.94] 
β7 – CEOisChairt 4,578.93*** 
[5.30] 
4,616.30*** 
[5.36] 
4,581.67*** 
[5.31] 
4,569.94*** 
[5.30] 
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β8 – BoardSizet 549.17** 
[2.14] 
610.22** 
[2.42] 
548.80** 
[2.16] 
538.81** 
[2.11] 
β9 – InsideDirst 14,370.65* 
[1.84] 
14,206.05* 
[1.82] 
14,267.45* 
[1.83] 
14,399.04* 
[1.85] 
β10 – OutRelDirst -6,597.42** 
[-2.20] 
-6,790.95** 
[-2.28] 
-6,627.93** 
[-2.22] 
-6,559.37** 
[-2.20] 
β11 – Over70Dirst 8,875.99** 
[2.42] 
8,616.47** 
[2.34] 
8,723.12** 
[2.36] 
8,887.82** 
[2.42] 
β12 – BusyDirst 28,299.40** 
[2.37] 
27,619.66** 
[2.31] 
27,785.18** 
[2.33] 
28,018.04** 
[2.34] 
β13 – NonCEOInsStockt 1,085.03 
[1.09] 
1,021.29 
[1.02] 
1,127.37 
[1.12] 
1,120.09 
[1.11] 
β14 – OutsideBlockt -3,220.60 
[-1.17] 
-3,352.57 
[-1.22] 
-3,289.98 
[-1.20] 
-3,261.46 
[-1.19] 
Intercept 2,951.48 
[0.62] 
-7,781.30 
[-1.01] 
-1,405.19 
[-0.18] 
-344.36 
[-0.05] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 26.77% 26.73% 26.77% 26.77% 
N 9,306 9,306 9,306 9,306 
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Panel B: CSR subsamples 
Variable CSR 
subsample 
(1) 
GOV_only 
subsample 
(2) 
GOV_SOC_only 
subsample 
(3) 
GOV_SOC_ENV 
subsample 
(4) 
γ1 – CSR_Scoret 164.62*** 
[2.93] 
   
δ1 – GOV_Scoret  -181.29 
[-0.51] 
268.84 
[1.61] 
69.75 
[0.33] 
δ2 – SOC_Scoret   273.97 
[1.29] 
-116.44 
[-1.42] 
δ3 – ENV_Scoret    156.44** 
[1.99] 
β1 – Salest 0.3271*** 
[5.19] 
0.5958* 
[1.88] 
0.4502** 
[2.35] 
0.3225*** 
[4.75] 
β2 – MTBt 777.01*** 
[3.59] 
427.85** 
[2.33] 
828.33** 
[2.23] 
743.28** 
[2.21] 
β3 – ROAt 29,390.78*** 
[4.54] 
23,065.39*** 
[3.22] 
21,123.47** 
[2.05] 
44,246.82*** 
[3.02] 
β4 – Returnt 45,663.58*** 
[18.67] 
27,918.14*** 
[10.04] 
50,731.31*** 
[12.28] 
61,039.44*** 
[12.78] 
β5 – StdDevROAt 7,212.75 
[0.48] 
-10,496.44 
[-0.99] 
30,342.09 
[0.99] 
576.89 
[0.02] 
β6 – StdDevRett -6,014.71*** 
[-5.45] 
-3,844.94*** 
[-3.37] 
-3,665.67 
[-1.31] 
-7,012.89*** 
[-2.68] 
β7 – CEOisChairt 4,892.10*** 
[4.57] 
4,320.94*** 
[3.25] 
3,644.35 
[1.64] 
6,309.07*** 
[3.63] 
β8 – BoardSizet 623.14** 
[2.00] 
-66.80 
[-0.17] 
1,163.86* 
[1.90] 
-359.88 
[-0.73] 
β9 – InsideDirst 17,953.88** 
[2.01] 
19,495.17* 
[1.83] 
13,158.39 
[0.85] 
32,753.6 
[1.62] 
β10 – OutRelDirst -6,869.71* 
[-1.90] 
-266.14 
[-0.06] 
-732.58 
[-0.09] 
-15,014.06** 
[-2.53] 
β11 – Over70Dirst 9,321.01** 
[2.17] 
3,643.08 
[0.82] 
10,469.69 
[1.34] 
17,220.01** 
[2.05] 
β12 – BusyDirst 25,727.38* 
[1.73] 
29,129.33 
[1.21] 
37,578.68 
[1.38] 
11,884.31 
[0.58] 
β13 – NonCEOInsStockt 1,534.83 
[1.24] 
2,154.88* 
[1.84] 
4,378.65 
[1.61] 
4,062.83 
[1.43] 
β14 – OutsideBlockt -4,778.85 
[-1.48] 
-11,745.23* 
[-1.95] 
4,189.02 
[0.73] 
-6,217.77 
[-1.50] 
Intercept 4,217.37 
[0.75] 
19,656.49 
[1.03] 
-17,482.77 
[-1.17] 
11,741.21 
[0.90] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 28.76% 27.65% 31.06% 32.43% 
N 6,984 2,256 1,905 2,823 
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Table 8: Additional Analysis on CSR Disclosure Type and CEO Compensation 
This table replicates the OLS regressions of CSR disclosure type and CEO compensation for the 
total sample from Table 6 using TDC1 as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows the results 
for model (1): CEO Compensationi,t = α + γ1 CSR_DVi,t + β1-6Financial Variablesi,t + β7-
14Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε. Column (2) shows the results for model (2): CEO 
Compensationi,t = α + δ1Gov_only_DVi,t + δ2 Gov_Soc_only_DVi,t + δ3 Gov_Soc_Env_DVi,t + 
β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε. Column (3) shows the 
results for model (3): CEO Compensationi,t = α + δ2 Gov_Soc_only_DVi,t + 
δ3Gov_Soc_Env_DVi,t + η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14 Corporate 
Governance Variablesi,t + ε. Column (4) shows the results for model (4): CEO Compensationi,t = 
α + δ1Gov_only_DVi,t + δ3 Gov_Soc_Env_DVi,t + η1 Non-CSR_DVi,t + β1-6 Financial Variablesi,t 
+ β7-14 Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε. All models include robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels or 
better, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent variable = TDC1t 
 
 
Variable Model 1 
(1) 
Model 2 
(2) 
Model 3 
(3) 
Model 4 
(4) 
Reference group: Non-CSR 
firms 
Non-CSR 
firms 
Gov_only 
CSR firms 
Gov_Soc_only 
CSR firms 
γ1 – CSR_DVt 299.65* 
[1.78] 
   
δ1 – GOV_only_DVt  -854.92*** 
[-4.76] 
 -1,199.20*** 
[-6.33] 
δ2 – GOV_SOC_only_DVt  344.28* 
[1.70] 
1,199.20*** 
[6.33] 
 
δ3 – GOV_SOC_ ENV_DVt  1,754.47*** 
[7.03] 
2,609.39*** 
[11.81] 
1,410.19*** 
[6.26] 
η1 – Non-CSR_DVt   854.92*** 
[4.76] 
-344.28* 
[-1.70] 
β1 – Salest 0.1517*** 
[11.67] 
0.1347*** 
[10.56] 
0.1347*** 
[10.56] 
0.1347*** 
[10.56] 
β2 – MTBt 84.50*** 
[3.15] 
67.15** 
[2.49] 
67.15** 
[2.49] 
67.15** 
[2.49] 
β3 – ROAt 3,927.52*** 
[4.29] 
3,527.60*** 
[3.91] 
3,527.60*** 
[3.91] 
3,527.60*** 
[3.91] 
β4 – Returnt 711.35*** 
[6.53] 
721.48*** 
[6.66] 
721.48*** 
[6.66] 
721.48*** 
[6.66] 
β5 – StdDevROAt -4,016.01** 
[-2.11] 
-3,292.64* 
[-1.75] 
-3,292.64* 
[-1.75] 
-3,292.64* 
[-1.75] 
β6 – StdDevRett -116.61 
[-0.71] 
14.69 
[0.09] 
14.69 
[0.09] 
14.69 
[0.09] 
β7 – CEOisChairt 904.67*** 
[5.71] 
837.66*** 
[5.46] 
837.66*** 
[5.46] 
837.66*** 
[5.46] 
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β8 – BoardSizet 539.76*** 
[10.80] 
439.69*** 
[9.06] 
439.69*** 
[9.06] 
439.69*** 
[9.06] 
β9 – InsideDirst -2,094.04* 
[-1.66] 
-1,935.63 
[-1.61] 
-1,935.63 
[-1.61] 
-1,935.63 
[-1.61] 
β10 – OutRelDirst -1,833.69*** 
[-3.41] 
-1,526.97*** 
[-2.84] 
-1,526.97*** 
[-2.84] 
-1,526.97*** 
[-2.84] 
β11 – Over70Dirst 554.76 
[0.81] 
951.36 
[1.43] 
951.36 
[1.43] 
951.36 
[1.43] 
β12 – BusyDirst 7,078.55*** 
[3.81] 
6,792.55*** 
[3.74] 
6,792.55*** 
[3.74] 
6,792.55*** 
[3.74] 
β13 – NonCEOInsStockt -780.29*** 
[-4.59] 
-536.63*** 
[-3.25] 
-536.63*** 
[-3.25] 
-536.63*** 
[-3.25] 
β14 – OutsideBlockt -43.06 
[-0.11] 
-22.81 
[-0.06] 
-22.81 
[-0.06] 
-22.81 
[-0.06] 
Intercept 2,094.57*** 
[3.01] 
2,433.66*** 
[3.83] 
1,578.74** 
[2.36] 
2,777.94*** 
[4.19] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 43.81% 46.00% 46.00% 46.00% 
N 9,306 9,306 9,306 9,306 
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Table 9: Additional Analysis on CSR Disclosure Quality and CEO Compensation 
This table replicates the OLS regressions of CSR disclosure quality and CEO compensation from 
Table 7 using TDC1 as the dependent variable. Panel A uses the total sample and estimates the 
following model in column (1): CEO Compensationi,t = α + γ1CSR_Score_1i,t + η1 Non-
CSR_DVi,t + β1-6Financial Variablesi,t + β7-14Corporate Governance Variablesi,t + ε. The CSR 
score variable is a continuous measure. In columns (2) through (4), the CSR Score variable is 
replaced with one, two or three of the underlying CSR score variables when estimating the 
model. Column (2) uses the governance score (GOV_Score_1), column (3) uses GOV_Score_1 
and the social score (SOC_Score_1), and column (4) uses GOV_Score_1, SOC_Score_1, and the 
environmental score (ENV_Score_1). Panel B estimates the model without the Non-CSR 
indicator variable for four CSR subsamples: column (1) includes all CSR firm-years, column (2) 
includes CSR firm-years that only provide governance disclosure, column (3) includes CSR 
firm-years that only provide governance and social disclosures, and column (4) includes CSR 
firm-years that provide governance, social and environmental disclosures. All models include 
robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels or better, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Total sample 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
γ1 – CSR_Score_1t 84.93*** 
[8.75] 
   
δ1 – GOV_Score_1t  124.37*** 
[6.60] 
40.08** 
[2.05] 
33.80* 
[1.79] 
δ2 – SOC_Score_1t   57.15*** 
[6.72] 
49.32*** 
[3.65] 
δ3 – ENV_Score_1t    12.82 
[0.89] 
η1 – Non-CSR_DVt 1,077.08*** 
[4.98] 
6,009.30*** 
[6.29] 
2,200.01** 
[2.29] 
1,875.16** 
[2.02] 
β1 – Salest 0.1268*** 
[9.35] 
0.1359*** 
[10.20] 
0.1286*** 
[9.74] 
0.1273*** 
[9.50] 
β2 – MTBt 77.51*** 
[3.00] 
82.43*** 
[3.16] 
73.86*** 
[2.85] 
74.37*** 
[2.87] 
β3 – ROAt 3,500.26*** 
[3.93] 
3,532.94*** 
[3.93] 
3,478.27*** 
[3.94] 
3,471.78*** 
[3.92] 
β4 – Returnt 759.23*** 
[7.02] 
748.76*** 
[6.84] 
748.95*** 
[6.92] 
753.28*** 
[6.96] 
β5 – StdDevROAt -3,266.21* 
[-1.75] 
-3,601.25* 
[-1.93] 
-3,356.38* 
[-1.82] 
-3,305.99* 
[-1.79] 
β6 – StdDevRett -48.50 
[-0.30] 
-83.45 
[-0.51] 
-20.74 
[-0.13] 
-24.44 
[-0.15] 
β7 – CEOisChairt 828.24*** 
[5.36] 
850.65*** 
[5.47] 
830.00*** 
[5.37] 
827.25*** 
[5.36] 
 86 
 
 
  
β8 – BoardSizet 453.95*** 
[9.15] 
487.61*** 
[9.79] 
450.99*** 
[9.15] 
448.64*** 
[9.08] 
β9 – InsideDirst -1,693.79 
[-1.37] 
-1,797.30 
[-1.45] 
-1,760.70 
[-1.43] 
-1,729.74 
[-1.41] 
β10 – OutRelDirst -1,461.91*** 
[-2.78] 
-1,576.14*** 
[-2.98] 
-1,478.94*** 
[-2.80] 
-1,462.81*** 
[-2.77] 
β11 – Over70Dirst 1,005.80 
[1.51] 
856.22 
[1.28] 
919.81 
[1.38] 
958.55 
[1.44] 
β12 – BusyDirst 7,106.66*** 
[3.87] 
6,802.17*** 
[3.68] 
6,900.86*** 
[3.78] 
6,955.64*** 
[3.80] 
β13 – NonCEOInsStockt -648.28*** 
[-3.86] 
-686.62*** 
[-4.04] 
-623.38*** 
[-3.68] 
-625.09*** 
[-3.69] 
β14 – OutsideBlockt 6.28 
[0.02] 
-56.16 
[-0.14] 
-18.84 
[-0.05] 
-12.13 
[-0.03] 
Intercept 820.05 
[1.08] 
-3,834.93*** 
[-3.47] 
-33.37 
[-0.03] 
216.20 
[0.19] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 45.51% 44.83% 45.64% 45.66% 
N 9,306 9,306 9,306 9,306 
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Panel B: CSR subsamples 
Variable CSR 
subsample 
(1) 
GOV_only 
subsample 
(2) 
GOV_SOC_only 
subsample 
(3) 
GOV_SOC_ENV 
subsample 
(4) 
γ1 – CSR_Scoret 95.89*** 
[9.43] 
   
δ1 – GOV_Scoret  -61.67 
[-1.08] 
21.47 
[0.62] 
52.87* 
[1.81] 
δ2 – SOC_Scoret   36.07 
[1.23] 
10.86 
[0.64] 
δ3 – ENV_Scoret    25.33 
[1.51] 
β1 – Salest 0.1190*** 
[8.50] 
0.2515*** 
[3.32] 
0.1815*** 
[4.60] 
0.1053*** 
[6.84] 
β2 – MTBt 74.65** 
[2.56] 
60.57* 
[1.89] 
88.88* 
[1.66] 
55.01 
[1.15] 
β3 – ROAt 3,406.21*** 
[2.96] 
1,374.04 
[1.46] 
4,883.09*** 
[2.64] 
2,592.78 
[0.89] 
β4 – Returnt 806.74*** 
[5.76] 
303.79** 
[1.97] 
580.34** 
[2.09] 
1,480.96*** 
[5.11] 
β5 – StdDevROAt -1,321.13 
[-0.54] 
-4,287.87* 
[-1.77] 
3,344.87 
[0.86] 
-2,377.73 
[-0.40] 
β6 – StdDevRett 109.96 
[0.52] 
518.25** 
[2.41] 
214.32 
[0.58] 
-227.68 
[-0.15] 
β7 – CEOisChairt 772.33*** 
[4.20] 
412.36** 
[2.30] 
569.61** 
[1.99] 
1,303.23*** 
[3.85] 
β8 – BoardSizet 464.78*** 
[7.92] 
176.39*** 
[2.89] 
429.79*** 
[4.57] 
476.86*** 
[4.81] 
β9 – InsideDirst -1,038.15 
[-0.69] 
-2,342.54** 
[-2.02] 
-695.19 
[-0.29] 
1,054.18 
[0.29] 
β10 – OutRelDirst -942.16 
[-1.51] 
-438.14 
[-0.65] 
-1,160.10 
[-0.95] 
-1,173.12 
[-1.05] 
β11 – Over70Dirst 1,275.40* 
[1.69] 
76.11 
[0.13] 
1,167.81 
[0.95] 
3,944.53** 
[2.35] 
β12 – BusyDirst 7,641.28*** 
[3.46] 
7,138.77** 
[2.19] 
8,975.01** 
[2.43] 
5,067.73 
[1.56] 
β13 – NonCEOInsStockt -668.50*** 
[-3.27] 
-173.65 
[-1.06] 
-323.29 
[-0.94] 
-273.65 
[-0.48] 
β14 – OutsideBlockt 29.67 
[0.07] 
519.38 
[1.51] 
-29.49 
[-0.04] 
-557.14 
[-0.88] 
Intercept 237.81 
[0.29] 
4,274.99 
[1.56] 
-1,430.47 
[-0.57] 
-114.20 
[0.19] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 46.42% 17.92% 25.38% 45.09% 
N 6,984 2,256 1,905 2,823 
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Appendix A – Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
CSR Variables 
CSR_Score Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a 
company's Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG) disclosure 
Bloomberg 
ENV_Score Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a 
company's environmental disclosure as part of 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) data 
Bloomberg 
SOC_Score Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a 
company's social disclosure as part of Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) data 
Bloomberg 
GOV_Score Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a 
company's governance disclosure as part of 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) data 
Bloomberg 
CSR_DV Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a 
CSR_Score in a given fiscal year; zero otherwise 
Calculated 
GOV_only_DV Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has both a 
CSR_Score and a GOV_Score in a given fiscal year, 
but neither an ENV_Score or SOC_Score; zero 
otherwise 
Calculated 
GOV_SOC_only_DV Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a 
CSR_Score, a GOV_Score, and a SOC_Score in a 
given fiscal year, but not an ENV_Score; zero 
otherwise 
Calculated 
GOV_SOC_ENV_D
V 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a 
CSR_Score, a GOV_Score, a SOC_Score, and an 
ENV_Score in a given fiscal year; zero otherwise 
Calculated 
CSR_Score_1 Continuous number set equal to CSR_Score if 
CSR_DV equals 1; zero otherwise 
Calculated 
ENV_Score_1 Continuous number set equal to ENV_Score if 
GOV_SOC_ENV_DV equals 1; zero otherwise 
Calculated 
SOC_Score_1 Continuous number set equal to SOC_Score if 
GOV_SOC_ENV_DV equals 1 or 
GOV_SOC_only_DV equals 1; zero otherwise 
Calculated 
GOV_Score Continuous number set equal to GOV_Score if 
GOV_SOC_ENV_DV equals 1 or 
GOV_SOC_only_DV equals 1 or GOV_only_DV 
equals 1; zero otherwise 
Calculated 
Non-CSR_DV Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm does not have a 
CSR_Score in a given fiscal year; zero otherwise 
Calculated 
Financial Variables 
Sales Total sales in millions (SALE) for firm i in year t  Compustat – 
Fundamentals Annual 
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Variable Definition Source 
MTB The ratio of market value of equity (MKVALT) to 
book value of equity (CEQ) for firm i, averaged across 
the five years ending in year t 
Compustat – 
Fundamentals Annual 
ROA The ratio of annual earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) for firm i in year t to lagged total assets (AT) 
Compustat – 
Fundamentals Annual 
Return The one-year total return to shareholders, including the 
monthly reinvestment of dividends (TRS1YR), for firm 
i in year t 
ExecuComp – Company 
Financial and Director 
Compensation 
StdDevROA The standard deviation of ROA for firm i, across the 
five years ending in year t 
Compustat – 
Fundamentals Annual 
StdDevRet The standard deviation of Return for firm i, across the 
five years ending in year t 
ExecuComp – Company 
Financial and Director 
Compensation 
Governance Variables 
CEOisChair Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the 
current Chairman of the board of directors; else zero 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies 
BoardSize Total number of all directors on a given board 
(excluding Emeritus or Advisory member positions) 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies 
InsideDirs Percentage of directors who are executives of the 
company, scaled by BoardSize 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies 
OutRelDirs Percentage of all independent directors on a given 
board that have or have had a significant relationship 
with the company, scaled by BoardSize 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies 
Over70Dirs Percentage of all directors over the age of 70 on a 
given board, scaled by BoardSize 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies 
BusyDirs Percentage of directors with more than 4 corporate 
(public) directorships on a given board, scaled by 
BoardSize 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies 
NonCEOInsStock Indicator variable equal to 1 if top management other 
than the CEO and directors hold an estimated 5% or 
greater of the firm’s outstanding shares; zero otherwise 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies; ExecuComp 
– Annual Compensation 
OutsideBlock Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has an external 
shareholder that holds at least 5% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares; zero otherwise 
GMI Ratings – 
Companies 
Compensation Variables 
Total CEO 
Compensation 
Total CEO compensation in thousands of dollars, 
defined as the change in cumulative CEO wealth with 
firm i from year t-1 to year t. Please refer to Appendix 
B for a detailed explanation of how this variable is 
measured. 
Calculated (ExecuComp – 
Annual Compensation, 
Outstanding Equity 
Awards; Compustat – 
Fundamentals Annual) 
TDC1 2006 reporting format, which is comprised of the 
following: Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity Incentive Plan 
ExecuComp – Annual 
Compensation 
 90 
Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of Option 
Awards, Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards, 
Deferred Compensation Earnings Reported as 
Compensation, and Other Compensation 
All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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Appendix B – CEO compensation measurement and analysis 
 In this appendix I describe the process used to measure Total CEO Compensation. By 
explaining the variable calculation, I will highlight its similarities and differences with respect to 
the measure more typically utilized in empirical studies on CEO compensation, TDC124. 
I define Total CEO Compensation as the change in CEO cumulative wealth related to firm i 
from year t – 1 to year t. Included in this variable are the following: salary, bonus, non-equity 
incentives, other compensation, the change in the fair value from year t – 1 to year t of the 
CEO’s entire stock options, restricted stock, and common stock portfolios, the change in the 
CEO’s pension from year t – 1 to year t, and the cash realized upon the exercise of stock options. 
ExecuComp defines its primary compensation variable, TDC1, as total compensation in 
thousands of dollars calculated using the: 
“2006 reporting format, which is comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity 
Incentive Plan Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards, Grant-Date Fair 
Value of Stock Awards, Deferred Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation, and 
Other Compensation.” 
 
For illustrative purposes, I’ve randomly chosen one firm-year from the sample with which to 
walk through both of these variable calculations in detail: Cytec Industries, Inc. for FY2011, 
whose CEO was Shane D. Fleming. 
1. Cytec Industries, Inc. – FY2011 
The following table presents the components of Total CEO Compensation and TDC1 for 
Cytec Industries, Inc. CEO, Shane D. Fleming, in FY2011 (all amounts are in thousands): 
                                                 
24 Studies using TDC1 for total compensation include but are not limited to: Carter et al. (2007), Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009), Faulkender and Yang (2010), Ferri and Sandino (2009), Graham et al. (2011), and Guthrie et al. 
(2012). 
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 Total CEO Compensation TDC1 
Salary $840.48 $840.48 
Bonus $0 $0 
Non-equity incentives $3,371.48 $3,371.48 
Other compensation $368.44 $368.44 
Stock options ($1,372.01) $1,292.08 
Restricted stock ($33.93) $388.34 
Common stock ($446.05) N/A 
Pension change $121.78 N/A 
Cash realized from stock option exercises $0 N/A 
Deferred compensation N/A $0 
Total: $2,850.19 $6,260.82 
 
The treatment of salary, bonus, non-equity incentives, and other compensation is identical for 
both variables, so the remainder of the discussion will focus on the stock options, restricted 
stock, and common stock components. 
1.1 Stock options 
The stock option component in Total CEO Compensation is calculated as the change in the 
fair value of the CEO’s entire outstanding stock option portfolio at fiscal year-end 2010 and 
fiscal year-end 2011. I first obtained the detail of the CEO’s outstanding stock option grants at 
each fiscal year-end, including the grant date and number of outstanding options (total options 
that have not yet been exercised). Then I calculated the Black-Scholes fair value for each grant, 
necessarily incorporating three assumptions as disclosed by the firms: risk-free rate, volatility, 
and dividend yield. One caveat to this approach is that due to data limitations, each outstanding 
grant at any given fiscal year-end will be based on the same three assumptions as all other 
outstanding grants for that firm’s fiscal year-end; however, in practice the fair value calculation 
would be performed when stock options are granted and would therefore be based on the risk-
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free rate, volatility, and dividend yield specific to that point in time. Since the individual 
assumptions that would have been used to value each grant on the original grant date are not 
available, I am approximating them using the annual assumptions provided by the firm. 
The following table outlines the stock option grants in which the CEO had outstanding (i.e., 
unexercised) options as of fiscal year-end 2010 and 2011, as well as the Black-Scholes fair value 
that I calculated for each grant, rounded to two decimal places: 
 FYE 2010 FYE 2011 
 Stock 
Option 
Grant Date 
Outstanding 
Options 
Fair Value Stock 
Option 
Grant Date 
Outstanding 
Options 
Fair Value 
 1/18/2005 15,000 22.26 1/18/2005 15,000 11.93 
 2/7/2006 22,000 23.90 2/7/2006 22,000 13.35 
 1/30/2007 20,000 23.27 1/30/2007 20,000 12.75 
 1/28/2008 25,000 26.68 1/28/2008 25,000 15.58 
 6/26/2008 11,250 26.66 6/26/2008 11,250 15.50 
 1/28/2009 100,000 38.72 1/28/2009 100,000 26.97 
 1/27/2010 82,150 26.55 1/27/2010 82,150 21.85 
    1/26/2011 62,030 19.17 
Total: 12/31/2010 275,400 $8,345.11 12/31/2011 337,430 $6,972.62 
 
To calculate the total fair value of the stock options portfolio at each fiscal year-end (shown in 
the last row of the table above), I multiply the outstanding options per grant by the fair value for 
the grant and then add them together. Finally, I take the difference between these two totals to 
calculate the stock options component of Total CEO Compensation. 
In comparison, the CEO’s stock option portion of TDC1 for fiscal year-end 2011 includes 
only the grant he received on 1/26/2011. Furthermore, this grant was valued using a binomial-
lattice option valuation model (as opposed to a Black-Scholes model). Although this type of 
model also considers the risk-free rate, volatility, and dividend yield, it is more complex to use 
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and requires other estimates (e.g., number of discrete time periods within each option grant) that 
are not readily available. However, in the company’s 2011 10-K, it notes that the weighted 
average fair value per option at 12/31/2011 is $20.83, which is very similar to the Black-Scholes 
fair value I calculated above of $19.17. 
Despite the use of different option valuation models, this is a good example of the cumulative 
effect that stock options can have on CEO wealth. If a CEO has outstanding options from 
numerous grants, many of which were made in previous periods, then how the value of all his 
outstanding options changes over time will impact how the CEO’s wealth also changes over 
time. In this particular case, although the CEO was granted more options in 2011 the fair value 
of his overall portfolio decreased from 2010, causing a reduction in his wealth in 2011. If the 
only grant considered as compensation in 2011 is the new grant made that year, then it ignores 
the potential downside (or upside) of the changes in wealth associated with the CEO’s remaining 
outstanding stock options. 
1.2 Restricted stock 
The restricted stock component in Total CEO Compensation is calculated as the average 
percentage of unvested restricted stock shares/units held by the CEO at fiscal year-end 2010 and 
fiscal year-end 2011, multiplied by the product of the company’s annual stock return for fiscal 
year 2011 and the company’s market capitalization at fiscal year-end 2011. The following table 
outlines the restricted stock grants in which the CEO had unvested shares/units as of fiscal year-
end 2010 and 2011: 
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 FYE 2010 FYE 2011 
 Stock Award 
Grant Date 
Unvested Stock 
Shares/Units 
Stock Award 
Grant Date 
Unvested Stock 
Shares/Units 
 1/27/2010 9,286   
Total: 12/31/2010 9,286 12/31/2011 0 
Total outstanding shares: 12/31/2010 49,445,000 12/31/2011 45,509,000 
Unvested stock (%): 12/31/2010 0.0204% 12/31/2011 0 
 
Incorporating the entirety of the CEO’s outstanding restricted stock portfolio at each fiscal year-
end results in an average unvested restricted stock holding of 0.0102% for fiscal year 2011. The 
company had an annual return of -15.02% in fiscal year 2011 and the market capitalization (in 
thousands) at fiscal year-end 2011 was $2,214,015. As a result, the restricted stock component of 
Total CEO Compensation for fiscal year 2011 is -$33.93 (0.0102% x -15.02% x $2,214.02). 
 The restricted stock component in TDC1 is calculated as the grant date fair value of the 
restricted stock awards made to the CEO in fiscal year 2011. According to the company’s proxy 
statement, the CEO received one restricted stock award in 2011 of 7,542 time-based restricted 
stock units and it is valued at $51.49. Therefore, the value of the restricted stock component of 
TDC1 for fiscal year 2011 is the product of the two, or $388.34. Although there is a slight 
discrepancy between what ExecuComp reported for the CEO’s restricted stock holdings as of 
fiscal year-end 2011 (nothing) and what is being included in TDC1 for the 2011 restricted stock 
grants, this still does not address the fact that the CEO’s restricted stock grant from 2010 is still 
outstanding in 2011, and as such, has decreased in value as a result of the company’s 
performance. Restricted stock, similar to the stock options, illustrates that even with new equity 
grants in a period, the CEO can still experience wealth reductions (or increases) as a result of the 
loss (gain) in value of any previously granted restricted stock shares. This wealth effect is not 
captured in TDC1. 
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1.3 Common stock 
The common stock component in Total CEO Compensation is calculated as the average 
percentage of outstanding common stock, excluding stock options, held by the CEO at fiscal 
year-end 2010 and fiscal year-end 2011, multiplied by the product of the company’s annual stock 
return for fiscal year 2011 and the company’s market capitalization at fiscal year-end 2011. The 
following table outlines the outstanding common stock held by the CEO as of fiscal year-end 
2010 and 2011: 
 FYE 2010 FYE 2011 
Total CEO outstanding 
shares: 
12/31/2010 60,774 12/31/2011 66,147 
Total outstanding 
shares: 
12/31/2010 49,445,000 12/31/2011 45,509,000 
Common stock (%): 12/31/2010 0.123% 12/31/2011 0.145% 
 
Incorporating the entirety of the CEO’s outstanding common stock shares, excluding stock 
options, at each fiscal year-end results in an average common stock holding of 0.134% for fiscal 
year 2011. The company had an annual return of -15.02% in fiscal year 2011 and the market 
capitalization (in thousands) at fiscal year-end 2011 was $2,214,015. As a result, the common 
stock component of Total CEO Compensation for fiscal year 2011 is -$446.05 (0.134% x -
15.02% x $2,214,015). There is no allowance for a change in the value of the CEO’s common 
stock holdings within TDC1. 
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Appendix C – Excerpts from CSR disclosures 
Example 1 – Chesapeake Energy, 2014 Corporate Responsibility Report 
The following excerpt comes from the “Letter to our Stakeholders”, written by Robert D. 
Lawler, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director, on page 1 (emphasis added): 
 
“This performance is the foundation for our goals in 2015 as we aim to further improve our 
safety and spills records for the benefit of our employees and the areas where we operate. 
Although we face a challenging commodity price environment, our commitment to operating 
responsibly remains at the forefront of our company culture. We will not sacrifice the safety of 
our employees or business partners, the livelihood of our communities or the reputation of our 
company for financial gain.” 
 
The following highlights are also noted on page 1 of the report (emphasis added): 
 
“KEY CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
» Achieved the best safety performance in the company’s history 
» Reduced cumulative reportable spill volume by more than 40% 
» Introduced a revised Supplier Code of Conduct and trained nearly 3,000 business partners 
» Launched a program that aligns employee compensation to top financial and operational 
metrics, including safety and environmental performance” 
 
This excerpt comes from a section entitled, “Board Accountability and Oversight”, on page 7 of 
the report (emphasis added): 
 
“Introducing Chesapeake’s core values in 2013 helped establish a culture of accountability 
across the organization. To maintain and grow this values-based culture requires continued 
commitment at the Board of Directors and executive level. The committees of the Board…have 
selective oversight over corporate responsibility matters, and the entire Board is responsible for 
Chesapeake’s overall responsibility performance. For further accountability, the Board 
established an executive compensation program that aligns pay with performance. When 
determining executive compensation, directors review both the company’s performance and 
the executive’s performance according to strategic financial, environmental and safety goals 
set each year. Both of these objective evaluation measures reward actions that drive 
shareholder value.” 
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Example 2 – Texas Instruments, 2014 Corporate Citizenship Report 
The following excerpt comes from the “Executive Statement”, written by Rich Templeton, 
Chairman, President, and CEO, on page 2 of the report (emphasis added): 
 
“During the year, we asked our employees, customers, investors, community leaders and others 
for their perspective on the most important social and environmental issues related to TI 
operations. We took that feedback and used it to identify new ways to advance our 
performance. In 2014, through our efforts to engage people, support our communities and 
innovate solutions, we strengthened TI, and at the same time reduced the environmental 
impact of our operations and improved the way people live around the world.” 
 
The following excerpt is in the “Report Overview” section, on page 3 of the report (emphasis 
added): 
 
“Citizenship is a commitment to hold ourselves accountable for our social, environmental and 
economic impact around the world. We strive to measure and learn from our performance 
annually. Operating responsibly is the way we do business. TI’s 2014 Corporate Citizenship 
Report provides a comprehensive overview of the company’s social and environmental 
performance in fiscal year 2014. As part of this process, we conducted a formal stakeholder 
assessment that included peer benchmarking, an employee survey and stakeholder interviews. 
The assessment helped us understand which environmental, social and governance initiatives 
are most important to our stakeholders and determine where to focus our efforts.” 
 
The following excerpt comes from the “Business continuity” section, on page 18 of the report 
(emphasis added): 
 
“The purpose of TI's business continuity program is to identify risks and prepare for potential 
business impacts to minimize or avoid any resulting interruption to TI's operations or supply 
chain. We monitor risks at each of our locations and within our supply chain such as 
earthquakes, extreme weather events and water-related issues that could reduce or disrupt our 
supply chain and/or production. We conduct more formal risk assessments every two years, or 
as major changes require, such as the purchase of new facilities. This assessment process 
includes the identification of existing controls (such as supplemental power generation) or the 
need for additional controls. Our facilities in Texas and China have become more vulnerable to 
prolonged droughts. Our facilities in Texas, Asia and Japan are also susceptible to hurricanes, 
tornadoes and typhoons. See more in Climate change and Water use. In 2014, we completed 
scheduled training and exercises for TI assembly and test facilities, further enhanced our supply-
chain response plan, and worked with our suppliers to mitigate raw material and component 
risks. In 2015, TI will further refine and improve its crisis management and business 
continuity program by implementing strict metrics through a new company initiative called 
Readiness 2 Recover. This will improve our ability to measure effectiveness and compliance 
with business continuity program requirements.” 
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Appendix D – Excerpts from proxy statements 
Example 1 – The Coca-Cola Company proxy statement, 3/5/2009 
The following excerpt comes from the “Annual Incentive” section of the proxy statement, on 
page 39, and refers to the compensation for E. Neville Isdell, the CEO of Coca-Cola from June 
2004 through June 30, 2008, and Chairman of the Board of Directors through April 22, 2009 
(emphasis added): 
 
“In utilizing its discretion, the Compensation Committee considered a number of quantitative 
and qualitative factors, including, but not limited to, volume growth, earnings per share growth, 
global volume and value share gains and overall Company operating performance in the current 
economic climate. In addition, the Compensation Committee also considered performance 
against individual goals as follows: 
 
Mr. Isdell: Mr. Isdell led a seamless Chief Executive Officer transition, enabling management 
and employees to focus on delivering business results. In addition, in his continued role as 
Chairman of the Board, Mr. Isdell continued to enhance the external perception of the 
Company in the areas of social responsibility and diversity. Mr. Isdell's strategic leadership in 
the first half of the year as Chief Executive Officer contributed substantially to the Company's 
solid operating performance. 
 
Example 2 – Philip Morris International, Inc. proxy statement, 4/1/2011 
The following excerpt comes from the “Executive Compensation” section of the proxy 
statement, on page 29, within the “Analysis of 2010 Performance Ratings” subsection (emphasis 
added): 
 
“In addition to these six performance measures, the Committee also evaluated our performance 
on the following key strategic initiatives:  
 • 
 
the highly promising transaction with Fortune Tobacco in the Philippines, which widened 
our share leadership in Asia;  
 • 
 
our continued efforts to pursue comprehensive, evidence-based regulation governing the 
manufacture, marketing, sale, use and taxation of tobacco products;  
 • 
 
our product and other innovation initiatives;  
 • 
 
achievement of our three-year productivity target of $1.5 billion in gross savings set at the 
time of the spin-off; 
 • 
 
our efforts and results in improving our environmental, health and safety record;  
 • 
 
our continued progress in nurturing and developing our talent pool and future leadership; 
and  
 • 
 
our robust control, compliance and integrity programs.” 
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Appendix E – Breakdown of data points underlying CSR variables in Bloomberg 
In order for Bloomberg to calculate its proprietary CSR variables (ESG_Score, ENV_Score, 
SOC_Score, and GOV_Score), they examine 758 data points (as of February 2016), as reflected 
in the ESG portion of their terminals. The following is a list of those data points by CSR variable 
(as of February 2016): 
Environmental (ENV_Score) (276) 
 Audit/Verification (3) 
  Verification Type 
  Assurance Auditor 
  Latest Period End Date 
 Certifications (3) 
  ISO 14001 Certified Sites 
  Number of Sites 
  % Sites Certified 
 Damages (5) 
  Number of Spill 
  Number of Environmental Fines 
  Environmental Fines (Amount) 
  Amount of Spills (Th Tonnes) 
  Hydrocarbon Spills 
 Emission (69) 
  Mercury Emissions 
  Direct CO2 Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Indirect CO2 Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Total CO2 Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  CO2 Intensity (Tonnes) 
  Total GHG Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Travel Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Nitrogen Oxide Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Sulphur Dioxide Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  VOC Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Carbon Monoxide Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Methane Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  ODS Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Particulate Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Emissions Reduction Initiatives 
  GHG Scope 1 
  GHG Scope 2 
  GHG Scope 3 
  Sulphur Oxide Emissions (Th Tonnes) 
  Direct Nitrous Oxide Emissions 
  Direct Sulfur Hexafluoride Emissions 
  Direct Methane Emissions in CO2 Equivalent 
  Direct Nitrous Oxide Emissions in CO2 Equivalent 
  Direct HFC Emissions in CO2 Equivalent 
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  Direct PFC Emissions in CO2 Equivalent 
  Direct SF6 Emissions in CO2 Equivalent 
  Carbon Dioxide Intensity per Sales Calculation 
  Total Greenhouse Gas / Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
  Scope 1 Greenhouse Gas / Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
  Scope 2 Greenhouse Gas / Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
  Sulphur Dioxide / Sulphur Oxide Emissions 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Sales 
  Scope 1 GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Sales 
  Scope 2 GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Sales 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per EBITDA 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Energy 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Employee 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Assets 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per MBOE 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Vehicle Sold 
  Tot GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Elec Sold 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per RPM 
  Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity PSF Meter 
  Embedded Carbon in Total Reserves 
  Embedded Carbon in Oil Reserves 
  Embedded Carbon in Gas Reserves 
  Gas Flaring per MBOE 
  NOx Emissions per Sales 
  SOx Emissions per Sales 
  GHG Scope 1 Intensity per Power Generated 
  Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Sales 
  Greenhouse Gas Intensity per EBITDA 
  Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Energy Consumption 
  Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Employee 
  Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Retail Elec Sold 
  Travel Related Greenhouse Gas per Employee 
  Carbon Dioxide Intensity per EBITDA 
  Carbon Dioxide Intensity per Employee 
  Carbon Dioxide Intensity per Retail Elec Sold 
  Travel Related Carbon Dioxide per Employee 
  Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Assets 
  Carbon Dioxide Intensity per Assets 
  GHG Scope 1 Intensity per Sales 
GHG Scope 2 Intensity per Sales 
Travel Emissions per Sales 
Greenhouse Gas Intensity per MBOE 
Carbon Dioxide Intensity per MBOE 
GHG Intensity per Vehicle Sold 
CO2 Intensity per Vehicle Sold 
Industry Specific (89) 
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 Energy (74) 
  Utilities (74) 
   Coal Energy Capacity 
   Gas Energy Capacity 
   Fossil Fuels Energy Capacity 
   Nuclear Energy Capacity 
   Hydro Energy Capacity 
    Wind Energy Capacity 
    Solar Energy Capacity 
    Biomass Energy Capacity 
    Waste Energy Capacity 
    Other Renewables Energy Capacity 
    Total Renewables Energy Capacity 
    Coal % Energy Capacity 
    Gas % Energy Capacity 
   Fossil Fuels % Energy Capacity 
   Nuclear % Energy Capacity 
   Hydro % Energy Capacity 
    Wind % Energy Capacity 
    Solar % Energy Capacity 
    Biomass % Energy Capacity 
    Waste % Energy Capacity 
    Other Renewables % Energy Capacity 
    Total Renewables % Energy Capacity 
   Coal Energy Production 
   Gas Energy Production 
   Fossil Fuels Energy Production 
   Nuclear Energy Production 
   Hydro Energy Production 
    Wind Energy Production 
    Solar Energy Production 
    Biomass Energy Production 
    Waste Energy Production 
    Other Renewables Energy Production 
    Total Renewables Energy Production 
    Purchased Electricity 
    Purchased Electricity Coal 
    Purchased Electricity Gas 
    Purchased Electricity Fossil Fuels 
    Purchased Electricity Nuclear 
    Purchased Electricity Hydro 
    Purchased Electricity Wind 
    Purchased Electricity Solar 
    Purchased Electricity Biomass 
    Purchased Electricity Waste 
    Purchased Electricity Other Renewables 
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    Purchased Electricity Total Renewables 
    Electricity Gen Capacity Thermal Coal/Lig MW 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Thermal Oil MW 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Thermal CHP MW 
    Electricity Gen Capacity Thermal Multifuel MW 
    Electricity Gen Capacity Renewables Geothermal MW 
    Electricity Gen Cap Therm Oth Non Renewables MW 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Thermal Lignite % 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Thermal Oil % 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Thermal CHP % 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Thermal Multiple % 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Geothermal % 
    Electricity Gen Capacity Other Non Renewable % 
    Electricity Produced Thermal Coal and Lignite GWh 
    Electricity Produced Thermal Oil Gigawatt Hours 
    Electricity Produced Thermal CHP GWh 
    Electricity Produced Thermal Multifuel GWh 
    Electricity Produced Renewables Geothermal GWh 
    Electricity Produced Therm Oth Non Renewables GWh 
    Fuel Used in Electricity Generation NatGas GWh 
    Fuel Used in Electricity Gen Fuel Oil Thousand MT 
    Fuel Used in Electricity Gen Biomass Thousand MT 
    CO2 Emissions Less Allowances Mil MT Under EU ETS 
    Carbon Dioxide Allowances Million MT Under EU ETS 
    Electricity Generation Capacity Thermal Coal/LC MW 
    Electricity Produced Thermal Coal/LC GWh 
    Electricity Generation Capacity – Total Megawatts 
    Carbon Dioxide Emissions Million MT under EU ETS 
    Heat Generation Capacity Thermal CHP in MW 
    Heat Produced Thermal CHP in GWh 
  Other (15) 
   Gas Flaring (Th Tonnes) 
   Nuclear % of Total Energy Production 
   Solar % of Total Energy Production 
   Phones Recycled 
   SRI Assets Under Management 
   Greenhouse Gas Intensity per RPM 
   Carbon Dioxide Intensity per RPM 
   Fuel Consumption per RPM 
   SRI Assets % Total AUM 
   Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Square Foot 
   Carbon Dioxide Intensity per Square Foot 
   Energy Intensity per Square Foot 
   Water Intensity per Square Foot 
   Greenhouse Gas Intensity per GwH Sold 
   Carbon Dioxide Intensity per GwH Sold 
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 Other (14) 
  Green Building Policy 
  Environmental Quality Management Policy 
  Investments in Operational Sustainability 
  Climate Change Policy 
  Environmental Accounting Cost 
  Biodiversity Policy 
  Climate Change Opportunities Discussed 
  Risks of Climate Change Discussed 
  Taxes Paid to Governments 
  Consistent Reporting Basis 
  R&D Expenditures per Cash Flow 
  ESG Disclosure Score 
  Environmental Disclosure Score 
  Sustainable Investment/Capital Expenditures 
 Product (3) 
  BNEF New Energy Exposure Rating 
  BNEF Nuclear Exposure Rating 
  New Products – Climate Change 
 Resource Consumption (69) 
  Total Energy Consumption (MWh) 
  Renewable Energy Use (MWh) 
  Total Water Use 
  % Water Recycled 
  Discharges to Water 
  Paper Consumption (Th Tonnes) 
  Raw Materials Used (Th Tonnes) 
  % Recycled Materials 
  Energy Efficiency Policy 
  Sustainable Packaging 
  Electricity Used 
  Water per Unit of Production 
  Total Power Generated 
  Waste Sent to Landfills 
  Fuel Used – Coal/Lignite 
  Fuel Used – Natural Gas 
  Fuel Used – Crude Oil/Diesel 
  Process Water Used 
  Surface Water Withdrawals 
  Groundwater Withdrawals 
  Salt Water Withdrawals 
  Municipal Water Use 
  Reclaimed Water Use 
  Total Water Recycled 
  Chemical Oxygen Demand of Discharges 
  Biological Oxygen Demand of Discharges 
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  Cooling Water Inflow 
  Cooling Water Outflow 
  Water Policy 
  Mining Overburden 
  Total Water Withdrawal 
  Water Use/Withdrawal 
  Water Use/Withdrawal Intensity per Sales 
  Water Use/Withdrawal Intensity per EBITDA 
  Water Use/Withdrawal Intensity per Energy Consumed 
  Water Use/Withdrawal Intensity per MBOE 
  Water Use/Withdrawal Intensity per Employee 
  Water Use/Withdrawal Intensity per Assets 
  Water Use/Withdrawal Intensity per Power Generated 
  Waste Intensity per Employee 
  Energy Intensity per Revenue Passenger Miles/Kms 
  NOx Intensity per Revenue Passenger Miles/Kms 
  SO2/SOx Intensity per Revenue Passenger Miles/Kms 
  GHG/CO2 Intensity per Power Generated 
  GHG Intensity per Power Generated 
  CO2 Intensity per Power Generated 
  NOx Intensity per Power Generated 
  SO2/SOx Intensity per Power Generated 
  NOx Intensity per MBOE 
  SO2/SOx Intensity per MBOE 
  Spills per MBOE 
  CO2 Intensity per Energy Consumed 
  Water Use per Power Generated 
  Energy Intensity per Sales 
  Energy Intensity per EBITDA 
  Energy Intensity per Employee 
  Energy Intensity per MBOE Produced 
  Water Intensity per Sales 
  Water Intensity per EBITDA 
  Water Intensity per Energy Consumption 
  Water Intensity per Employee 
  Paper Consumption per Employee 
  Energy Intensity per Assets 
  Water Intensity per Assets 
  Paper Consumption per Sales 
  Water Usage Efficiency Rate 
  Water Intensity per MBOE 
  Energy Intensity per Vehicle Sold 
  Water Intensity per Vehicle Sold 
 Scope of Coverage (2) 
  Percent of Disclosure 
  Scope of Disclosure 
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 Supply Chain (7) 
  Environmental Supply Chain Management 
  Number of Suppliers Audited 
  Number of Supplier Audits Conducted 
  Social Supply Chain Management 
  Number Supplier Facilities Audited 
  Number of Customer Complaints 
  Total Recordable Incident Rate 
 Waste Management (12) 
  Hazardous Waste (Th Tonnes) 
  Total Waste (Th Tonnes) 
  Waste Recycled (Th Tonnes) 
  Paper Recycled (Th Tonnes) 
  Waste Reduction Policy 
  Total Water Discharged 
  Drilling Waste 
  Tailings Waste 
  Water Discharge Percent 
  Waste Generated per Assets 
  Waste Generated per Sales 
  Waste Generated per Vehicle Sold 
 
Social (SOC_Score) (50) 
 Community (10) 
  Community Spending 
  Sustain Sup Guidelines Encomp ESG Area Pub Disclsd 
  Intellectual Property Rights Protection Policy 
  Quality Assurance and Recall Policy 
  Consumer Data Protection Policy 
  Equator Principles Signatory 
  Community Spending/Profit Before Tax 
  Social Disclosure Score 
  Community Spending Percentage of EBITDA 
  Community Spending Percentage of Total Equity 
 Employee (40) 
  Number of Employees – CSR 
  Employee Turnover % 
  % Employees Unionized 
  % Women in Management 
  % Women in Workforce 
  % Minorities in Management 
  % Minorities in Workforce 
  Workforce Accidents – Employees 
  Lost Time from Accidents 
  Fatalities – Contractors 
  Fatalities – Employees 
 107 
  Fatalities – Total 
  Health and Safety Policy 
  Equal Opportunity Policy 
  Human Rights Policy 
  Training Policy 
  Fair Remuneration Policy 
  Employee Average Age 
  % Disabled in Workforce 
  Lost Time Incident Rate 
  Employee CSR Training 
  Employee Training Cost 
  Fatalities – Third Party 
  Total Hours Spent by Firm – Employee Training 
  Number of Part-Time Employees 
  Number of Temporary Employees 
  Number of Contractors 
  Total Accidents – Contractors 
  Lost Time Incident Rate – Contractors 
  Total Recordable Incident Rate – Contractors 
  Policy Against Child Labor 
  BBBEE Rating Level 
  BBBEE Overall Score 
  BBBEE and Black/HDSA Ownership Percentage 
  Actual Cash Flow per Employee 
  Actual Personnel Expenses per Employee 
  Training Spending per Employee 
  Fatalities per 1000 employees 
  Accidents per 1000 employees 
  Lost Time per Employee 
 
Governance (GOV_Score) (432) 
 Audit/Verification (7) 
  GRI Criteria Compliance 
  UN Global Compact Signatory 
  Bloomberg Survey Completed 
  PRI Signatory 
  Global Reporting Initiatives Checked 
  Auditor Ratification 
  Years Auditor Employed 
 Board (125) 
  Board Size 
  # Non Executive Directors on Board 
  % Non Exec Directors on Board 
  # Employee Reps on Board 
  # Non Employee Directors on Board 
  CEO Duality 
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  Executive Chair (Y/N) 
  CEO Promoted from Within 
  Youngest Director Age 
  Oldest Director Age 
  Board Age Range 
  Board Average Age 
  Number of Executives 
  Size of Audit Committee 
  # Execs on Audit Committee 
  # Non Execs on Audit Committee 
  # Members of Comp Committee 
  # Execs on Comp Committee 
  # Non Execs on Comp Committee 
  # CEOs on Comp Committee 
  Size of Nomination Committee 
  # Execs on Nomination Committee 
  # Non Execs on Nomination Committee 
  CSR/Sustainability Committee (Y/N) 
  Average Exec Tenure 
  Average Board Tenure 
  Tenure of Longest Serving Board Member 
  # Non Employee Board Members Holding Shares 
  % Non Employee Board Members Holding Shares 
  % Shares Outstanding Held by Non Emp Board Members 
  % Shares Outstanding Held by CEO 
  % Shares Outstanding Held by Chair 
  Size of Executive Committee 
  # Non Exec Directors on Exec Committee 
  CEO on the Board (Y/N) 
  Is CEO on Compensation Committee? 
  # Comp Cmte Members in Comp Cmte List of Other Org 
  % Non Executive Directors on Audit Committee 
  % Non Executive Directors on Comp Committee 
  % Non Executive Directors on Nomination Committee 
  % Non Executive Directors on Executive Committee 
  Longest Serving Board Member Name 
  # Board Members Serving > 5 Years 
  # Board Members Serving > 10 Years 
  Highest # Boards Any Director Serves Ex CEO 
  Name of Director with Highest # Board Positions 
  Average Executive Age 
  Chief Executive Officer Tenure 
  % Non Executive Directors on 3+ Boards 
  % of Executive Directors on 2+ Boards 
  % Audit Committee Members on 3+ Boards 
  % Comp Cmte Members in Comp Cmte List of Other Org 
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  IR Title 
  IR Tenure 
  Chief Executive Officer Age 
  Chairman Age 
  Chairman Tenure 
  Chief Financial Officer Name 
  Number of Chair Positions Chairman Holds 
  Size of the Board 
  Number of Independent Directors 
  % Independent Directors 
  Board Duration (Years) 
  Number of Board Meetings for the Year 
  Board Meeting Attendance % 
  % Women on Board 
  Board Average Age 
  Board Age Limit 
  CEO Duality 
  Audit Committee Meetings 
  Independent Lead Director 
  Presiding Director 
  Outside Compensation Advisors Appointed 
  Classified Board System 
  BOD Nominees Legal Proceedings 
  Fees Paid to Compensation Consultants 
  Unitary or Two Tier Board System 
  Number of Executives/Company Managers 
  ESG Linked Compensation for Board 
  Independent Chairperson 
  Former CEO or its Equivalent on Board 
  Female Chairperson or Equivalent 
  Size of Board of Corporate Auditors 
  Number of Outside Corporate Auditors 
  Number of Independent Corporate Auditors 
  Number of Corporate Executive Officers also on BOD 
  Percentage of Corp Executive Officers also on BOD 
  Number of Non Executive Directors on Board 
  Percentage of Non-Executive Directors on Board 
  Executive Director Board Duration 
  Num of Directors Attending less than 75% of Mtg 
  Family Council 
  Number of Women on Board 
  Number of Employee Representatives on the Board 
  Age of the Youngest Director 
  Age of the Oldest Director 
  Board of Directors Age Range 
  Independent Directors Board Meeting Attendance % 
 110 
  Size of Audit Committee 
  Number of Independent Directors on Audit Committee 
  Pct of Independent Directors on Audit Committee 
  Independent Audit Committee Chairperson 
  # of Non-Executive Directors on Audit Committee 
  Audit Committee Meeting Attendance Percentage 
  Size of Compensation Committee 
  Num of Independent Directors on Compensation Cmte 
  % of Independent Directors on Compensation Committee 
  Independent Compensation Committee Chairperson 
  # of Non-Executive Directors on Compensation Cmte 
  Number of Compensation Committee Meetings 
  Compensation Committee Meeting Attendance % 
  Size of Nomination Committee 
  Num of Independent Directors on Nomination Cmte 
  % of Ind Directors on Nomination Committee 
  Independent Nomination Committee Chairperson 
  # of Non-Executive Directors on Nomination Cmte 
  Number of Nomination Committee Meetings 
  Nomination Committee Meeting Attendance Percentage 
  CSR/Sustainability Committee 
  Non-Executive Director with Responsibility for CSR 
  Executive Director with Responsibility for CSR 
  Size of Fiscal Council/Fiscal Board 
  Related Party Committee 
  Strategy Committee 
  Average Length Srvc Independent Directors Brd 
 Compensation (248) 
  Board (9) 
   Total Board of Director Compensation Paid 
   Total Board of Director Fees Paid in Cash 
   Total Board of Director Stock Awards Given 
   Number of Board of Director Changes During FY 
   Date of Last Board of Directors Change 
   # Directors Included Compensation Paid During FY 
   Latest Period End Date Exec Board of Director Comp 
   Average Board of Director Total Compensation 
   Percent Board of Director Comp Pd in Stock Awards 
  Executives (239) 
   Aggregate (39) 
    Total Compensation Paid to Executives 
    Total Salaries Paid to Executives 
    Total Bonuses Paid to Executives 
    All Other Compensation Paid to Executives 
    Total Stock Awards Given to Executives 
    Total Option Awards Given to Executives 
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    Total Non Equity Incentives Given to Executives 
    Tot Pension & Nonqualified Def Pens Given to Execs 
    Total Other Compensation Paid to Executives 
    Total Salaries and Bonuses Paid to Executives 
    Number of Executive Changes During Fiscal Year 
    Date of Last Executive Change 
    # Executives Included Compensation Paid During FY 
    Tot Top Three Highest Tot Top Compensation Amt Pd 
    Total Top Three Highest Salary Amount Paid 
    Total Top Three Highest Bonus Amount Paid 
    Total Top Three Highest All Other Comp Amount Paid 
    Total Top Three Highest Stock Awards Amount Paid 
    Total Top Three Highest Option Awards Amount Paid 
    Tot Top Three Highest Non Eqty Incentive Amt Paid 
    Tot Top 3 Highest Pens Non Qual Deferred Amt Pd 
    Tot Top Three Highest Other Compensation Amt Paid 
    Tot Top Five Highest Tot Top Compensation Amt Paid 
    Total Top Five Highest Salary Amount Paid 
    Total Top Five Highest Bonus Amount Paid 
    Tot Top Five Highest All Other Compensation Amt Pd 
    Total Top Five Highest Stock Awards Amount Paid 
    Total Top Five Highest Option Awards Amount Paid 
    Total Top Five Highest Non Eqty Incentive Amt Paid 
    Tot Top Five Highest Pens Non Qual Deferred Amt Pd 
    Total Top Five Highest Other Compensation Amt Paid 
    Total Executive Pay as Percent Tot Personnel Expn 
    Total Executive Pay as Percent SG&A Net R&D 
    Total Executive Pay as Percent Operating Expense 
    Clawback Provision for Executive Compensation 
    Executive Compensation Consultant Srvcs Provided 
    Executive Comp Advisory Fees Pd to Comp Adv 
    % of Compensation Advisory Fees Paid to Comp Adv 
    Chg of Ctrl Benefits/Golden Parachute Agreements 
   C-Suites (65) 
    Total Compensation Paid to CEO and Equivalent 
    Total Salaries Paid to CEO and Equivalent 
    Total Bonuses Paid to CEO and Equivalent 
    All Other Compensation Paid to CEO and Equivalent 
    Total Stock Awards Given to CEO and Equivalent 
    Total Option Awards Given to CEO and Equivalent 
    Tot Non Eqty Incentives Given to CEO & Equivalent 
    Tot Pens & Nonqual Def Pens Given to CEO & Equivalent 
    Total Other Compensation Paid to CEO & Equivalent 
    Total Salaries & Bonuses Paid to CEO & Equivalent 
    Total Compensation Paid to CFO and Equivalent 
    Total Salaries Paid to CFO and Equivalent 
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    Total Bonuses Paid to CFO and Equivalent 
    All Other Compensation Paid to CFO and Equivalent 
    Total Stock Awards Given to CFO and Equivalent 
    Total Option Awards Given to CFO and Equivalent 
    Tot Non Eqty Incentives Given to CFO & Equivalent 
    Tot Pens & Nonqual Def Pens Given to CFO & Equivalent 
    Total Other Compensation Paid to CFO & Equivalent 
    Total Salaries & Bonuses Paid to CFO & Equivalent 
    Total Compensation Paid to COO and Equivalent 
    Total Salaries Paid to COO and Equivalent 
    Total Bonuses Paid to COO and Equivalent 
    All Other Compensation Paid to COO and Equivalent 
    Total Stock Awards Given to COO and Equivalent 
    Total Option Awards Given to COO and Equivalent 
    Tot Non Eqty Incentives Given to COO & Equivalent 
    Tot Pens & Nonqual Def Pens Given to COO & Equivalent 
    Total Other Compensation Paid to COO & Equivalent 
    Total Salaries & Bonuses Paid to COO & Equivalent 
    Total Compensation Paid to CIO and Equivalent 
    Total Salaries Paid to CIO and Equivalent 
    Total Bonuses Paid to CIO and Equivalent 
    All Other Compensation Paid to CIO and Equivalent 
    Total Stock Awards Given to CIO and Equivalent 
    Total Option Awards Given to CIO and Equivalent 
    Tot Non Eqty Incentives Given to CIO & Equivalent 
    Tot Pens & Nonqual Def Pens Given to CIO & Equivalent 
    Total Other Compensation Paid to CIO & Equivalent 
    Total Salaries & Bonuses Paid to CIO & Equivalent 
    Number of CEO and Equivalent Changes During FY 
    Compensation Linked Last CEO and Equivalent Chg Dt 
    # CEO & Equivalent Included Compensation Pd Dur FY 
    Number of CIO and Equivalent Changes During FY 
    Date of Last CIO and Equivalent Change 
    # of CIO & Equivalent Included Comp Pd Dur the FY 
    Number of CFO and Equivalent Changes During FY 
    Date of Last CFO and Equivalent Change 
    # CFO & Equivalent Included Compensation Pd Dur FY 
    Number of COO and Equivalent Changes During FY 
    Date of Last COO and Equivalent Change 
    # COO & Equivalent Included Compensation Pd Dur FY 
    Chief Executive Officer Tenure as of FY End 
    Chief Financial Officer Tenure as of FY End 
    Chief Operating Officer Tenure as of FY End 
    Latest Period End Date Exec Board of Director Comp 
    Average Executive Total Compensation 
    Average Executive Salary Plus Bonus Amount 
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    Last Chief Executive Officer Start Date 
    Last Chief Financial Officer Start Date 
    Last Chief Operating Officer Start Date 
    Last Chief Information Officer Start Date 
    Last Executive Start Date 
    Last Board Start Date 
   Ranked Figures (135) 
    Highest Total Compensation Amount Paid 
    Highest Salary Amount Paid 
    Highest Bonus Amount Paid 
    Highest All Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Highest Stock Awards Amount Paid 
    Highest Option Awards Amount Paid 
    Highest Non Equity Incentive Amount Paid 
    Highest Pension Non Qualified Deferred Amount Paid 
    Highest Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Second Highest Total Compensation Amount Paid 
    Second Highest Salary Amount Paid 
    Second Highest Bonus Amount Paid 
    Second Highest All Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Second Highest Stock Awards Amount Paid 
    Second Highest Option Awards Amount Paid 
    Second Highest Non Equity Incentive Amount Paid 
    Second Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Amt Pd 
    Second Highest Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Third Highest Total Compensation Amount Paid 
    Third Highest Salary Amount Paid 
    Third Highest Bonus Amount Paid 
    Third Highest All Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Third Highest Stock Awards Amount Paid 
    Third Highest Option Awards Amount Paid 
    Third Highest Non Equity Incentive Amount Paid 
    Third Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Amt Pd 
    Third Highest Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest Total Compensation Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest Salary Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest Bonus Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest All Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest Stock Awards Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest Option Awards Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest Non Equity Incentive Amount Paid 
    Fourth Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Amt Pd 
    Fourth Highest Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Fifth Highest Total Compensation Amount Paid 
    Fifth Highest Salary Amount Paid 
    Fifth Highest Bonus Amount Paid 
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    Fifth Highest All Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Fifth Highest Stock Awards Amount Paid 
    Fifth Highest Option Awards Amount Paid 
    Fifth Highest Non Equity Incentive Amount Paid 
    Fifth Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Amt Pd 
    Fifth Highest Other Compensation Amount Paid 
    Highest Total Compensation Paid Executive Name   
    Second Highest Tot Comp Paid Executive Name 
    Third Highest Tot Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    Fourth Highest Total Comp Paid Executive Name 
    Fifth Highest Tot Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    Highest Total Compensation Paid Executive Title   
    Second Highest Total Comp Paid Executive Title 
    Third Highest Total Comp Paid Executive Title 
    Fourth Highest Total Comp Paid Executive Title 
    Fifth Highest Tot Compensation Paid Executive Title 
    Highest Salary Paid Executive Name 
    Second Highest Salary Paid Executive Name 
    Third Highest Salary Paid Executive Name 
    Fourth Highest Salary Paid Executive Name 
    Fifth Highest Salary Paid Executive Name 
    Highest Salary Paid Executive Title 
    Second Highest Salary Paid Executive Title 
    Third Highest Salary Paid Executive Title 
    Fourth Highest Salary Paid Executive Title 
    Fifth Highest Salary Paid Executive Title 
    Highest Bonus Paid Executive Name 
    Second Highest Bonus Paid Executive Name 
    Third Highest Bonus Paid Executive Name 
    Fourth Highest Bonus Paid Executive Name 
    Fifth Highest Bonus Paid Executive Name 
    Highest Bonus Paid Executive Title 
    Second Highest Bonus Paid Executive Title 
    Third Highest Bonus Paid Executive Title 
    Fourth Highest Bonus Paid Executive Title 
    Fifth Highest Bonus Paid Executive Title 
    Highest All Other Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    Second Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Name 
    Third Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Name 
    Fourth Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Name 
    Fifth Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Name 
    Highest All Other Comp Paid Executive Title 
    Second Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Title 
    Third Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Title 
    Fourth Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Title 
    Fifth Highest All Other Comp Paid Exec Title 
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    Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Second Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Third Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Fourth Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Fifth Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Second Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Third Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Fourth Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Fifth Highest Stock Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Second Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Third Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Fourth Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Fifth Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Name 
    Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Second Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Third Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Fourth Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Fifth Highest Option Awards Paid Executive Title 
    Highest Non Equity Incentive Paid Executive Name 
    Second Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Nm 
    Third Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Nm 
    Fourth Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Nm 
    Fifth Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Nm 
    Highest Non Equity Incentive Paid Executive Title 
    2nd Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Title 
    3rd Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Title 
    4th Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Title 
    5th Highest Non Eqty Incentive Pd Executive Title 
    Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Name 
    2nd Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Name 
    3rd Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Name 
    4th Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Name 
    5th Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Name 
    Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Title 
    2nd Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Ttl 
    3rd Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Ttl 
    4th Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Ttl 
    5th Highest Pension Non Qual Deferred Pd Exec Ttl 
    Highest Other Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    2nd Highest Other Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    3rd Highest Other Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    4th Highest Other Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    5th Highest Other Compensation Paid Executive Name 
    Highest Other Compensation Paid Executive Title 
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    2nd Highest Other Compensation Pd Executive Title 
    3rd Highest Other Compensation Pd Executive Title 
    4th Highest Other Compensation Pd Executive Title 
    5th Highest Other Compensation Pd Executive Title 
Executives (31) 
 # Executives Holding Shares 
 % Executives Holding Shares 
 % Shares Outstanding Held by Executives 
 CEO Name 
 Chair Name 
 Lead Director Name 
 # Exec Positions Chair Holds 
 # Board Positions Chair Holds 
 # Exec Positions CEO Holds 
 # Board Positions CEO Holds 
 CEO Founder (Y/N) 
 Avg # of Public Comp BOD Serve as BOD (Ex-CEO) 
 # of Non-Executive Board Members on 3+ Boards 
 # Executive Directors on 2+ Boards 
 # Audit Committee Members on 3+ Boards 
 Insiders on Audit Committee 
 Insiders on Comp Committee 
 Insiders on Nomination Committee 
 IR Contact Name 
 IR Phone Number 
 IR Email Address 
 IR Address First Line 
 IR Address Second Line 
 IR Address Third Line 
 Number of Executives / Company Managers 
 CEO or Equivalent Appointed from Within 
 Female Chief Executive Officer or Equivalent 
 Corporate Executive Officer System Indicator 
 Number of Female Executives 
 Percentage of Female Executives 
 Women Management to Employees Ratio 
Other (8) 
 Political Donations 
 Business Ethics Policy 
 Executive Compensation Linked to ESG 
 Employee Protection / Whistle Blower Policy 
 Anti-Bribery Ethics Policy 
 Unequal Voting Rights Stocks Issued Includes Pfd 
 Political Donations/Profit Before Tax 
 Governance Disclosure Score 
Practice (2) 
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 Blank Check Preferred Authorized 
 Dual Class Unequal Voting Rights 
Shareholder (11) 
 % Ownership Required for Special Meeting 
 Say On Pay Provision 
 Poison Pill Plan 
 Shareholder Approved Poison Pill 
 Poison Pill TIDE Provision 
 Poison Pill Sunset Provision 
 % Poison Pill Trigger Threshold 
 Frequency of Say on Pay Votes 
 Say on Pay Number of Votes FOR 
 Say on Pay Number of Votes AGAINST 
 Say on Pay Support Level  
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 Appendix F – Excerpts from SEC filings on climate change and CDP disclosures 
Example 1A – Microsoft Corporation, SEC filing on climate change 
The following excerpt comes from the Microsoft Corporation Form 10-K for the fiscal year 
ended 6/30/2012, filed on 7/26/2012. It appears in the section titled “Item 1A. Risk Factors”, and 
is the second to last factor listed in the section on page 21 of the report (emphasis added): 
 
“Catastrophic events or geo-political conditions may disrupt our business. A disruption or 
failure of our systems or operations because of a major earthquake, weather event, cyber-attack, 
terrorist attack, or other catastrophic event could cause delays in completing sales, providing 
services, or performing other mission-critical functions…The long-term effects of climate 
change on the global economy in general or the information technology industry in particular 
are unclear. Environmental regulations or changes in the supply, demand or available sources 
of energy may affect the availability or cost of goods and services, including natural resources, 
necessary to run our business. Changes in weather where we operate may increase the costs of 
powering and cooling computer hardware we use to develop software and provide cloud-based 
services. New regulations may require us to find alternative compliant and cost-effective 
methods of distributing our products and services.” 
 
Example 1B – Microsoft Corporation, CDP disclosure 
The following excerpts come from the Microsoft Corporation Investor CDP 2012 disclosure for 
the year ended 12/31/2011 (emphasis added): 
 
Module: Introduction 
Page: Introduction 
Item: 0.1 
Introduction 
Please give a general description and introduction to your organization 
 
“We know that climate change is a serious challenge that requires a comprehensive and 
global response from all sectors of society. We are committed to measuring, transparently 
reporting, and reducing the carbon footprint of our own operations. We are also searching for 
opportunities to minimize our environmental impact, reduce waste, and conserve water and other 
raw materials. In pursuing these goals, we follow strict policies to ensure that the company 
remains fully compliant with international environmental regulations and the specific 
environmental requirements of each country/region where we do business.” 
 
Module: Risks and Opportunities 
Page: 2012-Investor Risks & Opps – Climate Change Risks 
Items: 5.1, 5.1e, and 5.1f 
 
5.1 
Have you identified any climate change risks (current or future) that have potential to 
generate a substantive change in your business operations, revenue or expenditure? Tick 
all that apply 
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“Risks driven by changes in regulation 
Risks driven by changes in physical climate parameters 
Risks driven by changes in other climate-related developments” 
 
5.1e 
Please describe your risks that are driven by changes in other climate-related developments 
“Risk Driver: Reputation 
Description: Nature of the effect: The IT industry as a whole is drawing increased attention for 
its impact on the environment and climate change, and consumers, businesses, and 
institutional investors are increasingly making investment decisions based on how 
environmentally responsible companies are. Microsoft is one of the largest IT organizations in 
the world, and so the perceived impact of our products and services on the environment is 
heightened. If Microsoft does not appear to take measures to reduce its impact on climate 
change to the same or greater extent as our competitors, we could potentially lose business. 
Location of the effect: Microsoft's reputation has implications globally because we operate 
throughout the world; in our experience, the area where businesses and consumers emphasize 
climate change the most in their buying decisions currently is in Europe, where environmental 
issues are gaining the greatest attention.  
Potential Impact: Reduced demand for goods/services 
Timeframe: Current 
Direct/Indirect: Direct 
Likelihood: Likely 
Magnitude of Impact: Unknown” 
 
5.1f 
Please describe (i) the potential financial implications of the risk before taking action; (ii) 
the methods you are using to manage this risk; (iii) the costs associated with these actions 
 
(i) Financial implications: “Without knowing the magnitude of impact of this risk, it is 
difficult to quantify the potential financial implications. However, theoretically if we 
were to lose—for example—3% of our business to competitors because of a perceived 
insufficient investment in climate change mitigation, the result could be a 3% 
reduction in revenue. In 2011, that would have been worth >$2 billion USD.” 
(ii) Management: “We are actively working on an internal footprint reduction strategy to get 
our own house in order and reduce the impact of Microsoft operations on the 
environment. As part of this strategy we have set a goal to reduce Microsoft greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions by 30% per unit of revenue by 2012 from our 2007 baseline. 
Changes we are making to reduce our footprint include: 
o We are implementing an energy management program that will drive systematic 
energy efficiencies across our offices in Puget Sound, WA; based on the results 
of our initial pilot, we expect 6-10% energy savings for the campus. Ultimately, 
we plan to expand this program globally. 
 
Microsoft is a board member and active participant in several industry consortia to 
drive energy efficiency in the design and use of IT, including The Green Grid, The 
Climate Savers Computing Initiative, and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GESI). 
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We are also among the founding members of the ICT for Energy Efficiency (ICT4EE) 
Forum. 
 
Finally, we proactively communicate with the public and stakeholders about our efforts 
to reduce our impact on climate change, such as through annual Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) reporting, our Software Enabled Earth blog (http://blogs.msdn.com/b/see), 
and our annual Citizenship Report (www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship). In 
2011, Computerworld recognized our efforts to reduce energy use by naming Microsoft 
one of the top green IT vendors. 
 
By making strategic investments to reduce our own footprint, deliver energy-efficient 
products and services, and participate globally in the movement to use ICT to mitigate 
the effects of climate change, it should be unlikely that Microsoft’s reputation will 
suffer as a result of our approach to climate change (in fact, we may even improve our 
reputation), and the magnitude of any impact should be low. In terms of timeframe, we 
are already seeing the benefits of these efforts.” 
 
(iii) Costs: “Our investments in an internal footprint reduction strategy include labor costs 
and capital outlay. We anticipate having upwards of 50 FTEs contributing to footprint 
reduction activities at ~$7.5 million in annual salaries. The energy management program 
will cost <5% of the annual energy costs for our Puget Sound campus. For the lab 
chargeback model in Puget Sound, it cost $1.8 million to implement the monitoring 
systems; there are no additional costs other than labor costs of ~$4,000/year to compile 
lab chargeback data. Constructing new data centers that use adiabatic cooling over 
traditional large chillers does not add costs; in fact, it is typically 30% cheaper. In 
addition, ultimately we will save money through reduced maintenance and energy costs. 
There are modest capital expenses to retrofit our existing facilities for increased 
efficiency; however, these costs are minimal and typically quickly repaid through 
reduced operating expenses. Any additional costs are primarily labor costs, which 
represent ~$250,000-500,000/facility annually”  
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